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ABSTRACT
This historical dissertation examines the intersectionality of sanctions, war and autocratic
rule as it manifested itself on Iraqi university campuses and, more specifically, the
impact on female students. While much has been written on Iraq, we have yet to
understand the academic, personal and professional toll it took on university students
between the onset of the Saddam regime in 1979 and 2005, three years after the Allied
Invasion. This is a unique opportunity to study a higher education system that once held
an esteemed regional reputation and is now greatly eroded.  Our ability to generate
historical research on this population enhances our knowledge of the role political and
economic events play on university campuses. The historical method was employed in
this dissertation and expanded upon by Iraqi women’s narratives.  Primary and
contextual sources were collected, coded and reconstructed thematically and
chronologically.  Findings included increasing obstacles and restrictions placed on
academic freedom and women’s higher education opportunities as the regime increased
its power. Iraqi women reported that the decade of sanctions was the most damaging to
their college learning but that current civil unrest and rising Islamist factions are greatly
hindering their ability to achieve academic goals. The intersectionality of three wars
(First Gulf, Iran-Iraq and Second Gulf Wars), shifting Saddamist law concerning
women’s rights, and international sanctions diminished women’s learning, social and
professional engagements at Iraqi universities.  Efforts to rehabilitate Iraqi higher
education must include international partnerships, expatriate alumni participation, gender





Iraq’s higher education system was once a shining jewel in the Middle East.1  Jointly
imbued with ancient Mesopotamian heritage and Arabic scholarship, Iraqi universities
prided themselves on their academic standards, western trained faculty and rapidly
growing student population. At the onset of the Saddam Hussein regime in 1979, the
government aggressively pursued further higher education objectives as well as political,
social, and economic access for women.  Saddamist rhetoric encouraged women to
persist in their educational and career goals and several laws were enacted to protect
these burgeoning opportunities. Unfortunately for these women, Saddam was both fair-
weather and ruthless.  As Iraq suffered through the Iran-Iraq War (1981-1988), First Gulf
War (1991), UN imposed sanctions (1991-2003) and affiliated air strikes, it became a
totalitarian state ruled by terror and dominated by chronic deprivation.  When the United
States and allied nations deposed Saddam in the Second Gulf War (2003), conditions
only worsened in Iraq.  Amidst this quarter century of devastation, more than twenty Iraqi
universities continued serving students, including thousands of Iraqi women. The story of
Iraqi students, who refused to give up on the promise of higher education, has yet to be
told.  This dissertation restories how university students, especially women, experienced
deprivation, foreign occupation, tyranny, radicalism and violence.
                                                




Iraq’s twenty-two million inhabitants live in a country of contrasts.  To the north is the
forested mountain region of Kurdistan; to the south, what were once fertile marshlands;
and in the west a formidable desert climate.  Baghdad, in central Iraq, sits on the famed
Tigris River, enduring scorching summers but pleasant winters.  Iraq’s contrasts are not
only geographic; its collective identity has undergone numerous metamorphoses. Once
part of the Ottoman Empire, the British occupied Iraq beginning in the First World War.
In 1932, Iraq became an independent kingdom and in 1958 declared itself a republic.  In
truth, Iraqis lived under a cycle of dictatorships and coups.  Once the Baath’s bastardized
form of socialism2 began to dominate Iraqi governance, establishing pan-Arabism
became a priority.3 Soon, this mutated to fostering Iraqi nationalism, independent of
regional movements.4 It was at this time that Saddam Hussein rose in the Baath ranks,
becoming Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council as well as Director
of Internal Security (1968).  In 1979, President al-Bakr, who was instrumental in
Saddam’s advancement, was removed from office and Saddam named president.
                                                
2 Samir Al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Inside Story of the Saddam’s Iraq (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1989), 255.
3 Pan-Arabism is a nationalist ideology stressing commonality amongst Arab nations, especially
in their opposition to Western forays into the region.
4 Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear, 208.
3
Following Iran’s Islamic Revolution, Saddam declared war on Iran in 1980, using the
pretext of disputed border territories.5  In the eight-year conflict, up to 300,000 Iraqis
were killed – the deadliest war in Iraqi history.  As the war drew to a close, Saddam
intensified attacks against Kurdistan, the northern, semi-autonomous region he wanted
brought to heel.  During the 1988 Anfal Campaign (Anfal means “spoils of war”), 4,000
Kurdish villages were razed and thousands of Kurds succumbed to nerve gas attacks.
In the same decade, central and southern Iraq witnessed great progress.  When Iraq
nationalized petroleum reserves (1972), GDP instantly increased five-fold; as of 2004,
75% of Iraq’s GDP still originates from the sale of oil.6   Iraq now had the resources to
concentrate on infrastructure, much of which went to education at all levels.  The
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MOHE) was reorganized and
from the onset, ordered to promote Baathist ideology, including anti-Western
propaganda.  This ambition has always manifested itself as a challenge in Iraqi
universities.  Prior to the 1990’s, many faculty members were trained in Europe or the
United States and Iraq’s developing infrastructure relied heavily on western technology.
Hence, Iraqi engineers, doctors, architects and so forth appreciated and put to use what
they learned abroad.  This has led to a fissure between the humanities and hard sciences,
one limited to endorsing regime practices and the latter trying to modernize it with
western practices.
                                                
5 George Packer, “Testing Ground,” New Yorker, February 28, 2005,
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/050228fa_fact.
4
In 1991, after boasting he had weapons of mass destruction, Saddam invaded Kuwait.
UN-affiliated forces, most of which were American, bombed Iraq when he refused to
withdraw.  At the same time, the UN imposed Resolution 661 that prohibited the
purchase of any commodities originating in Iraq, reasoning that Saddam’s regime could
not survive without their multi-billion annual oil sales.  Instead, Saddam sold oil through
illegal channels and pocketed the income for himself (he further exploited the sanctions
program when the 1996 Oil-for-Food Resolution was put into place). Whom embargoes
did greatly harm were the Iraqi people.  Throughout the 1990’s, Iraqis endured massive
food and medicine shortages, decimated municipal services, and rampant inflation not
matched by income gains.  Corrupt government practices and a black market quickly took
hold.7  Those who supported the Baath lived slightly better than most Iraqis (mainly
through job security) but almost everyone outside Saddam’s inner circle encountered
tremendous hardships.
Sanctions eviscerated higher education gains8 made in the 1980’s by also prohibiting the
sale of educational materials to Iraq. From 1991 until 2003, the majority of Iraqi students
have been prevented from study abroad or updating study materials. Even today, with the
US’s stated commitment to an open Iraqi society, university students have very few
                                                                                                                                                
6 US Commerce Department Report (2004), quoted in Riverbend, Baghdad Burning: Girl Blog
from Iraq (New York: The Feminist Press, 2005), xv.
7 Joseph Braude, The New Iraq: Rebuilding the Country for Its People, the Middle East and the
World (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 120.
8 Riverbend, Baghdad Burning, 132.
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opportunities to go abroad, enter into international research collaborations, and have not
received sufficient donations of modern textbooks, computers and lab equipment.
Western scholars are just now beginning to understand the scholastic repercussions of
sanctions, imagining their own professional development devoid of journal subscriptions,
internet research and modern lab equipment.
Taken independently, dictatorship, wars, and trade embargoes can severely erode the
educational infrastructure of any country, let alone one in the Developing World. In Iraq,
these events occurred in a coinciding, intersectional fashion (a discussion of the term
intersectionality can be found in Appendix A).  The repercussions for Iraqi universities
were devastating: student and faculty attrition; severe limitations on academic freedom;
destruction of campus buildings and library collections; isolation from the outside
academic world and violent incursions on campuses.  Add to this the continual
deterioration of women’s freedoms, whether by political, criminal, military or social
forces.  As of 2005, Iraq’s university women are struggling to make it to classes safely
and, once there, find few resources to guide their college learning.  A more complete
discussion on the status of Iraqi women, in historical context, follows.
Focus of Study
Iraq provides a unique opportunity to study how concurrent external phenomena, such as
militarism, civil violence and dominant ideologies, manifest themselves on university
campuses. This research distinguishes itself with an emphasis on female university
6
students. It is not a comparative study – reflecting the experiences of female students
against those of their male peers.  Instead, this research centers on Iraqi universities in
historical context, often including but not limited to the perspective of its female students.
However, there were many instances where I found it necessary to stress that men
struggled equally under the regime, sanctions, occupation and numerous wars.
Employing historiographic methods, this dissertation will restory salient developments
and events as they relate to Iraqi higher education from the 1979 onset of Saddam’s
regime until 2005, two years after the Allied Invasion of Iraq.  In addition to targeted
research on female students, the study is partially limited to experiences at the
Universities of Baghdad, Basra and Technology.  A full discussion of methodology can
be found in Appendix A.
It is impossible to examine the impact wars, economic stressors and the Baath autocracy
had on the Iraqi campus in isolation of one another because these events and their
repercussions acted in concurrence.  Given the timeframe of this study, most Iraqi
students have always lived under a dictator, struggled to secure basic commodities, and
witnessed military and criminal violence in their communities. “Normal” campus life in
2005 Iraq consists of students using photocopied, outdated textbooks, classrooms where
everything has been looted down to the outlet covers, and tanks rolling across campus
7
lawns.9  Students are now entering a second decade of acute learning deprivation.  They
lack current materials, qualified instructors, collegial research opportunities and, most
significantly, a stable higher education infrastructure.
The consequences of regime rule, wars, and trade embargoes cannot be measured in
material losses alone. Female students (as well as their male peers) have lost their
collective sense that vibrant higher learning and gratifying careers await them.  This was
a promise made to women in Saddam’s vision of a utopian Socialist Iraq.  Until the
1990’s, Iraqi college-educated women were well represented in most white-collar sectors,
especially engineering and the medical sciences.10  However, due to sanctions and
rampant Baathist cronyism, the value of an Iraqi college degree diminished greatly.11
Today, many Iraqi women express a desire to complete their studies abroad.  When a
nation’s university students place little value on their own higher education system, the
road back to international prestige is formidable.
This historical dissertation has significance across multiple disciplines and, hopefully, the
potential to impact US policy in Iraq and the willingness of the international higher
education community to offer sustained, collegial assistance to Iraqi universities.  A
                                                
9 Beriwan Khailany, Deputy Minister of MOHE, Iraq, “Department of Higher Education and
Scientific Research: Iraq after the War,” speech delivered at the University of Oklahoma (Al
Sharaka Program for Higher Education in Iraq, April 27, 2004).
10 Samir Al-Khalil, Republic of Fear, 88.  Doreen Ingrams, The Awakened: Women in Iraq
(London: Third World Centre for Research and Publishing, 1983), 121-122.
11 Nadje Al-Ali, “Reconstructing Gender: Iraqi Women between Dictatorship, War, Sanctions and
Occupation,” Third World Quarterly, 26 no. 4-5 (2005), 747.
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popular hadith12 says, “A woman acts for the people.”  The ability of Iraqi women to
regain the collective educational ground they lost during the past two decades greatly
influences their country’s prospects in terms of civil liberties, economic opportunity and
international relations.
Previous Studies on Iraqi Women and Iraq’s Education System
The theoretical frameworks in which Iraqi education and its female students have been
examined are problematic.  While there is plentiful literature on Iraqi women, nearly
none of it centers on university experiences.  Many of these studies examine the lives of
Iraqi women who are either functionally illiterate and poor or already established in their
professional fields.  Other Iraqi women studies are situated in Islamic familial structures;
survival strategies under tyranny; political advocacy and advancement; or health issues
under sanctions.  Western scholarship on Middle Eastern women has always and in all
ways been challenged to view our subjects beyond victimhood.  All too often, we
encapsulate their identity to whether they must wear the hijab or abaya;13 familial
relations; adult literacy; and issues of poverty and refugee status.14
One methodological pitfall pertaining to Iraqi women is a heavy reliance on documents
generated by the General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW).  The GFIW was the only
                                                
12 Islamic proverb not found in the Qur'an but attributed to the Prophet Mohammed.
13 The hijab is the head covering worn by some Islamic women; the abaya is the full-length
garment.
9
sanctioned national women’s organization during Saddam’s rule and no more than a
Baath mouthpiece. While the GFIW made considerable progress in eradicating female
illiteracy, more intensive (and objective) research indicates that the GFIW had no right to
self-govern or set their agendas.15  The function of the GFIW was to indoctrinate Iraqi
women and enroll them as laborers in Saddam’s vision of an Arab superpower. For
research relying solely on regime-sanctioned publications and interviews of Baath-
approved study participants,16 the resulting analyses are far from the reality of many Iraqi
women’s lives. One such illustration is Doreen Ingrams who presents the GFIW as truly
empowering and Saddam as their kindly patron.17  To be fair, Iraqi women made
considerable educational, personal, and professional gains in the 1980’s.  Nonetheless,
Ingrams fails to stipulate that the Revolutionary Command Council (which was entirely
comprised of men)18 established the GFIW to institutionalize women’s conformity to
Saddam’s pan-Arab agenda.   Instead she uses vague language such as GFIW “members
are expected to be in sympathy with the ruling Baath Party.”19
                                                                                                                                                
14 Haleh Afshar, “Development Studies and Women in the Middle East: Dilemmas of Research
and Development” in Women in the Middle East: Perceptions, Realities and Struggles for
Liberation, ed. Haleh Afshar (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 6-7.
15 Nadje Al-Ali, “Reconstructing Gender,” 754.
16 As illustrated in Jan Goodwin, Price of Honor: Muslim Women Lift the Veil of Silences on the
Islamic World (New York: Plume Publishing, 2003), 224. Foreign researchers were often
assigned a Ministry of Information “translator” whose primary function was to limit who the
researcher spoke to and report back to the Ministry on daily activities.
17 Doreen Ingrams, The Awakened, 111-112.
18 Deborah Cobbett, “Women in Iraq,” in Saddam’s Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?, ed. CARDI
(Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq, United Kingdom: Zed Books,
1990), 127.
19 Doreen Ingrams, The Awakened, 112.
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The methods and biases that western scholars assume when studying Middle Eastern
women must be questioned.20  All too often, we posit that our concepts of gender equality
existing (or that should exist) in Western culture are applicable to the Middle East.  This
fails to consider what Islam means to Middle Eastern women, notions of postcolonial
national identity, and the fact that, in Iraq’s mere forty-eight years of independence, it
endured numerous coups, wars, and dictatorial rule.  Haleh Afshar contends, “We must
address critically both the tools and the results of prevalent analysis and root out hidden
assumptions.”21 The ability to place the experiences of Iraqi women in the appropriate
context -- understanding the milieu in which they live -- has yet to be fully achieved by
historical and women’s studies scholarship.  In regard to this study, there are very few
academic publications that discuss the formative university experience as it pertains to
Iraqi women. However, overall, studies of Iraqi universities and all students’ experiences
of such are lacking in the field of comparative higher education.
Research on Iraq’s education system concentrates predominantly on primary and
secondary school levels and adult literacy programs, especially prior to 2003.  Since the
Allied Invasion, numerous media outlets and a select group of academics have explored
the current dire state of Iraqi higher education.  Journalists and scholars repeatedly iterate
that Iraqi higher education was the regional model, superior in its research output and
academic rigor. However, since there were few comparative higher education studies
prior to our current engagements in Iraq, it appears as if many in the academic
                                                
20 Haleh Afshar, “Development Studies and Women in the Middle East,” 3-17.
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community are surprised to learn about the past glory of the higher education system and
our complicity in its near demise.  Keith Watenpaugh, in an expanded dialogue on the
war in Iraq and its impact on higher education, chastises:
Sometimes, I think we are, as a community of humane
scholars, sleepwalking through the most important crisis
of our lifetimes and we will look back on the legal, civil
and moral outrages committed in the name of War on
Terror with the same embarrassment we now view the
internment of Japanese Americans or the communist
Witch Hunts of the 1950’s.  Elements of the so-called
War on Terror and certainly the war in Iraq have been
predicated on purposeful misinformation, rank ethnocentrism,
bad language skills and poor analysis – the things we
college professors are supposed to be good at counteracting
and helping students and society overcome.22
Significance of Study
Historical narratives of Iraq’s universities, enhanced by participant interviews, elevate
our scholarly analyses of modern Iraq and serve as case studies -- illustrating how higher
education reacts and adapts to external political, social and economic pressures.  By
specifically examining the experiences of Iraqi female students, we reframe the academic
gaze used to study Middle Eastern women and schooling systems.  There remains a
vibrant, scholarly debate on the purpose of research.  Are our objectives, as scholars and
researchers, purely epistemological or do we also want to be agents of change?  Can we
write about human struggles and acute suffering absent of emotive currents emerging in
                                                                                                                                                
21 Ibid, 6.
22 Keith Watenpaugh, “Rebuilding Iraq’s Academic Community and Challenges of Civil Society
in Civil War,” speech delivered to Center for Arab and Islamic Studies, Villanova University
(Philadelphia, September 9, 2004).
12
our scholarship? Ruth Behar speaks of the appropriate objectivity required: “We need
other forms of criticism, which are rigorous yet not disinterested; forms of criticism
which are not immune to catharsis.”23
When choosing to research a topic as evocative as this, not acknowledging one’s visceral
reactions does not demonstrate objectivity, only apathy.  Instead, by relying upon
multiple perspectives, narrative objectivity is more nearly achieved. The implications of
this proposed work go beyond a simple enrichment of current scholarship.  Karl Hostetler
writes:
Good research is a matter not only of sound procedures
but also of beneficial aims and results.  Our ultimate aim as
researchers and practitioners is to serve people’s well-being –
the well-being of students, teachers, communities and others.24
This research may galvanize entities able to extend educational resources to Iraq to do so
promptly.  This includes all foreign governments currently involved in Iraq’s
reconstruction but also universities around the world that value academic freedom and
communities of genuine higher learning.  To date, the response record of both has been
substandard.25 In the case of Iraq, higher education entities should inform themselves
                                                
23Ruth Behar, The Vulnerable Observer: Anthropology that Breaks your Heart (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1996), 175.
24 Karl Hostetler, “What is ‘Good’ Education Research?” Educational Researcher 34, no. 6
(2005): 17.
25 See, for example, Keith Watenpaugh, “Between Saddam and the American Occupation: Iraq’s
Academic Community Struggles for Autonomy,” Academe 90, no. 5 (2004).  David Jobbins, “Aid
to Iraq Starts to Flow but More Help is Needed,” The Times Higher Education Supplement,
March 4, 2005, 13. Andrew Albanese and Michael Rogers, “Iraqi Libraries Devastated in War,”
Library Journal 128, no. 9 (May 15, 2003),
http://www.libraryjournal.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA296431.
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thoroughly prior to extending well-intentioned assistance. Not to do so results in
misguided and inappropriate interventions. As a contemporary case in point, it makes
little sense to build new classrooms and laboratories if there is no safe means for women
to travel to class.26
Regarding Iraqi women’s ability to determine their own futures, Haleh Afshar speaks of
“research as a liberating strategy.”27 By converting testimonies of lived experience into
reliable and valid data, we generate context and space for transformative, sustainable
change.  Afshar urges researchers to dismantle both the patriarchal ideology that
dominates women’s lives as well as our own assumptive analyses that render scholarly
judgments.28 Research such as this may inform women’s advocacy and humanitarian aid
agencies on how higher education is connected to national gender integration. For
example, a 2002 UNESCO Report argues that limitations placed on women at the
undergraduate level, whether they originate from cultural, economic or institutional
barriers, are a leading cause of women’s inability to assume leadership in both
professional fields and at their own universities.29
                                                                                                                                                
I would agree with these assessments.  As of 2006, Iraqi universities, while for the most part,
operational, still lack critical infrastructure and materials to provide university schooling that
meets both the nation’s demands and expectations of academic leadership.
26In 2003, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) awarded $20 million in grants
to five US university consortiums to rebuild Iraq’s higher education. None of these consortiums
prioritized the issue of safe student commutes.
27 Haleh Afshar, “Development Studies and Women in the Middle East,” 5.
28 Ibid, 5.
29 UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations), Women and
Management in Higher Education (Paris: UNESCO, 2002), 31.
14
Conceptualizing the role gender plays in this study merits special discussion.  Women’s
studies and affiliated scholarship is augmented by in-depth studies of Iraqi university
women, which can provide new illustrations of gendering practices.  John Tosh writes,
“Gender is knowledge,”30 while Catharine Stimpson defines it as the “architecture of
femininity and masculinity” or “patterns of behavior that men and women, as men and
women, learn, act out and act on.”31  Stimpson emphasizes that studies of women beyond
US borders “can challenge our affluent, but tacky, provincialism…repudiat[ing] loftier
American generalizations about women as a globally common group.”32 Gender
manifests itself within “prevailing ideologies and norms, in laws, in citizenship rights, in
political dynamics…and economics.”33  One means in which Iraq promulgated Baath
nationalism was by exploiting gender integration efforts.  Saddam’s regime demanded
ever-shifting roles for the ideal Iraqi woman.  She must, at different times, be a
professional, a fruitful mother (putting childbirth before education), educate the illiterate,
educate her family and neighbors on Baath ideology, report family and neighbors for any
suspicious behavior and, ultimately, be a symbol of the newly “enlightened” Iraq34 under
the magnanimous Saddam Hussein.35
                                                
30 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 3rd ed. (London: Pearson, 2000), 187.
31 Catharine Stimpson, “Women’s Studies: The Idea and the Ideas,” Liberal Education 73, no. 4
(1987), 37.
32 Ibid, 36.
33 Nadje Al-Ali, “Reconstructing Gender,” 740.
34 Saddam Hussein, The Revolution and Woman in Iraq (Baghdad: Translation and Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1981), 11.
35 Ibid, 740.
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While the US has an abundance of media pundits postulating their theories, the American
public lacks a multidisciplinary, academic conceptualization of why Iraq is mired in its
current situation.  As an illustration, Americans often assume that Iraqi, Saudi and
Afghani women are essentially the same – same faith, same oppression, same ethnicity.
This is as valid as stating that Canadian and Mexican women are identical because they
live on a shared continent.  The academic community should make efforts to counteract
this collective naiveté, and yet we lack both the studies and the personnel to do so. For
instance, of today’s 1,084 U.S. international relations professors, nearly half teach
extensively on Middle Eastern issues and yet only 7% can be considered regional
experts.36
Overview of Iraq’s Higher Education System
Prior to Baath rule in the 1970’s, Iraq maintained a handful of colleges, each under the
guidance of an affiliated ministry -- Baghdad’s College of Medicine was managed by the
Ministry of Health; teachers’ colleges came under the auspices of the Ministry of
Education; veterinary and agriculture studies were developed by the Ministry of
Agriculture, and so forth.37 College leadership and ministry relations were the
responsibility of campus deans.38  Due to numerous factors, Iraqi higher education
boomed in the 1970’s.  In the decade ending in 1980, the number of Iraqis ages nineteen
                                                
36 Susan Petersen, Michael J. Tierney and Daniel Maliniak, “Inside the Ivory Tower,” Foreign
Policy, November/December 2005, 58.
37 Mustafa Al-Abideen, “A Comparative Study of the Perceptions and Expectations of Deans and
Faculty Members Regarding the Functions of the College Dean at the University of Basrah,”
(PhD diss., Vanderbilt University, 1979), 4.
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to twenty-three grew from 685,000 to 1,014,000 (32% growth rate).39  While in 1970
only 30% of high school graduates enrolled as college freshman, by 1980 the rate
increased to 50%.40  Female participation rates were even more dramatic.  While the
overall increase of male university students in the 1970’s rose by 122%, it skyrocketed to
173% for women.  By 1980, one-third of all Iraqi university students were female.41
As the Baath cemented their powerbase, a vision for centralized higher education
emerged. Revolutionary Command Council Mandate 342 (1969) ordered the abolishment
“of all colleges and institutions of higher learning and [to organize] a new structure of
higher education with a strong intention to integrate national development.”42  In the next
year, the MOHE was formally instated. The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific
Research, by its very name, made explicit that the Iraqi government sought to generate
and control applicable scientific and technological advances.  Furthermore, Baath
indoctrination became mandatory curricula. In the late 1970’s the MOHE issued the
following:
New syllabuses must at once be prepared for every level from
nursery school to university, inspired by the principles of the party
and Revolution … reactionary bourgeois and liberal ideas and
trends in the syllabus and the educational institutions must be rooted
out.  The new generation must be immunized against ideologies and
cultures conflicting with our Arab nation’s basic aspirations and its
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aim for unity, liberty and socialism.43
Yousif Hamame argues that the centralization of Iraq’s higher education system, akin to
similar movements in the Middle East, evolved primarily “to meet a particular need
for…specialized manpower.”44  Nationalization of Iraq’s oil reserves in 1972 made Iraq
considerably wealthier and the Baath immediately drew up ambitious infrastructure
development plans.  By 1980, Iraq had six internationally recognized universities with the
University of Baghdad especially well regarded.  While prior to the 1970’s, many high
school graduates pursued university educations because they were not able to secure
suitable employment,45 the hiring boon generated by nationalizing petroleum resources
created the greatest impetus for higher education development --although couched in the
language of an ideological revolution. Iraqi national mandates included decrees such as:
“[The goal of higher education is to] modernize and expand science, technology, and
research programmes to meet political, military, economic and social needs of the
state.”46  The emphasis on political and military objectives and the omission of the arts,
humanities and social sciences forebodes many of the struggles Iraqi universities faced in
the ensuing decades.  For women, Saddam’s tyranny eventually rendered pointless all the
promises he made toward their professional advancement.
                                                
43 ABSP (Arab Baathist Socialist Party) Political Report cited in Samir Al-Khalil, Republic of
Fear, 85.
44 Yousif Hamame, “Higher Education and Labour Market,” 78.
45 Ibid, 113.
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Until the Allied Occupation, Iraqi higher education remained highly centralized –
although no impression should be given that the MOHE itself was an autonomous
agency.  Like all government entities, MOHE operations were extensions of Saddam’s
tyranny and were wholly dependent on the regime for their viability and funding.  The
MOHE was a considerable bureaucracy, tasked to oversee:
• All public university and technical institute admissions, including which
universities students would attend.
• Granting travel permission and scholarships to study abroad.
• Accrediting all public institutes of higher learning.
• Hiring, promotion and termination of all university staff.
• Development and dissemination of all higher education curriculum and
courses of study.
• Managing the national higher education budget. This included approving
requests for any campus construction as well as textbook, library, lab,
computer purchases, etc.
Admission into Iraq’s universities remains based entirely on baccalaureate exam scores
taken during the last year of high school. Students can list their university and department
preferences but, ultimately, the choice is left to the MOHE.47  Entrance into medical and
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engineering colleges are the most competitive,48 followed by scientific and non-medical,
pre-professional studies.  One female lawyer recounted her university admission
experience: “I had not planned to enter the law profession…[i]nstead, I had intended to
enter the College of Administration and Economic[s]; but I found that I had been
accepted by the College of Law and Politics despite my wish.”49
The Iraqi academic year begins in early October and ends in June with final exams each
semester.  Undergraduate degrees in the sciences, arts, and engineering fields are four-
year programs; veterinary, pharmacology and dentistry studies require five years;
achieving an MD requires six.  Humanities students may select either the BA or BSc
route.50  Faculty hierarchy is akin to the US model: professors report to department
chairs; department chairs report to deans but deans can report directly to the university
president.51  Lecturers (graduate students or adjunct faculty), assistant professors and full
professors provide Iraqi university instruction and achieving tenured status is more a
function of MOHE promotion than peer review.  Administrative and faculty
advancement, especially in the higher echelons, required loyalty oaths to and membership
within the Baath Party. 52 These loyalty oaths should not be construed similar to those
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taken by American faculty.  Instead, Iraqi faculty vowed to uphold party objectives as
well as report colleagues and students involved in suspected anti-Baathist activities.
Iraq currently maintains twenty public universities as well as numerous technical
institutes.53   Among the public universities are more than 200 colleges and 600 academic
departments. It is a testament to Iraqi perseverance that, in the weeks after the 2003
invasion, 240,000 students (80% of the total student body) returned to their university
studies54 (of which approximately 18,000 held graduate student status).55 Numerous
media outlets report that females comprise approximately 50% of the total university
student body. However, the reliability of this figure should be questioned as this may be
based on enrollment and not actual class attendance data.56
Historical Overview on the Status of Iraqi Women
Throughout the twentieth century, Iraqi women participated in national independence
struggles as well as making demands of their own.  In the 1920’s, women’s organizations
protested British imperial rule and promoted education for girls.  The Teachers Training
College for Women opened its doors in 1923 and Iraq’s first female doctors and lawyers
began graduating in the late 1940’s.57  While the Iraqi monarchy (1932-1958) outlawed
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many women’s organizations,58 evolving versions of the national constitution recognized
full citizenship rights for females.  By 1970, the Labour Act promised women equal pay
and fair working conditions. The law, however, contradicted itself by stipulating that
women were prevented from night shift work, such as nursing, or physically rigorous
jobs.59
 Iraqi women have long been considered the most educated in the Middle East.60  In the
1980’s, more female physicians, scientists and engineers came from Iraq than any other
Arab country.61 Women, in the appropriate cultural context of Iraqi society, engaged in
civic and social events and served as laborers and professionals in multiple sectors.
Historians stress that it was, again, the economic boon and not Saddam’s benevolence
that provided enhanced social and economic mobility for women.62  The 1991 imposition
of UN sanctions drastically altered Saddam’s second decade of rule.  Without the ability
to legally sell oil, inflation and corruption overtook every aspect of Iraq’s economy and
infrastructure.  This is not to say that Saddam’s earlier years were built on any sort of
humane ethic.  However, almost every Iraq scholar argues that sanctions, by far, did more
damage to Iraqi women than their dictator, the Iran-Iraq War, or the First Gulf War.63 As
an illustration, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reports that in
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1991, Iraq maintained the region’s highest rate of women in the workforce at 23%.  By
1997, it had fallen to 10%.64 In effect, the situation in Iraq is one of confounding
variables – we cannot distinguish a discrete amount of damage that just one event, such
as sanctions or the First Gulf War, instigated.
The 2003 “liberation of Iraq” severely curtailed women’s access to higher learning.
Adding to the scholastic deprivation created by sanctions, Iraqi university women now
deal with lengthy security checkpoints, suicide bombings, looting, and clerical groups
intent on terrifying them into Islamist ideals of appropriate womanhood. Allied
Occupation agencies interceded on behalf of women, although these efforts can be
construed as misguided.  UN Resolution 1325 called for Iraq’s women to be fully
included in reconstruction and government building efforts.65  While historically Iraqis
promoted women’s advancement, they are in no mood, after sanctions and two wars with
the west, to mimic US methods of gender integration. The intent of UN Resolution 1325
may be based upon women’s innate rights but the tone is entirely too Western and
condescending for some Iraqis, women included.66  Nadje Al-Ali further explains that
demands “for the mainstreaming of gender…[are] being linked to the wider issue of
foreign occupation, neocolonial configurations and an interim government that lacks
widespread credibility.”67
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Academic expertise on Iraq should demand commensurate scholarship on women and
higher education researchers must consider female students’ perspectives. This study is
not a feminist polemic but rather feminist scholarship in practice; framed upon the
premise that women engage in formal schooling through means unique to regional and
social constructs of gender.  As researchers, we must view the influence of gender in
schooling as an integral component of the student experience.  The stories of these
women do not represent the Other, or, rather said, a corollary to the history of Iraqi
higher education.  Instead, their narratives are essential to and exemplify multifarious
facets of Iraq’s university system.  Certainly, these women experienced higher education
in ways unique to their gender.  However, there are numerous factors, for instance,
tyranny, embargoes and war that affected all students.  By validating the influence of
gender, historians are not generating exclusive histories, but rather inclusive and
complete narratives.
Unfortunately, some Western scholars do not adequately address Iraqi female
perspectives. Keith Watenpaugh, a recognized expert, has written extensively on
contemporary Iraqi higher education.  However, his brief commentaries regarding female
students leave more questions than answers. Indeed, at times, he seems to forget the
presence of university women altogether.  Iraq’s cafés, according to Watenpaugh, have
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long been intellectual enclaves although “exclusively male spaces.”68  In an article later
the same year, he describes these same cafes as where “Iraqis of all strata test for
themselves the very limits of free speech and thought.”69  This illustrates a common
misstep in research on Iraq, regardless of the author’s gender.  We cannot accurately
measure freedoms and opportunity in Iraq absent valid data from women. To omit their
experiences indicates a worldview where the status of women is of secondary
significance.
Study Structure
This dissertation is the resulting coalescence of primary and secondary textual evidence,
augmented by interviews from seven women who attended the Universities of Baghdad,
Basra or Technology between 1979 and 2005. Subsequent chapters are historical studies
examining student experiences’ of national events and phenomena. Chapter Two is an
overview of postsecondary education under the Baath regime; Chapter Three recounts
female students’ experiences of the Iran-Iraq and First Gulf Wars as well as UN
embargoes.  Chapter Four assesses the condition of Iraqi higher education since the 2003
Allied Invasion.  In the final chapter, recommendations for postsecondary rehabilitation
are presented. Each chapter is framed upon analyzing how external and campus events
influenced students, notably women, and the meanings they took from these.  Since
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historical research is inherently conceptual70 and interpretive and supported by textual
evidence, the explanations for events and phenomena are imbedded in the history
themselves. Historians list events A, B & C that created circumstances D, E & F.71
Therefore, it seemed inappropriate to include a chapter on findings and analysis.
Conclusions arrived at from restorying the data were more appropriately situated when
placed in the historical chapters themselves because they indicate the climate in which
Iraqi universities and female students existed.
In an effort to not interrupt the flow of the overarching narrative, the method of study is
contained in Appendix A.  This in no way diminishes its significance but rather places it
in a more appropriate setting for historical scholarship. Appendix B is a chronology of
significant events in modern Iraqi history and a sampling of interview questions are in
Appendix C. Institutional Review Board documents can be found in Appendix D,
acronyms are defined in Appendix E and Appendix F groups cited scholars according to
their expertise.
Biases
Acknowledging the theoretical lens I bring to this study enhances my ability to write
objectively as well as generate germane conclusions and recommendations. In narrative
research, the theoretical lens is “the guiding principle or ideology that provides
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structure.”72 As the research gathering instrument, I process the data through my own
preconceived notions of the function of higher education as well as my perceptions of
gender and the Middle East.  It can be presumed that totalitarian regimes, wars and
economic deprivation generate stressors and that researchers attempt to quantify and
qualify these. It would be, however, imprudent to make conclusive statements until data
have been collected, deconstructed and repieced thematically, uncovering a more robust
and focused narrative. The beliefs and assumptions that I bring to this research include:
• Higher education plays a vital role in national development, international
engagement as well as the capacity to foster and sustain an open civil society.
• Nation states have an obligation to promote and provide, to the best of their
abilities, postsecondary education independent of ideological agendas and
political machinations.
• Higher education should be both available and affordable to every qualified
student regardless of gender, ethnicity, faith, orientation, political affiliation or
physical limitations.
• Higher education furnishes critical formative experiences in terms of self-identity
and civic engagement.
• External campus events such as civil strife and economic hardships impact
universities’ resilience.
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• Unstable conditions in modern day Iraq are the result of British imperialism,
tyranny, numerous wars, US and their allies’ interventions, UN sanctions as well
as competing ethnic and religious factions.
• Gender is a social, not physiological, construct and refers to the historical, social
and cultural mores that define norms of femaleness and maleness.
• Women can experience schooling differently from men due to gender constructs.
By validating the existence of my biases, I confirm that this study’s approach is not
without certain objectives.  Aside from generating a thorough history, I also seek to
expose the calamitous state of contemporary Iraqi higher education.  This is done in the
hopes that my academic colleagues, across multiple disciplines, will explore their own
potentialities in extending assistance to Iraqi universities.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Mirage and Menace of the
Baathist University: 1979 – 2003
The history of Iraq’s universities and their female students is one of tensions, widening
polarities between what the state expected from higher education and the educational
venues students needed; between autocracy and the desire to learn in a stable and
democratic civil society. Despite the high regional regard Iraqi universities held in the
1980’s, Saddam deprived them of their vitality, insistent that academia avail itself
completely to his whims and nationalist agendas.  Woven throughout this narrative is
evidence of resilience and defiance, when students took advantage of the state’s inability
to control every mind and idea.  This chapter provides historical context to Saddam’s
adulterated oversight of higher education and the strained conditions in which
universities and female students attempted to persevere.
University women’s interviews triangulate, complement and sometimes question the
trustworthiness of the documents analyzed in this study.  These testimonies verify what is
yielded in historical documents, especially important since most of the cited scholars and
journalists are neither Iraqis nor graduates of Iraqi universities.  Eight Iraqi university
women volunteered to serve as research participants for this study.73  Pertinent
biographical data for each, as well personal impressions based on interview transcripts,
both quantifies and qualifies the significance of their commentaries.  In an effort to
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distinguish between scholarly and participants’ comments, the names of these eight
women are bolded.74
Azhar is the eldest participant at fifty-six years old and demonstrated the most visible
involvement in Iraq’s current reconstruction through her advocacy work and as the
founder of the Iraqi Women’s Charitable Association.  While her parents were not
college-educated, Azhar achieved an impressive academic record.  She attended the
University of Basra in 1971to study biology, followed by graduate and doctoral level
work at both the University of the Philippines and University of Basra, where she is
currently a professor of marine biology.  Azhar is married to a professor and the mother
of five children, ages seventeen to twenty-nine.  Ghaida is also a University of Basra
instructor, having worked a decade to complete her PhD in computer engineering.75
Ghaida’s life is marked by sorrow.  Her only brother was killed during the First Gulf
War and her sister emigrated to Australia, rarely able to enjoy her family’s company.
Ghaida, a single professional, lives with her mother and survived open heart surgery and
an aggressive breast cancer during her doctoral studies.
Linda’s responses are often acerbic and witty, betraying both her disgust and apathy with
Iraq’s tyranny and cycle of wars.  At twenty-seven years old, Linda is completing her
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master’s in translation and linguistics studies at the University of Baghdad; her
undergraduate was awarded by the University of al-Mustansiriyah in 2002 (same field).
She is also unmarried.  Nedal, a decade older, described her father as an “unskilled
worker, cook and guard and my mother was a housewife,” and that, as an adolescent, her
career ambitions were to be a physician.  Instead, Nedal attended the University of
Kuwait, achieving a bank and finance undergraduate degree in 1990.  In 1997, she
completed an MBA at the University of Basra and her PhD in business administration
five years later.  Another single woman, Nedal’s measured responses revealed both
positive and negative aspects of Saddam’s regime.  Mayyada was more reserved in her
email interviews, exhibiting less disclosure than most respondents.  She is single, forty-
five years old and the daughter of a businessman and schoolteacher.  Mayyada graduated
from the University of Baghdad, first in 1984 with a BA in English literature and then in
1988 with dual master’s degrees in English literature and modern drama.
Finally, there is Nidhal76 and her two daughters, Wasna and Shayma.  Married to an
architect who holds a PhD, Nidhal is completing her own PhD studies at the University
of Technology where she is also a lecturer.  She shared her concerns about young Iraqis
notions of democracy, “The young people thought democracy meant that they could do
anything they want and thought it was what you saw in American movies.” This is,
perhaps, a reflection of her experience as a mother and grandmother, including harrowing
moments of barely escaping street violence in Baghdad. Nidhal has three daughters, two
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of which met this study’s criteria.77  Shayma, Nidhal’s eldest, wrote that her career goals
were to graduate from high school with high enough grades that she could attend the
college of dentistry, “and thank god, I did,” in 2000.  Shayma has a three year-old
daughter, and between hers and her mother’s interviews, Shayma’s psychological
suffering became apparent.  She also exhibited a good deal of self-determination,
especially in her personal life.  When asked whether she was married while in college,
Shayma revealed, “No, I [wasn’t] married nor engaged, just in love…my dad ha[d] firm
laws that no engagement until graduation, so the same day of graduation I was engaged.
My husband is a dentist.”  Nidhal’s second daughter, Wasna, is the study’s youngest
participant at twenty-two years old.  Her career ambitions sound more indifferent
compared to her sister’s, “Maybe it is a pity, but I can’t remember that I had a goal, all I
wanted was to get an average of marks that could get me in any college I want.”
Wasna’s MOHE acceptance letter stated she was to attend the University of Mosul (in
northern Iraq) despite her request for the University of Baghdad.  Her mother, using her
professional contacts, was able to secure Wasna’s admission to the University of
Baghdad in the end.  Wasna’s email commentaries were always distinguished by her
enthusiastic use of exclamation points and capital letters.
While this cohort represents a multiplicity of social and educational backgrounds, as well
as diverse in age, for the Universities of Baghdad, Basra and Technology, I have always
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remained struck by the collective academic persistence these women exhibited.  Each
endured Saddam’s regime and sanctions as well as surviving at least two wars.   Only
three participants studied abroad at some point but all demonstrated a keen understanding
of how Iraqi universities compared to regional and western institutions.   Every
participant either attended graduate school or has plans to do so, many with the hopes that
they may complete programs abroad.
Managing Higher Education
A swelling youth population, rapid industrialization and a booming oil economy fueled
the advancement of Iraqi higher education.  Prior to Saddam’s presidency, the Iraqi
government supported postsecondary schooling; the 1974 Free Education Law provided
free education from primary school through the university level at any public
institution.78  University students could also expect free textbooks, health care and, often,
housing.79  In the same year, another law guaranteed public sector employment for all
university graduates.  Again, the state supported Iraqi universities to address labor needs -
- not for the simple ambition to educate the Iraqi people.80  Nonetheless, Iraq’s financial
windfall (as a result of nationalizing oil preserves) allowed Saddam to invest $20 billion
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annually into infrastructure,81 or approximately $1000 per Iraqi.  At the close of the
1980’s, 20% of the total education budget went to higher education; by 1992, it rose to
nearly 25%.82  A great deal of this increased financing reflects the professionalization of
the Iraqi middle class with dramatic rises in women’s university enrollment especially.
The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, established in 1970, was
tasked to oversee all public university management and development.  From the onset,
the medical and hard sciences, as well as engineering and allied technical fields, received
more supervision from national entities.83  The Council of Higher Education and
Scientific Research was Iraq’s “supreme scientific body,”84 under the direct oversight of
Saddam Hussein.  Council members included MOHE personnel, university presidents,
the president of the Union of Iraqi Lecturers and student representatives.  The Council’s
objective was to fashion “a supreme policy of education, culture, science and technology,
considering its coordination and integration with the proposed social and economic
programmes of the state.”85 The MOHE’s regulatory nature encapsulated more than
accreditation standards and operational support.  Its overarching function was to generate
a replenishing pool of skilled, Baath-supporting citizens.
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Naturally, such administrative oversight inhibited academic freedom.86  For instance,
professors had to secure MOHE research approval before embarking on a sabbatical
semester87 allowing “for little pretence of free inquiry.”88 Steve Niva claims the Iraqi
regime sustained
a pattern of violations of academic freedom that ranges
from direct censorship and interrogation to institutionalized
control and manipulation, from restricting educational materials
to storming universities campuses.89
A blatant example of curtailed academic inquiry is that the government required every
typewriter and copier be registered with them90 -- not for inventory measures but to make
users accountable for any documents generated from them.  Interview participants
mentioned additional regulated items including wireless communication and internet
devices; “computers were on the top [of the] list in the 70’s, then in the late 80’s this was
found [to be] a foolish decision.”91  Iraq is hardly alone in persecuting their professoriate
-- many Middle Eastern countries have poor records concerning academic freedom.
Palestine, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have banned research programs and
textbooks and interrogated instructors.  Following a 1980 coup in Turkey, 2,000 faculty
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members lost their jobs and some were imprisoned.92 For the Arab region, where
“institutionalization of the educational systems [is a] part of state-building,”93 model
citizenship is expected from the most eminent scholars, not civil disobedience.
The Universities of Baghdad, Basra and Technology
Both the University of Baghdad and the University of Basra are spread across multiple
city campuses.  The majority of University of Baghdad students attend the al-Jadiriyya
campus butted against the Tigris River or the Bab al-Muazzam liberal arts campus, nearer
to downtown. Today, the University of Baghdad enrolls approximately 72,000 students
(41% female).94 The University of Basra is in Iraq’s second largest city and mere miles
from Iran and Kuwait. The University of Technology is located in Baghdad.
The 1956 founding of the University of Baghdad incorporated a dozen Iraqi colleges that
had been established as early as 1908.95  Four years later, graduate programs were begun
with an enrollment of 14 students. By 1965, the University of Baghdad had more than
700 graduate students.96 At both the undergraduate and graduate level, the university
relied heavily on foreign instructors because of a limited, qualified Iraqi teaching pool.
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Of the 1265 teaching members at the University of Baghdad in 1965, 20.6% were
foreigners.97  Table I illustrates the university’s composition:
















Most Iraqi universities relied on foreign teaching personnel and even by 1980, only two-
thirds of all university instructors were Iraqis.99 Ghaida recalled that the majority of her
University of Basra engineering professors were Indian, Polish and Egyptian and that she
preferred their teaching and testing methods. “Most Iraqi staff,” she wrote, “[were] too
stiff and not…accepting [of other] opinions.” Another means by which Iraq addressed its
lack of native teaching staff was to require government employees (who held a master’s
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degree or higher) to teach up to six hours weekly in their field at an assigned
university.100
Several Iraqi universities maintain colleges for female students only.  For instance, at the
University of Baghdad there are women’s colleges in education, physical education and
science.  This does not mean that female students interested in these subjects must enroll
in the women’s colleges, they may choose either sex-segregated or co-educational
programs.  Rather, women’s colleges are vestiges of earlier single sex schooling and
remain viable as some Iraqi families will not permit their daughters to engage in co-
educational learning.  Nonetheless, these women’s colleges represent a small minority of
all Iraqi higher education and none of the women who participated in this study attended
a single-sex college.  Nidhal explained that the state did not necessarily endorse
segregated schooling.  However, because Iraq needed to maintain primary and secondary
teaching staff levels, they provided teacher training venues that appealed to “the desires
of parents,” concluded Nidhal.
The city of Baghdad, renowned for its ancient and scholastic heritage, stands in contrast
to Basra in southeastern Iraq.  The region is geographically significant for multiple
reasons. Basra is where the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers merge to flow into the Persian
Gulf.  The region contains most of Iraq’s vast oil reserves, date palm industries,
marshlands and Iraq’s only sea access.  Prior to the Iran-Iraq War, Basra was a
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cosmopolitan playground known for its nightclubs, casinos and foreign shops that were
frequented by wealthy Kuwaitis.101 In 1964, four colleges were established in Basra,
under the auspices of the University of Baghdad.  The University of Basra became
autonomous in 1967102 with graduate studies beginning in the 1970’s.103  At first, like
other Iraqi universities, the University of Basra relied solely on MOHE faculty
appointments.  However, by the mid 1980’s, the university began to cultivate its own
specialized expertise and teaching staff that, with the MOHE’s approval, pursued
advanced studies in Baghdad or abroad.104  As of December 2004, the University of
Basra enrolled more than 23,000 students and has one of the highest rates of female
students nationally (44%).105
The University of Technology in Baghdad was established as a vocational technology
center in 1974.106  As Iraqi infrastructure became increasingly technocratic, the university
gained acclaim for its engineering and computer programs as well as training technical
educators. Today, the campus serves 13,342 students (28% female).107 In the 1990’s, UN
weapons inspections teams repeatedly investigated the University of Technology for
                                                
101 George Packer, “Testing Ground,” New Yorker, February 28, 2005,
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/050228fa_fact.
102 Kadhim Hussain Bakir, “Arabization of Higher Education in Iraq,” 194.
103 Ibid, 194.
104 Ibid,  226.
105 MOHE Enrollment Report.
106 UNU (United Nations University), The Current Status and Future Prospects for the
 Transformation and Reconstruction of the Higher Education System in Iraq,
http://www.unu.edu/news/ili/Iraq.doc.
107 MOHE Enrollment Report.
39
suspected atomic and biological weapons labs. In 2003, Allied Forces again searched for
evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).108
Baath Ambitions for Higher Education
Yousif Hamame observes “There is a choice between educating the individual for his
own sake and educating him for the sake of the nation.”109 Since the onset of Baath rule,
Iraqi universities served state ambitions before those of their students. Naturally, every
nation has a vested interest in higher education. By supporting post secondary entities,
nations seek to enrich human potential for their own benefit and among international
venues. However, Iraq’s governance of higher education is unique for its overtly
exploitative nature -- human potential could only be measured against its perceived value
to the state, including the advancement of women.  Baath dogma saturated every aspect
of Iraqi higher education in order to hone a technocratic, compliant citizenry.110 In
Nedal’s estimation, “Saddam ruined the whole education [system]” and the Iraqi
Prospect Organisation described Iraq’s higher education as such: “rather than places of
political and social dialogue, universities were just another means of indoctrination and
control by the state.”111  Consequently, while Iraqi universities maintained a regional
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reputation for excellence, the reality within Iraq is that they struggled to meet regime
standards. 112
As early as 1978, ABSP agendas discussed “Baathizing” universities, including directives
to hire and promote Baath members only.113  The Iraqi tenure system guaranteed
“employment but not necessarily rank” -- that was tied directly to demonstrated ABSP
loyalty.114  Professors who actively promoted the Baath party on campus found it
“increasingly easy … to move through the ranks.”115 This practice reflected the
professional caste system taking place throughout Saddamist Iraq.  Once the vast
majority of industries and institutions had been nationalized, job placement and
advancement became tethered to Baath membership.  Increased pay and rank demanded
further public support of the regime as well as submitting intelligence reports.116
Professors were expected to participate in Baathist campus rallies and to meet with senior
party members,117 presumably to receive directives and report any suspicious behavior on
the part of their colleagues or students. Some professors refused to make public their
politics and faced the repercussions.  One ABSP document insisted that any educator who
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refused to join the party must sign an “Implicating Pledge” which was then forwarded to
regional RCC headquarters.118
Again, Iraqi universities are not unique in their existence under autocratic rule. Steve
Niva contends that Middle Eastern regimes commonly “embed and reproduce their rule
in educational systems.”119  Niva further explains
This is done through controlling curricula, books and educational
facilities as well as monitoring who can teach and providing
incentives for those who serve the goals of state power and prestige.
These methods often result in situations where limitations of
academic freedom need to be understood in the broader
context of a multitude of institutional pressures and inertia,
as well as self-censorship.120
Abdul Amir Al-Rubaiy concurs with Niva, connecting efforts to upgrade schooling
systems to Arab nationalist movements.121  Arab nationalism required adherents who
could identify their exploiters as well as their own potential as a talented yet obedient
population. Universities ideally filled this niche as the instructional centers for
appropriate citizenship and professional engagement.  They represented Saddam’s
modernity and generosity as well as the vow between the professional classes and the
tyrant.
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As the ABSP conceptualized how to indoctrinate Iraqis (a process called Baathification),
two educational pillars were established – “mental guidance” and “Baath education.”122
Objectives included:
 Targeting special populations including women and students at all levels.
 Inundating public dialogue spaces, such as cafes, with Baath treatises.
 Promoting rallies and artistic works glorifying the Baath.
 Controlling all media outlets and flooding them with images of Saddam and
transcripts of his speeches.
 Initiating “home education visits” to present ABSP objectives, outline what was
expected of every Iraqi citizen and insisting that “hostile activities” be
immediately reported.123
The Baath recognized that indoctrination required formal and informal instruction and
that Iraqis of all strata had the potential to advance or subvert their nationalist ambitions –
notably thinkers, artists, youth, journalists and parents.  The nation’s universities were, in
a fashion, laboratory schools where innovations in propaganda and “mental guidance”
could be developed and practiced.
University departments were concerned with their relevance to the regime. Academic
departments managed a precarious existence – too much attention from the regime was
stifling and could be dangerous; being irrelevant could result in financial neglect. Unlike
engineering, medicine, and the hard sciences, the humanities and fine arts did not have
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“an obviously pragmatic value to the state”124 but they were not entirely ignored.  By the
1980’s, the Ministry of Information actively recruited artists and writers, faculty and
students, providing financial incentives for their intelligence gathering efforts.125  Such an
arrangement, completely coercive on the part of the regime, vanquished any semblance of
academic freedom and civil liberties.  For those reported upon by their colleagues, the
repercussions seemed especially ominous.  In 1986, a faculty of arts professor was
arrested for distributing “50 Kurdish and Arabic hand-written hostile pamphlets” with
alleged communist passages.  During his interrogation, the professor named his fellow
“communist saboteurs” which included at least one student.  There is sufficient
contextual evidence to suspect any confessions made by the professor were done so under
extreme duress.126 One of the offending passages from the confiscated literature read
“Democracy for Iraq.”127  As shall be seen, university women also faced accusation and
interrogation, often sexually victimized by state officials.
Saddam: Imagined Scholar
If the learning outcomes had not been so disastrous, Saddam’s foray into scholarly
writing might be viewed with amusement. Under the assumption that his “scholarship”
was integral to Iraqi canon, Saddam insisted that The Political Dictionary of Saddam
Husayn and The Complete Writing of Saddam Husayn (all eighteen volumes) be
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published early in his presidency.128  Saddam exploited Iraq’s scholarly milieu by
publishing several books that were more works of myth weaving than valid research.129
While Saddam held two law degrees (University of Cairo, 1962 and University of al-
Mustansiriyah, 1971), he seemed more keenly interested in history and how he could
manipulate it to his ends.  In the 1980’s Saddam unabashedly stated that history “should
be written to serve the interests of the Iraqi society as defined by Baathist ideology.”130
In the estimation of Ofra Bengio,
The [Baath] regime interfered massively in the writing (or
rewriting) of history and in the didactic messages it was
meant to convey. [Hussein] declared that history was not
written for the dead, it was there to guide the living…
[H]istoriography must accentuate the ideal and heroic figures—
not so much to do them justice but rather to make them into
role models.131
For the Baath, history was an indoctrinating tool with an evocative function132 – requiring
students to conform, not think. Saddam reminded educators that “We do not seek to
return to history but rather to move history towards us”133 and that history should inspire
Iraqis “without theoretical or philosophical explanations or analyses that might confuse
them.”134
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The impact to the historical record is apparent – contemporary Iraqi history is difficult to
write simply because there is a great deal of fiction and omission in sanctioned
sources.135  Saddam rejected western or Orientalist136 interpretations of Arab history for
their “imperialist and racist concepts.”137  While there is merit to this stance, the
Saddamist version of history was vainglorious and promoted racist and ethnocentric
concepts in an attempt to legitimize his rule and wars on an intellectual basis.  Today,
Iraq’s history books lack accounts of the Iran-Iraq War or invasion of Kuwait presumably
because more objective accounts of these events are not yet available.138
Nearly all higher education curricula were revised to idolize Saddam and Arab heritage.
Measures included the ineffectual Arabization campaign and mandatory coursework
known as “Arab Social Studies.”  The manipulation of curriculum also included limiting
access; Tariq Aziz, the longtime Minister of Information, sent a letter to the MOHE
requesting that
Due to public welfare requirements, and security and media
reasons, please inform all institutions and departments in your
charge to not circulate any foreign-printed material perfunctorily.
Such material should be presented first to this Ministry’s
department of censure to obtain approval for circulation.139
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Mayyada, who attended the University of Baghdad (1980-1984) as an English literature
student recalls, “any books that [were] related to Anti-Baath ideologies or those by
Jewish writers were banned.”
All undergraduates were required to take Arab Social Studies -- approximately 240
instructional hours over four years.140 Mayyada remembers assigned texts by Saddam
and that Arab Social Studies was not “aimed for education but as a sort of propaganda for
the party’s principles.” Andrew Rubin describes the course as “a brain-numbing,
chauvinistic and hyper-nationalist occasion for unrestrained celebration of Baathism,
elevating the writing of party theoreticians to canonical heights.”141  Nedal offered a
more nuanced perspective, writing, “It shows how this country is unique and the great
men and ideas which buil[t] this country.  There was a lot of good stuff but [it has] been
used to reinforce the party’s objectives.” She adds, “The party was using our legacy to
validate its own ideas and pass them to youth.”  One focus of Arab Social Studies was to
“describe America and Israel as the number one enemy for Arab[s] and Iraq,” according
to Azhar.  Linda concurs, recalling that Arab Social Studies was intended to teach “how
wonderful Arabs are and how base the others, who all our enemies are.”
The Arabization movement, as it manifested itself on universities, was one response to
anti-Western sentiments and considered “an essential basis for Arabizing other aspects of
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life such as administration, courts, banks, factories, etc.”142 For many Arab academics,
the Middle East’s subjugation to western imperialism and capitalism was partly the result
of the region’s inability to make scientific advancements relevant to their own needs and
in their own language.143  Kadhim Hussain Bakir wrote his 1984 dissertation on Iraqi
efforts to covert the language of instruction, textbooks and technical terminology into
Arabic for the sake “emancipat[ing] science from its narrow circles.”144  The Law of the
Preservation of Soundness of the Arabic Language (1977) vested the Iraqi Scientific
Academy with “coining scientific and technical terminology.”145  Furthermore, the
MOHE issued numerous directives stating that Arabic was Iraq’s official language of
university instruction.146  Despite the presence of coded law, the issue has been
problematic for numerous reasons.  During the 1970’s and 1980’s, Iraqi universities had
too many foreign instructors unable to teach in Arabic.  Ghaida, Azhar, and Shayma
each stated that the majority of their science, medical and engineering courses were
taught in English.  Wasna’s experience was similar, her Arab Social Studies class was
taught in Arabic but “all other classes were in English.” Ghaida’s case is intriguing –
while her electrical engineering classes were predominantly given in English, classes
with an immediate pragmatic value to Iraqi development, such as power and
communication systems, were taught in Arabic.
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The lack of qualified Arabic speaking instructors was only one reason the Arabization
movement did not succeed.  Iraq also needed Arabic textbooks and terminology but
translation staff and publishing houses could not keep pace with MOHE and university
demands.147  The greatest challenge to Arabization was the public’s response. Students’
parents voiced concern that, by not repeatedly reading, writing and speaking in English,
their children would limit their study abroad and employment options.148 Azhar recalled
how her English-based marine biology courses helped in later international research
collaborations.  Since most Iraqi school children had eight years of English instruction
(beginning at the age of eleven) and many university freshmen had compulsory English
courses,149 the regime obviously placed some value on the ability to speak the
language.150 Graduate students realized that
scientific research carried out in English and published in
a foreign journal still [made] a greater impression on
researchers in general, and on promotion and research
committees, in particular, than work carried out in Arabic.151
Hussain Bakir, writing about the fluctuant application of Arabization standards, explains,
“This practice…has encouraged the use of foreign languages in scientific institutes, while
Arabic was more associated with teaching humanistic subjects.”152 Azhar mentioned that
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until the 1990’s the majority of their scientific lectures were delivered in English but
noticed an increase in coursework in Arabic after that.  This may indicate enhanced
measures by the Baath to advance Arabization in an era of international tensions and
foreign wars.  For instance, Nedal’s graduate coursework in business and finance (1998-
2002) was taught in Arabic although her instructors relied on English language textbooks.
Not surprisingly, Arab Social Studies was always taught in Arabic.  The Arabization
program illustrates how the Iraqi government was more concerned with conversion than
cognition, believing that every lesson should be infused with nationalist objectives. In
this fashion, curriculum detoured from pure studies and became subservient to ideology.
Students remained savvy enough in understanding their higher education was being
forsaken for Saddam’s glory, as indicated by the comments made by interview
participants.  However, the nature of Saddam’s Iraq, as is true with any regime, prevented
students and faculty from generating sustained, proactive protest.
Undergraduate and Graduate Standards
Iraq maintained six public universities by 1980 with impressive enrollment numbers:
Baghdad University had approximately 35,000 students; Basra University more than
10,000 and Technology University enrolled 8,000.153  Increasingly, students from other
Arab nations applied to Iraqi universities that were held in regional regard.154 University
admissions remained competitive and determined entirely by students’ baccalaureate
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exam scores.  Each academic department maintained enrollment quotas “determined in
relation to Iraq’s Development Plan”155 with medical and engineering programs most
popular and selective, followed by the sciences and finally non-scientific courses of
study.156  Approximately 50% of university applicants were denied admissions based on
their baccalaureate scores in the 1980’s.157 Corrupt student admissions were a common
Baath practice, commonly known by university students.  The RCC habitually waived
admissions requirements for family members and allies.158  A 1978 RCC decree
permitted any member of the armed forces or internal security forces to be admitted into
any university of their choice, regardless of their baccalaureate exam scores.159  Linda, a
University of Baghdad graduate student, explained that applicants designated as
“Leader’s Friends” benefited from their political ties by being given extra five points on
their exam scores.
Alongside preferential treatment for some applicants were admissions practices that
diminished opportunity -- based on factors completely apart from academic performance.
The MOHE identified applicants by religious and ethnic markers: applicants’ files were
yellow if they were Arabs, red for Kurds and green for Christian students.160
Furthermore, the Baath required that a high school student’s political affiliation be kept
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on file for future reference.161  One RCC memorandum explicitly endorsed student
evaluations by non- academic measures:
Students who hold different views than that of the government
or are simply of a different ethnicity, religion or tribe than the
leading Tikriti clan…[can be] blacklisted and barred from attending
university.162
Undergraduate pedagogy and curriculum had certain structural impediments.  First,
colleges tended not to collaborate on commonly required coursework resulting in several
departments teaching the same course.163  For instance, students had to enroll in math
courses offered by their academic department rather than from a mathematics department.
This may have been a prohibitive factor in students’ decisions to switch degree plans as
core curricular courses, transferable across departments, may not have existed.
Universities emulated foreign models of educational organization and pedagogy,
sometimes to their detriment.  Yousif Hamame, writing about the University of Baghdad,
states that the Law School patterned itself on the French model; medicine and the
sciences followed the British system; the Colleges of Education and Agriculture practiced
the American model and engineering studies were based on German and British
systems.164  Hamame questions the effect such patch working had on institutional
cohesion:
Such a variety of experiences could have represented an excellent
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opportunity to develop a healthier intellectual environment if
the salient features of each pattern were integrated and adapted
to local conditions.  Instead, and maybe because of the lack of
communication and the absence of coordination, complexities and
obstacles have dominated higher educational institutions…in Iraq.165
Allegiance to foreign pedagogies meant that academic departments did not prioritize
community needs and that, often, instructional materials did not relate to actual
conditions in Iraq.166  Finally, undergraduate instruction did not encourage engaged and
critical thinking skills on the part of students.  “For all practical purposes, undergraduate
studies tend[ed] to transmit information rather than produce knowledge.”167 In the
estimation of Mayyada, all Iraqi schooling “depends on memorization rather than
initiative and discussion.” A.A. Al-Rubaiy criticizes Iraqi higher education pedagogy,
contending it ill-prepared students for graduate school who were required to complete
one year of independent thesis research.168
Despite a lack of student preparedness, universities routinely developed graduate
programs--often from “the urge to compete with the University of Baghdad”169 which, by
then, had several graduate departments of international acclaim. Adequate facilities and
qualified teaching staff could not keep pace with the surge in graduate programming
resulting in inferior efforts, at least at the onset.170  Nonetheless, undergraduates eagerly
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applied to graduate schools with the Master’s of Science being the most popular degree
program.171  PhD programs were highly selective and most academic departments
admitted only a few doctoral candidates annually.172  Certainly, many Iraqi graduate
students took advantage of study abroad offerings but these opportunities began to
diminish by the 1990’s.  The Iraqi PhD required three years of study (after successful
completion of a Master’s) of which two years centered on dissertation research.  Doctoral
candidates were encouraged to select at least one foreign professor for their committee.173
Khalis Adham’s 1975 dissertation on Iraqi medical education surveyed 108 medical
students at the Universities of Basra and Mosul (of which 50% of participants were
female).174  The data processed by Adham may illustrate some of the challenges and
frustrations felt by Iraqi graduate students in the ensuing decades.  Complaints from these
medical students are, for the most part, universal themes of student dissatisfaction:
• Financial obligations
• Coursework does not address actual medical conditions in Iraq
• Limited interactions between professors and students outside the classroom
• Students were discouraged from asking or too intimidated to ask questions;
professors chastised them publicly
• Limited funding and facilities for student socials
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• Poor new student orientation
• Stress generated by academic pressure and unrealistic exam schedules175
• Rote memorization instruction
Each of these stressors may indicate an overly rigid schooling system, out of tune with
the needs of its students and communities. Such assessments can only be made when
researchers evaluate postsecondary education against regional models and Iraq’s own
stated higher education goals.  Western universities are not solely the appropriate
yardstick to gauge student satisfaction simply because the resources invested into both
schooling systems as well as the culture in which they exist are not commensurate.
Theoretical guidelines for research are discussed more fully in Appendix A.
Thousands of Iraqi graduate students took advantage of study abroad opportunities,
especially early in the regime when it was both encouraged and funded by the state.176
Three interviewed women, Azhar, Nedal and Nidhal, studied in the Philippines, Kuwait
and the United Kingdom accordingly. A 1978 Baghdad Observer report stated that 4884
Iraqi students were studying abroad – 1504 in the United Kingdom, 949 in the Soviet
Union and the rest in the United States, Egypt or elsewhere.177  When considering that
Iraq enrolled approximately 28,500 university students that same year,178 this study
abroad figure is quite extraordinary and does not even include students paying for their
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own overseas schooling. Study abroad students understood that they were expected to
return to work as civil servants or university professors179 and, until the 1990’s, a
majority of Iraqi faculty did complete their doctoral work abroad.180 After the First Gulf
War and imposition of UN sanctions, vastly fewer Iraqis had either the state’s permission
or the wherewithal to study abroad. The impact was that, “an entire generation of junior
professors have spent no time abroad, have never attended international conferences or
have not built connections with colleagues outside of Iraq.”181
Nidhal’s experience exemplifies the diminishing opportunities in Iraqi higher education.
In 1988, Nidhal won a full scholarship to complete her PhD studies at an Australian
university.  The MOHE confirmed that she had all of her travel documents and
permissions but still denied approval, despite having allowed her to study in Great Britain
just six years earlier. This was in accordance with a new Baath law that prohibited a
woman’s right to travel overseas without a male, related chaperone. Even though Nidhal
was an advanced student in a field much favored by the state (chemical engineering) and
at a university that routinely churned out senior level technocrats (University of
Technology), the state was reacting to two emerging issues – a growing brain drain182 and
replenishing a military force decimated by the Iran-Iraq War.
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Interviewed participants revealed multiple facets of student-professor relations.  None of
the women were appointed an academic advisor by their department of university.
However, many chose their own mentors and met with professors beyond the classroom
setting. Not all professors were approachable.  Linda recalls instructors that harangued
students publicly and Mayyada disclosed that, “not all professors welcomed …our
asking questions or raising points of debate.  Some of them looked at that as a sort of
challenge to their knowledge.”  Several women felt their male instructors treated them
with due respect in deference to cultural norms of male-female relationships.  Sisters and
dental students Shayma and Wasna noticed that, however, not all male instructors
respected these boundaries.  Shayma insists that some younger male professors “treat the
girls nicely because they are Romeos.” In Wasna’s estimation, male professors were
either “real gentleman,” “Casanovas,” or treated female students as if “we are a low life.”
Ghaida, who pursued undergraduate and doctoral work in engineering at the University
of Basra, writes about her male instructors:
They always told me that I should not look to [compete]
with other colleagues because…I am a woman and I
have to look [to be just] a wife so [there was] no need
for high education and it is better to limi[t] my education
to BSc. … This usually happened when I got high marks
in some examinations.  For example, one [Egyptian professor]
told me “I can give you [a]… 100% in this exam, what will
you do with high competency?  You will certainly [be] getting
married in [the] future and [have] no need to get high marks…”
and after that he gave me 95% rather than 100%.
It should be noted that Ghaida, like several other women in this study, remains
unmarried.
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Many aspects of professor-student interactions were not colored by gender. Women like
Azhar never felt they were treated differently from their male classmates, “they treated
me as a student only,” and enjoyed opportunities to consult and even socialize with their
instructors. Azhar contributes her professors’ attitude to the fact that, during her
undergraduate years in the 1970’s, conditions in Iraq were “different from now, saf[e]
life, no war and the staff live[d] in good conditions.” With varying degrees of confidence,
all of the interviewed women felt they could ask their professors questions.  Iraqi
students, like their counterparts in any other country, learned which professors were
friendly, aloof, quick to anger and so forth. Linda participated in the time honored
student tradition of mocking professors’ mannerisms and methods.  The resulting
impression from these narratives is that professors were a varied lot but generally
respected by their students.  Mayyada concluded that “I don’t claim that [student-
professor relations] were 100% ideal.  But there was a sort of implied and generally
accepted code of behavior.”  Interviewed women repeatedly suggested that professors
should rely less on the textbooks and lecture and encourage more discussion and practical
application of studied subject matter.  Linda urged professors to “broaden their horizons
for they are so st[u]ck to the books which is quite boring.”
Cronyism, Hypocrisy and Foul Play
Like other institutions dominated by the regime, Iraqi universities became conduits for
Saddam’s corruption and victimized by his tyrannical surveillance.  Saddam’s family and
friends exploited their regime connections and were awarded university degrees under
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questionable circumstances -- Uday Hussein being the most glaring example.  His 1988
University of Baghdad civil engineering transcript ranked him first amongst his 174 peers
and perfect scores in each of his subjects183 – quite an accomplishment considering his
government and lothario obligations surely kept him elsewhere.  His father also gave
Uday the presidency of the Iraqi Student Union.184  The RCC codified corrupt admission
standards with laws such as any one in the “armed forces, internal security forces and
Presidency of Public Intelligence shall be admitted into the university” regardless of their
academic standing.185  Furthermore, once admitted, enrollment and attendance standards
did not apply to Baath-favored students.186 Samir Al-Khalil estimates that in 1979 nearly
20% of all university students were the result of “open door admission standards”
originating from the military, security forces or ABSP.187
Deborah Cobbett asserts that, beginning in 1990, only students who swore allegiance to
the Baath party could gain university admission.188  Multiple sectors of Iraqi society were
held accountable through loyalty oaths:
Written pledges are required of most citizens [for]
clearance for work, study or even residential relocation.
They are the Iraqi government’s way of incriminating
all citizens in the intelligence-gathering procedures.189
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Other evidence indicates these oaths were haphazardly applied to students. Nedal and
Wasna both filled out allegiance forms; Wasna recalls her oath that stipulated “I promise
that I will support the Baath [P]arty and the [P]resident Saddam Hussein until the end and
damned [be] the traitor.”  However, Wasna explains, “it was only paper and this paper
did not mean anything to us.”  Mayyada and Linda perceived their loyalty oaths as
optional, even when they knew they would face pressure from Baath campus
representatives. In Mayyada’s case, her loyalty oath asserted that no one in her family
was a member of an opposing political party and she chose not to take it.  Linda also
chose not to sign, writing,
After my admission I was harassed by high-ranking
Baathists who used to threaten me that I will be kicked
out of college if I don’t join the party, but it turned out
they were bluffing and wanted to increase their quota.
There is no indication that female students were targeted more intensely than their male
peers – however, nor did their social status provide them any protection from Baathist
violence.
Both instances indicate that Baath tyranny was imperfect in its application and students
were willing to take risks in order to retain some autonomy. While loyalty oaths may
have not been compulsory, other issues were non-negotiable. All university campuses
were ordered by the RCC to admit armed forces, security and policing units, as well as
intelligence agencies “at any time for any reason.”190 Indeed, there were several instances
when university students were arrested on campus for suspected political activism.  In
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1998, two University of Baghdad engineering students were removed from their final
exams, accused of demonstrating against the state and never heard from again.191  Najia
Hatim al-Rikabi, a female university student in 1980, was imprisoned and tortured (along
with her one year-old daughter) for her membership in a communist organization.
Although released, she died within a few days as the result of poisoning.192
Student activism and student instigated violence occurred sporadically.  During the Iran-
Iraq War, some university students protested against U.S. support of Saddam Hussein.193
A series of bombings at al-Mustansiriyah University in Baghdad occurred during an
international youth conference, killing two students (1980).  The next day, as students
processed behind their classmates’ caskets, two more bombs were detonated.  Al’Da’awa,
a fundamentalist group opposed to Baath regime, assumed responsibility for the terrorist
attacks.194  In the same year, Al’Da’awa attempted to assassinate University of
Technology’s president, killing a staff member instead.195  It remains uncertain how
many university students participated in Al’Da’awa’s terrorist activities.
The criminality that was more omnipresent in student’s lives was the regime’s nepotism
and retaliatory, capricious measures that adulterated the value of Iraqi postsecondary
education.  Shayma explains, “In Iraq, college is just for learning and studying and
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graduating…and any other activities, especially during Saddam’s time, [were]
…suspicious.” When Luay Hussein, Saddam’s nephew, failed an engineering course at
the University of Baghdad due to his chronic absences, his friends beat Luay’s professor
so severely he was permanently disabled.  Saddam’s response was to produce a staged
video of the attackers receiving corporeal punishment and turning it over to the
university.196 At any rate, the university clearly did not feel they had the authority to
handle the matter on their own.  This is partly because universities had no genuine self-
governance but also because a hallmark of the totalitarian state is the “normaliz[ation of]
moral transgressions and criminality.”197
The regime expected universities to lead in citizenship building, even if they had to use
duplicitous measures to achieve the mirage.  Linda recalls the “Model Student” program
where pupils especially favored by the Baath led classes and served as peer mentors. In
actuality, Linda admits, “we used to choose the academically dumbest but the brightest
in terms of skipping classes.”  Here students learned to exploit the corrupt system
exploiting them, both state and student fronting illusions to their own benefit.  The Iraqi
Student Union (ISU) was the only sanctioned university student group in the entire
country. Not surprisingly, the ISU was micromanaged by the ABSP to glorify the regime
and, insists Shayma, “professors were not allowed to give any advice to them.”  Students
were not required to join but certainly pressured to do so.  Mayyada writes,
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“Joining…was suggested to me many times but I refused because I am disinterested in
politics.”  The ISU appears to have been a gateway association, segueing graduates into
full ABSP standing.  Perks came with ISU membership – officers were not required to
attend classes in order to receive diplomas198 and, according to Azhar, many joined
simply to improve their scholarship or study abroad chances with the MOHE.  Ofra
Bengio has pointed out that ISU elections, while showcased as exercises in democracy,
were essentially Baath-rigged affairs to elect compliant student leaders.199  Annual ISU
functions included lectures, festivals, new student orientation and parties for graduates,
according to Nedal who found it frustrating that the entire campus would close down
during these events.  On occasion, Nedal attended ISU social programming for “a good
time” but did not consider herself a member.
Conclusion
As Iraq mucked its way through a war with Iran and then suffered a decade of sanctions,
the prevailing campus climate was one of increasing suspicion and isolation.  Once, Iraqi
universities were on a trajectory to academic greatness but strangulating regime
surveillance, coupled with trade embargoes, left them isolated and antiquated, vestiges of
their own glory.  Despite episodic opportunities students took to express their defiance of
their government,  they were not taught to think independently, practice thoughtful
critique or nurture their professional and political personas.  What did emerge were
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students’ coping strategies: remaining above suspicion or even invisible to the regime --
meaningless markers of academic success.
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CHAPTER THREE
Rhetoric and Realities for
Iraqi University Women: 1980 – 2003
Most western scholars, until the 1990’s, viewed Iraq as progressive; a model for other
Middle Eastern countries.  What was overlooked was Saddam’s brutal and capricious
dictatorship that chose torture and misinformation campaigns to instate allegiance.
Anthony Shadid, writing about Saddam, asserts, “for three decades he dragged his
country through the sewer in delusional attempts to impose a legacy.  The efforts would
have been pathetic if not for the horrific toll they inflicted.”200  While Saddam exploited
the Iraqi people in actuality, on paper and in speeches he glorified and defended them,
especially women.201 Take, for example:
Those who still look on women with the mentality
and ideas of the ages of darkness and backwardness
do not express the aspirations and ambitions of the
Revolution.  They are at variance with the principles of
the Party which are essentially based on freedom and
emancipation.202
As promising as this may have sounded, the Baath always made it clear that women’s
liberation was contingent upon achieving party objectives; that Saddam’s version of
freedom demanded obedience to the state:
The ideological premise of the ABSP and its theory of
action indicate that no revolutionary change may…
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[occur without] precise knowledge of the laws which govern
social change and their correct utilization by capable
leadership which defines with precision sound formulas
and correct areas for the emancipation of women.203
Therefore, Iraqi women could expect personal freedoms and wider opportunity once they
had put forth their best efforts to advance the pan-Arab socialist agenda and Iraq as the
utopian example.204  Conversely, citizens should ultimately blame themselves for any
hardships they endured.
Women were critical to Saddam’s plan to fully dominate Iraq.  Certainly, he needed
greater female participation to meet increasing labor demands.  However, by appointing
himself the liberator of Iraqi women, Saddam also realigned the social hierarchy.
Kinship and tribal allegiances, historically, under girded Iraqi governance. This was due
to the inherently patriarchal Arab culture where “the old and the males hav[e] authority
over the younger and female.”205  By providing Iraqi women financial and state
enunciated support to further their educations, Saddam attenuated the kinship yokes many
Iraqi fathers, brothers and husbands held over their daughters.206 While he may have
empowered women, Saddam’s true ambition was to weaken powerful men and their
tribal allies who might rise against him.207 The president “shifted women’s allegiance to
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the state and away from the family or ethnic group.”208 Saddam instated himself as the
national father figure – benevolent or merciless, depending on the collective behavior of
his newly nationalized “tribe.”209  Saddam expected Iraqi women to represent his
modernity and magnanimous rule.  This behavior has often been expected of Arab
women – to symbolize the honor, the wealth, the virtue and the values of their family or
community despite or even to the detriment of their own ambitions.
Civil Society and Women’s Opportunities in Saddamist Society
Early in his presidency, Saddam promised civil and economic opportunities for women
but only so far as such actions benefited the regime first.  During the earlier 1980’s,
Iraq’s rapidly developing economy generated a solid middle class sector210 and increased
postsecondary opportunities.  Women’s participation in white collar professions such as
social work, law, journalism, engineering, architecture and the diplomatic corps rose. 211
46% of teachers and dentists, 29% of physicians and 70% of pharmacists were women in
1980’s Iraq – all of which required a university education.212  However, women’s
participation at senior management levels remained stagnant at 4%.213  Doreen Ingrams
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concedes that any senior female administrator or executive would have “almost
certainly…had to prove herself to be more exceptional than any male competitor.”214
Nadje Al-Ali resists over glorifying Saddam’s early years:
How far this access to education and the labor market
resulted in an improved status for women is a more
complex question.  As in many other places, conservative
and patriarchal values did not automatically change
because women started working.215
Such prospects and limitations surely influenced women’s career choices as they pursued
university studies.  Graduates did not expect grand salaries216 but, in a country that
subsidized many basic expenses, they were able to secure professional class status.   For
women, “working outside the home became…not only acceptable but prestigious and the
norm.”217 The first generation of female college graduates under Saddam have, more
often than not, positive recollections of their government. Higher education was free,
government and public sector jobs were plentiful, study abroad was feasible and women
were encouraged to study in male-dominated fields.218 Amal Sharqi,219 former director of
Iraq’s Department of Culture and Children, chastises those critical of Saddam’s treatment
of women, “When people raise the issue of totalitarianism, I point out that without it we
                                                
214 Doreen Ingrams, The Awakened, 78.
215 Nadje Al-Ali, “Reconstructing Gender,” 745.
216Ibid, 72.
217 Nadje Al-Ali, “Reconstructing Gender,” 745.
218 Ibid, 745.
219 Jan Goodwin, Price of Honor, 230.
68
would never have been able to achieve the present status of women in Iraq.”220  Amal
demonstrated pride for her president’s efforts, expressing,
To bring about change, to enable women to be educated,
to go to school, to be economically active takes time
and effort.  In the West, it took a century to change
the status of women.  You have to build an infrastructure
for it, and Saddam Hussein did so and did so quickly.221
Beneath the veneer of liberated womanhood, lay more sinister realities. Most menacing
must have been Saddam’s eldest son, Uday, thug lord of predatory sexual violence.
During Uday’s enrollment at the University of Baghdad’s civil engineering program,
peers claimed he abducted and raped female classmates.222 Many Iraqis believed Uday
maintained special “rape palaces.”223  While facts may never be untangled from urban
legend, one Iraqi woman conceded, “It didn’t matter whether these stories were true.
They were believed.”224  Rape carried additional repercussions in Iraq beyond the
immediate violation and long-term healing required.  Traditionally, when a young Iraqi
woman is raped, she is no longer marriageable unless the family can arrange for her to
marry her assailant.225  This was, for obvious reasons, not an option for those women
raped by Uday (or his allied goons).226  Therefore, for a University of Baghdad woman to
be noticed by Uday must have been nightmarish indeed.
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Sexual assault was a standard method of intimidation and intelligence gathering
employed by the regime. A recently discovered government identification card listed a
male employee as “a fighter in the popular army” with the job classification as “violation
of women’s honour”227 – in other words, a state sanctioned rapist.  Saddam’s secret
police often videotaped their gang rape activities, threatening to release the video to the
victim’s family if she did not become an informant on her family and community.228
This practice is eerily similar to events that took place at a University of Basra student
picnic in 2004, to be discussed fully in chapter four, where the perpetrators then were
militant fundamentalists.  In both instances, a woman’s sexual reputation was an effective
tool of coercion.  To be sexually victimized in Middle Eastern culture often results in
dual traumas: surviving the attack and facing one’s family in the aftermath.  Middle
Eastern women’s chastity is the family’s crest or cross to bear.  Zainab Salbi explains:  “a
family’s honor is judged by the behavior of women, but it is effectively owned by men:
her husband or father or brothers, or even her sons.”229 While there is no evidence that
university women were more susceptible to state sanctioned rapes, there is also no
evidence that they were not equally targeted. Fearing abduction and sexual assault may
have well influenced a woman’s choices of when and where to attend classes as well as
whom she could trust on campus.
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Rape was only one instrument in the regime’s cache of physical, sexual and emotional
extortion. According to a 2002 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office report, Saddam’s
preferred methods of torture included eye gouging, electric shock, use of electric drills,
nail extraction, pipe beatings as well as rape and sodomy.230 One man who went to the
Baghdad city morgue to recover the body of a relative stumbled upon the corpses of more
than twenty young women, all naked, all having had their breasts hacked off and most
mutilated by additional means.231 In an effort to force parents to confess to something or
accuse someone, Baathist violence often centered on children.  Even very young children
have been raped,232 fed poison,233 and put into gunny sacks with starving cats in front of
their mother’s eyes.234 Today, it seems as if every Iraqi knows at least one person who
was abducted, tortured, incarcerated or never heard from again. Surely thousands of
university students lost family members to this brutal dictatorship.  While Article 22A of
the Iraqi constitution prohibited all forms of psychological or physical torture to “obtain
information or confessions from detainees,”235 the RCC maintained the right to operate
outside any national law to protect party interests.  Therefore, until 2005, not one Baath
official had been formally tried for ordering or participating in torture.236  Yet, of the
estimated 10,000+ Iraqi who were executed by the regime, human rights workers believe
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most were tortured first,237 and of which one quarter may have been academics or
students.238 By the 2003 demise of the regime, Iraq still held approximately 100,000
citizens as political prisoners. 239
Saddam criminalized many women’s activities despite his public declarations favoring
their independence.  The RCC declared it a crime against the state to belong to any
women’s organization other than the GFIW240 which, will be recalled, was not more than
a conduit for Baath propaganda.  Another RCC decree made “punishable by execution”
supporting any political party besides the Baath or purposely concealing earlier support
for other political parties.241 In his research on mental health in totalitarian regimes,
Riadh Abed concludes that dictators intentionally abrade civil society so that its members
will not feel they have anything left worth defending.242 In a totalitarian state, where what
constituted political organizing and activism was broadly defined – it is not surprising to
hear Iraqis describe themselves as apolitical, for to be outspoken could be fatal.
Therefore, university women could not openly organize as students, faculty, allied
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professionals or even around a seemingly innocuous hobby or interest. Nor did university
women find much appeal in joining the GFIW.  Nedal explained that university women
rarely affiliated with the GFIW as many of its objectives were not related to professional
women nor was it highly regarded on campus.  Linda was even more direct about her
opinion of the GFIW “What do I think of it?  It sucks, like all Baath stuff.”
Those women who dared to speak out against the regime often paid with their lives.  In
the 1980’s, women of the rogue Iraqi Women’s League as well as female Kurdish
demonstrators and Shia supporters were abducted, tortured and executed.243 “It has often
been said, with great irony, that in Iraq women have been granted equal rights with men
only in detention and torture” writes Deborah Cobbett.244 The story of eighteen year-old
Maysoon al-Assadi, a university student and member of the Iraqi Communist Party in
1980, 245 leaves little doubt that college students were under regime suspicion.  Maysoon
was hanged by her hair and repeatedly beaten on her feet during her interrogation.  When
she refused to recant a condemnation of Saddam, she was intentionally electrocuted at a
slower voltage rate resulting in her death taking two hours to arrive.246
Incidents such as these infected Iraqis with apprehension, foreboding and distrust and
they acknowledge their emasculation under the tyrant,
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I had never come to terms with the big questions,
like how Saddam Hussein had managed to stay in
power for a quarter of a century when most Iraqis
hated him[.]…How did he manage to dictate the
way virtually every Iraqi spoke, loved, married,
prayed, played, smiled, learned, dressed, ate,
deceived, despaired, celebrated and died?247
While none of the women interviewed for this study disclosed personal experiences of
torture, each acknowledged the pervasive fear in which they lived, in the Saddamist
malaise where finding freedom seemed beyond human capabilities. Comments included:
• Azhar: “Saddam said ‘All the Iraqis are from Baath, even if they do not join it.’”
• Linda: “We (students and professors) treat[ed] each other suspiciously.”
• Mayyada: “We had to accept all [Baath] ideas and pretend to welcome them.”
• Nedal: “I spent my days dreaming that I would be able to break from that big
prison [known as] Iraq”
Women’s reluctance to provide specific examples of Saddam’s cruelty may result from a
self-censorship habit248-- undoubtedly reinforced when the RCC ordered tongue
amputations for any person found slandering Saddam or his family (2000) and then airing
these events on television.249  When censorship was raised to a macabre version of state
entertainment, Iraqi academics surely weighed the value of their work against that of their
lives.  Samir Al-Khalil, writing on the functions of Saddam’s sanctioned violence, argues
For the [Baath], violence is no longer merely the sanction used
periodically against a genuine opposition.  The [Baath] invent[ed]
their enemies; violence – not the threat of it – is institutionalized,
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forever reproducing and intensifying that all-pervasive climate
of suspicion, fear and complicity so characteristic of their polity.250
The much-vaunted social services provided by the socialist regime often came at a
personal cost. Since the 1980’s, Iraqi children received daily lessons idolizing Saddam
and how to report on their families and neighbors.251 Deborah Cobbett has been
especially critical of Iraq’s early childhood education contending that Iraqi women “have
less and less confidence in them since children are subjected to chauvinist indoctrination
and acquire habits of spying and violence.”252 Cobbett questions how Iraqi youth could
glorify Saddam’s rule (as required by state curriculum) when the reality of their lives
included losing family members to military and political violence.253 Services provided to
Iraqi children are significant to this study on dual fronts.  First, many university women
used state subsidized childcare services or had children in elementary school.  Secondly,
many of these children are now Iraq’s contemporary university students, having already
endured more than a dozen years of dogmatic schooling.
News reports showered adoration on Saddam as the propaganda machine it was forced to
become.  According to Ofra Bengio, “the press became a subcontractor,”254 and Uday
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was appointed director of all media outlets.255  Uday quickly passed a measure requiring
all print media to carry his or his father’s image on their front page each time they
published.256  Baath officials rarely appeared on television or for an official photograph
without some image of Saddam prominently displayed.257 In essence, the media did not
report news but rather Saddam’s message. Unfortunately, narratives and other data
sources describing the impact on journalism students have not surfaced. It is known,
according to interview participants, that no student publications, such as a campus
newspaper258 were permitted besides Baath approved publications – most notably the
Heartbeat of Youth, a pet project of Uday’s.259  According to Linda, the University of
Baghdad issued its first independent, student-generated newspaper just last year.
Saddam saturated Iraq in his image and his eyes, both literally and figuratively, were
everywhere.  Statues and murals canvassed the country showcasing Saddam as a kindly
benefactor, sex symbol, international activist or military giant. Films, stamps, festivals
and archways elevated Saddam to mythic proportions.260  Saddam appeared daily on
television, delivering live and lengthy speeches. Every classroom from nursery school to
the university lecture hall was expected to display his likeness.  It seems as if this
publicity blitz (lasting more than two decades) had dual objectives – obviously to glorify
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Saddam as Iraq’s modern hero but also to remind every Iraqi that no activity could escape
the tyrant’s gaze.  The dreaded Ministry of Information was the regime’s more visible
surveillance agency, gathering intelligence and gossip alike from homes, classrooms,
workplaces and cafes.  The very fact that many of these incoming reports were false or, at
the very least, embellished, was not always a concern for either the Ministry of
Information or Saddam.  Samir al-Khalil writes:
For the system to work the truth value of a report is
irrelevant.  The simple fact of its existence is enough
to generate the appropriate atmosphere of suspicion
and fear, and to implicate with impeccable proof
broad layers of people in the violence of the regime.261
It is impossible to fully perceive how students persisted in this climate where truths were
secondary to rumors, anxieties and malice. Linda, sharing a painful memory, reveals the
transgressions students had to choose between:
[I]n my freshman year…the officials kicked my friend
and me out of the classroom for we were the only
persons who refused to join the Baath party.  The
reason I was furious was…that I realized this won’t
be the last… [this] was just what I had bargained for.
University Women in 1980’s Iraq
College aged Iraqi women enjoyed a vibrant social life within the appropriate context of
Arab society during the early regime years.  While many functions were co-ed, men and
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women often segregated themselves,262 with women dancing and sharing tea and treats
amongst their female friends.  One study of the medical college at the University of Basra
found male students complaining that their female peers did not want to socialize with
them enough, especially at school functions.  The women responded that their non-
participation reflected their dislike for the behavior and language used by male
students.263
Very few of the interview participants were married during their undergraduate careers.
While this practice is universally common, it should be recalled that Ghaida, Mayyada
and Nedal, entering their fourth decades, have yet to marry and remained at universities
for doctoral studies. It appears as if most female college students either lived at home or,
if attending a more distant university, resided with extended family instead of occupying
residence hall space.  One Iraqi young woman wrote in the 1980’s,
They [her parents] usually let me do what I like and I respect them
for that. But even though I am independent I would always live
with them until I marry.  No girl would dream of taking a flat
on her own or with friends, however much she wanted to,
as only bad girls do that.264
It should be noted that, regardless of parental objections, Iraqi law forbade single men or
women to lease apartments.265
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Iraqi youth, like much of the world, were drawn to western pop culture, especially music,
fashion and film. Saddam did not completely ban these more innocuous foreign
influences. Linda wrote that her dream vocation as a younger woman was “to be the
manager of my fave Irish pop group.”  Sana al-Khayyat contends that “clothes and make-
up [became] almost an obsession” for many 1980’s cosmopolitan, young Iraqi women266
and while many donned the abaya during their transit to and from campus, they revealed
western-styled clothing once there.267
Interviewed women gave lackluster reviews of their campus student services, regardless
of when or where they attended university.  Women were asked about student health care,
psychological counseling, libraries and computer labs as well as athletic venues.
Participants reported that student health centers provided minor medical treatment –
aspirin, antibiotics and such, as well as handing out excuse slips for student absences.
Mayyada described her health center at the University of Baghdad campus as limited to
“just one doctor and one nurse.”  Iraqi universities made limited provisions for student-
centered psychological counseling, even though facilities were provided on both the
University of Baghdad and Basra campuses.  Nedal, who admitted, “I had a lot of
problems,” nonetheless did not turn to her campus (University of Basra) counseling
services, stating, “I rely on myself my family and friends to deal with it.” Linda claimed
she had “never heard of such a thing” as campus based mental health.  Her remarks may
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illustrate that students had no reason to expect their universities would or should provide
such resources.
Interviewed women did rely on some “student comforts” provided by their universities,
especially the cafeteria and libraries.  Azhar used both facilities on a nearly daily basis
and continues to do so as a faculty member. Linda admitted that  “I couldn’t survive
without the cafeteria” and Nedal estimated she was in the library up to twenty hours a
week.  Mayyada stayed away from her cafeteria because it “was crowded and dirty” and
had to rely on a home computer as her department did not provide a computer lab. Azhar
also depended on her personal computer mainly because she was able to secure internet
access long before the University of Basra could.
A common theme in the interviewed women’s responses was the role grades and parents
played in choosing a degree plan and profession.  Respondents were asked to recreate
their university admissions experience and their parent’s influence.268 Data from these
women indicates that academic major selection was more directly influenced by the
prestige associated with the field than personal interest and Nidhal admitted that a
majority of Iraqi college students, in her estimation, select their courses of study based on
potential earning power.  Therefore, it appears as if career tracking took place at the
national level (favoring some professions more than others) but that when parents and
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students made choices, they also based these on cultural perceptions rather than
individual ability and ambitions.  Mayyada illustrates this phenomena writing,
My father thankfully influenced my choice because
I first thought of studying law but he suggested that
I should study English language and literature because
the field is more fitting for me as a female in the
society where I live…it was rather a democratic
influence since we discussed both choices and I
was ultimately convinced of his.
In her case, Mayyada was fortunate,  “My first choice was the Department of English [at
the] University of Baghdad…and I got exactly what I wanted because my grades
qualified me for it.” Linda’s father also opined on his daughter’s college plans, although
not quite as diplomatically. “Humanities for my dad are rubbish. He wanted me to study
engineering,” writes Linda, who then turned to her mother. “My mother went to same
university where I studied. I was a bit influenced by her.” Azhar had not intended to
study biology but had to settle for the field when her grades were not high enough to
enter the medical school track.  In the end, she became a respected professor of marine
biology.
Nidhal’s Experience: Student and Student Parent
Nidhal’s story as both a daughter and mother is instructive.  Neither of Nidhal’s parents
were college educated although her mother had some teacher training. She is the second
of five children, including three sisters, and all of her siblings attended college.  Nidhal
felt that her parents sought every advantage of the free education provided by the Iraqi
government.  She remembers that her mother pushed her to study so often that when she
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became an adult she could not accomplish basic household tasks like cooking an egg.
Nidhal wanted to be a pharmacist but having missed the entrance bar by one point on her
baccalaureate exam, she had to settle for chemical engineering instead at the University
of Baghdad.  Currently, she teaches at the University of Technology.  When Nidhal’s
two daughters received their baccalaureate results, their scores were high enough that she
insisted they must choose dentistry, pharmacology or medical studies.  One daughter,
Wasna (currently an undergraduate at the University of Baghdad’s dental college),
explains her mother’s intent:
I know for a fact that both mom and dad would will
support me with any choice I make and if they think
the choice is not good for me, we’ll sit down, discuss
the matter and see if they can convince me.
Nidhal also shared that, in 1996, the Ministry of Industry declared all chemical
engineering departments must halt their admission of female students because there
“were too many in the profession.”  Nidhal reported that five years elapsed before
universities admitted women.269  The female graduate students at the University of
Technology asked for the policy to be reversed in 2000 on the grounds that, as
instructors, “it made them uncomfortable to teach in classrooms with only male
students.”  The MOHE ruled that 15% of the 2001 incoming chemical engineering
students be female followed by another 15% increase in 2002.  According to Nidhal, as
of 2005, more than half of chemical engineering students are female.
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The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)
Saddam’s tyranny metastasized as he dragged Iraq through two wars followed by a
decade of defying the UN and, hence, suffering sanctions. As the longest continual armed
conflict of the twentieth century, the Iran-Iraq War originated over a turf squabble;
Saddam sought greater access to the southern waterway shared between the two
nations.270 Nonetheless, Saddam exploited ideological, cultural and ethnic differences271
between Iraq and the new Iranian theocracy and further insisted Iraqi Shia
(predominantly residing in the south) were rebellious, under the sway of Ayatollah
Khomeni.272  Yet Samir Al-Khalil argues for an ulterior motive on Saddam’s part,
contending that the president saw a war with Iran as an opportunity to foster nationalism
and appoint himself as the defender of pan-Arabism in the Middle East.273  Salbi concurs,
arguing
By reviving ancient animosities and claiming that
[Saddam] was protecting Iraq from the spread of the
Iranian revolution, he was able to portray this as a
defensive war, not a war of aggression.274
However, as the war progressed and failed to achieve Saddam’s objectives, he declared
the conflict a jihad (which he had no vested authority to do), insisting every Iraqi was
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morally obligated to participate militarily.275  10% of all Iraqis served in some war-
related capacity,276 including at least 40,000 female soldiers.277  The Iraqi regime put one
million troops in the field and, by 1986, every male under the age of 55 was put on
conscription notice.278  In essence, this means that almost every Iraqi college student
today had at least one male family member who either served in the war or was under
conscription obligations.  Saddam spent more than one trillion dollars to fund the war,279
up to 300,000 Iraqis died,280 and in the end no territorial shifts transpired.281   Anthony
Shadid concludes, “For many Iraqis, the years of battle with Iran represent great suffering
without a real purpose.  People will often shrug when asked what it was about.”282
Saddam surely recognized the role university students played in the Iranian Revolution,
notably deposing the Shah, overrunning the U.S. Embassy and thrusting the new
theocracy’s tenets onto the global stage.  At the time (1979), Saddam was still considered
a progressive leader and began to amass powerful allies in his build up to war.283
Nonetheless, the successful Iranian coup led, in part, by university students, may have
well fostered the further restrictions and surveillance placed on Iraqi universities in the
1980’s.  The actual war fueled further corrupt admissions practices.  By the mid 1980’s,
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in an effort to reward military service, the regime ordered the MOHE to provide bonus
points on baccalaureate exams for those children or siblings of a fallen soldier.284
Universities felt other repercussions of military obligations.  For instance, during the war
75% of University of Baghdad nursing students were male – rates clearly out of sync
with the department norm.  This was the direct result of women being prevented from
serving on the front lines and the regime facing massive nursing shortages in their
conflict zones.285
The extent to which specific Iraqi campuses sustained damage as a result of the war is
difficult to ascertain.  Basra, especially in the last years of the war, was constantly
bombed from across the shared waterway and many Shia communities faced Saddam’s
wrath for their actual and suspected insurgent activities.  The experience for Baghdadis
was different.  At first, the war barely impacted the capital as it was far from the front and
not lacking in basic commodities.286  Soon, however, Baghdad became saturated in
militaristic ambitions and martyr glory.  Zainab Salbi, who was then an adolescent,
recalls soldiers and the youth laden Civil Defense canvassing the city with their assorted
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weaponry.  Television bulletins endlessly ran graphic images of dead Iranians while cars
snaked through Baghdad with coffins strapped to the their roofs.287
Like embargoes, sanctioned terrorism, and the First Gulf War, the Iran-Iraq war is
significant to this study because it shaped the identity and worldviews of contemporary
university students.  Samir al-Khalil concurs, writing that the Iran-Iraq War “will cut
deep into the modern consciousness of future generations…it will shape their beliefs,
attitudes, prejudices and values for many, many years to come.”288  Those Iraqis who
were children during the Iran-Iraq war recall practicing air raid drills, emergency medical
treatment and identifying Iranian sympathizers.289  A video recently uncovered in
Saddam’s archives shows a girl, prim in a frilly white dress, singing to her president
“One day I hope to hold a gun.”  She looks to be no more than eight years old.290
Shifting family law and national priorities negatively impacted opportunities for
university women. Before the Iran-Iraq War, multiple forms of birth control were
available to Iraqi women but were made illegal once the war began.291 Saddam’s feminist
rhetoric faded amidst pronatalist policies and conciliatory slogans emerged such as “the
fields, the brains, the wombs will bear fruit.”292 Indeed, Saddam seemed to take special
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interest in increasing the number of children born to at least one college educated Iraqi,
granting some men five hundred dinars for marrying a university graduate.293 As the Iran-
Iraq War dragged on, Saddam announced that any woman who had less than five children
“would be considered a threat to national security.”294  While it is unclear whether
women faced prosecution, Saddam did justify his reversal on their educational
opportunities by saying,
[E]ducation in Iraq is spreading at the expense of childbirth…
if a man comes to me and asks me to allow him to study for his
Master’s degree or PhD then I would probably let him do so.
If, however, a twenty-eight year old woman comes to me with
the same request then I would have to calculate how long it
would take for her to get her doctorate, and I would see that
this may take her beyond marriage…I consider the raising of
a family to be far more important than getting a PhD.  We must
unashamedly let this be known to Iraqi women.
Implied in Saddam’s message is that national permission is required to pursue
educational and other personal goals.  Azhar’s experience illustrates this new regime
policy.  Between 1977 and 1989, she had five children and expressed her struggles to
secure birth control – “it was very difficult to buy or get anti-pregnant tablets [and] if I
found [them] I should buy with…a high price.”  Azhar also addressed a rumor that has
consistently circulated throughout Iraq – that during the Iran-Iraq War Saddam began a
fertility enhancement injection program for childbearing aged women (married or not).
Azhar stated that the injection program had occurred although not able to provide
specific evidence; Nedal admitted to having heard the rumor also.  However, both
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Mayyada and Linda strongly refuted the existence of the fertility program.  Regardless,
unlike the previous decade, university women in 1980’s Iraq found their bodies
increasingly under state control, similar to what was happening to their campuses.
The RCC criminalized any new marriages between Iraqi women and foreign men, in an
effort to prevent children from having dual citizenship.295  The law was instated at the
onset of the Iran-Iraq War when Saddam’s vision for an invincible army required a
replenishing troop body.  For women studying abroad, it is unknown how this marriage
law impacted their personal lives.  What should be noted is that most interviewed
participants did not marry while they were university students.  This is, obviously, similar
to marital rates for university women in the western world who often postpone marriage
until after achieving their undergraduates.  However, it should be observed that some of
these eight women have been attending the university for more than a decade.
TABLE TWO: MARITAL DATA FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS





Nidhal Married in mid 1970’s while in graduate school
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Shayma Married in 2000 while in graduate school
Wasna Not married, still an undergraduate
The First Gulf War (1991)
While Iraq did not initiate the First Gulf War, the invasion of Kuwait certainly pointed to
Saddam’s willingness to flaunt international law.  As the Iran-Iraq War drew to its
fruitless end, Saddam began to focus his diatribes on western involvement in Middle
Eastern affairs and how, in his estimation, Kuwait had become an American lapdog.296
Again, Saddam’s real motives for military aggression were more self-serving. Anthony
Shadid argues that the regime invaded Kuwait for potential financial gain.  Kuwait,
wealthy in terms of oil and bank accounts, stood in contrast to Iraq -- now deeply in debt
after the Iran-Iraq War.297  Again, Saddam employed ethnocentric mongering to garner
national support for the invasion. Saddam also exploited scholastic venues to justify his
aggression. Within three weeks of invading Kuwait, three academic publications circuited
Iraq “proving” that Kuwait was actually Iraqi territory and insisting reunification take
place.298
The chronology of the First Gulf War is brief.  On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait
followed, four days later, by the UN passage of Resolutions 660 and 661.  Resolution 660
officially condemned the invasion while Resolution 661 codified the sanctions policy.  In
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early 1991,299 when Iraq refused to withdraw from Kuwait by a UN imposed deadline,
UN Allied Forces300 bombed Iraq.  In the mere 43 days of actual conflict, bombings were
so intense that more than 700 Iraqi sites were destroyed301 including forty university
facilities such as laboratories and residence halls.302  It is estimated that 250,000 Iraqis
died as a result of the conflict.  Zainab Salbi shared the following passage from her
mother’s journal, written at the time of the war:
Every morning and every evening the sky is full of fire.
It looks like Star Wars: airplanes, jets, rockets, missiles.
Every second the house shakes. We get used to the
shaking, but not to being afraid.
Nadje Al-Ali agrees that First Gulf War bombings were especially traumatic:303
Iraqis invariably have vivid memories of the
Gulf War and, even before the latest war, many
Iraqis spoke about ongoing nightmares, a sense
of anxiety and a great sensitivity to certain noises
that could only remotely be mistaken for bombs.304
The majority of today’s university students would have been between the ages of four
and twelve during the war and mental repercussions are apparent today, even in a country
that does not recognize post-traumatic stress disorders.305  Education and medical experts
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agree that today’s young adult population shows the strain of having grown up amongst
wars, sanctions and civil strife.306
Sanctions and the Dispossessed Generation
With Saddam’s refusal to vacate Kuwaiti territory, the United Nations imposed
Resolution 661, barring imports to and exports from Iraq, save items of humanitarian
need.307  The UN knew they were committing the Iraqi people to acute hardship.  In
1991, at the onset of embargoes, 70% of all food consumed in Iraq was imported.308  The
1996 “Oil for Food” modification permitted Iraq to sell a certain percentage of their oil to
purchase food, medicine and other items of humanitarian need309-- none of which directly
impacted university resources.  Not only did Saddam exploit the “Oil for Food” program
to horde funds but, in the estimation of Jan Goodwin, the whole modification was “only a
palliative, and insufficient to overcome the humanitarian crisis in Iraq.”310
Sanctions decimated Iraq and the much of the promise its people held.  Iraq was unable to
make repairs to damage sustained in the First Gulf War -- hundreds of bridges, electrical
grids, refineries, water treatment and sewage facilities were simply left in disrepair
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throughout the decade.311 In a country once deemed the region’s most advanced in terms
of health care and social services, children began dying of malnutrition.  Half of all Iraqi
newspapers and magazines were shut down to preserve paper and the remaining
publications were ordered to cut their circulation in half.312  As sanctions progressed,
there was massive unemployment, inflation and a devalued currency313-- a bag of rice
cost more than one month’s salary for the average Iraqi laborer.314  One of the
embargoes’ most damaging effects to higher education was the erosion of the middle
class --“reduced to penury and struggling simply to survive.”315
Prior to 1991, Iraq held the highest regional rate of women in the labor force at 23% of
the total population.  By 1997, it fell to 10% when salaries could not keep pace with
inflation.316  Social services, such as free transportation to and from campus and childcare
services began to diminish.  Many women could no longer afford to go to work317 or
attend classes.  Iraq already had an inflated rate of female run households as a result of
their engagement in two wars and by the fact that sanctions increased the “forced
migration of men.”318  For many university-affiliated women, this meant that their
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fathers, brothers and even husbands left to work in other countries when able to do so.319
Saeid Neshat summarizes the devastation sanctions wrought on professional Iraqi
women:
During the…period of 1991-2003, women, who had gained a
great deal during the period 1958-1978, were the most endangered
by the war and sanctions. These sanctions created wild inflation
that shut down the whole economy, brought on massive
unemployment, and cut off revenue to the public sector, the largest
employer of women.  The salaries of schoolteachers, doctors, social
workers, engineers and technicians became almost worthless.  Young
women in big cities, who had enjoyed financial independence with
a salary of around $400 a month a few years earlier, suddenly found
that their real wages were reduced to less than $2 a month.320
Naturally, the collective morale of Iraqi womanhood spiraled downward amidst surges in
domestic violence, divorce and male emigration, resulting “in an acute demographic
imbalance.”321 Ultimately, the decade is remembered by Iraqis for its dual repressors:
Saddam and sanctions.  Professional Iraqi families accustomed to household help found
themselves taking care of new tasks – cooking meals, gardening, and cleaning. Nadje Al-
Ali commented on the symbolism of professional women resorting to doing their own
baking– a marker of how far they had fallen economically.322  Or, in the words of Nidhal,
“I never expected to make my own bread.”
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Universities were not immune to the “austerity measures” the regime was forced to take
in response to sanctions.323  Watenpaugh and co-authors write,
It was determined at the time [by the Iraqi government]
that it was impossible for the state to continue to fully
fund universities and maintain a level of quality [and
therefore] it would create a multi-tiered and hierarchical
university system.324
Saddam’s new pet university, Saddam University, became the flagship institution,
replacing the University of Baghdad in terms of funding and resources.325  Established in
the 1990’s and butted against the University of Baghdad,326 Saddam University,
according to Nidhal, operated independently of the MOHE and under the leadership of
Uday Hussein. A newly awarded PhD in political science did not mitigate Uday’s total
lack of university administrative experience. Uday assumed a professorship and much
was made of the thesis he supposedly wrote foretelling the demise of the United States in
the twenty-first century.327  Nidhal insists that Uday culled the brightest professors and
students from other Iraqi universities, forcing them to attend Saddam University.328
Nidhal did concede that the shuffle enhanced the academic output at Saddam University
where classrooms were often limited to twenty-five students (unlike 200 in comparable
classes at the University of Technology).   Nonetheless, the “new system neglected the
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established universities… to the benefit of ad hoc institutions like Saddam University.
Colleges of law, technology and medicine were founded along the same line and lavished
with resources.”329
Again, the state manipulated study programs, financially favoring those fields that most
benefited their immediate needs – namely engineering and medicine.330 Nonetheless,
every Iraqi instructor and student endured hardships, witnessing their education and
expertise become obsolete as the world closed off to them.  Many university students
were expected to use their skills to respond to sanctions’ effects. Students in the computer
networking fields were tasked with repairing the nation’s telecommunications grid that
had been severely damaged in the First Gulf War331 and medical students constantly
treated cases of child malnutrition.332 Azhar witnessed the deteriorating health of
students themselves, writing
students [are] suffering from low hemoglobin
due to malnourishment and also their teeth are
not very well [because it is] very difficult to  go to
the dentist because their money is not enough.
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Textbooks were years, even decades, out of date and most university students relied upon
photocopied versions sold in book markets.333  Riverbend writes,
Because curriculums were American or British,
the books also originated from these countries.
Major publishing houses refused to sell books
to Iraqi universities because their government
considered it illegal (apparently, you can make
a WMD using a calculus book).334
Furthermore, the U.S Treasury Department ordered American professional organizations
to limit services they provided to members residing in embargoed countries, including
mailing serial publications and providing online access.335 UNESCO reported that the
“presence of Iraqi scientists in internationally refereed journals [was] very low,” and
primarily limited to Iraq’s own eighteen journals, of which all were scientific in nature.336
Faculty couple Jenan Al-Mukhtar and MH Al-Ali remember their productive lives before
sanctions’ isolation set in, “Until 1990, we were active in research, producing at least
four to six papers each academic year.  We were in continuous contact with many foreign
universities and took part in conferences.”337 Interviewed women, recalling their own
academic hardships, wrote of sanctions repercussions. Ghaida, of the University of
Basra, remembers three or four students having to share one computer to complete in-
class assignments in her computer networking classes and Azhar had to rely on friends
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outside of Iraq to smuggle books to her. Linda claimed her textbooks were twenty years
old and that, as a translation student, she had no access to “English speaking media.”
Nidhal’s situation was equally dire. As a chemical engineering student at both the
University of Baghdad and Technology, she used lab equipment from the 1970’s.  Nidhal
also stated that paper was so scarce that “official university correspondence was printed
on the back of PhD theses.”
The 1996 Oil for Food modification included a MOHE request for $692 million in funds.
In the end, Iraqi universities received only $263 million in supplies of which nearly 45%
were vehicle donations.  Educational and sports equipment constituted 23%, teaching
materials comprised 22% and the remaining donations were furniture, generators and
printing machinery. Almost none of the $263 million included laboratory or information
technology equipment.338 Essentially, the UN and affiliated donors barely took into
consideration campus needs, doing little to remedy the situation.
As a result of sanctions, “Many of these [university] institutions” concludes Keith
Watenpaugh, “are frozen in terms of development somewhere in the late 1980’s.”339
Many Iraqi academics remain bitter that their brethren in other countries forsook them,
especially those professors who built relationships with their own instructors during their
study abroad years.  One Iraqi history professor explained the sentiment, “we knew our
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government was never with us.  But we trusted the West, the professor community
abroad, our colleagues, whose principles we shared.”340
Nowhere was the sense of isolation more apparent than the late arrival of the internet to
Iraq.  Saddam severely curtailed internet access in addition to the restrictions placed by
the UN.  Linda asserted that Saddam had IT personnel scramble “any site [that had]
anything to say against Saddam.” As of 2000, college students were aware of the
internet’s potential but had limited access to it, especially on campus (instead, most relied
on pay-as-you-go internet cafes).  Anthony Shadid, who traveled to Iraq numerous times
in the 1990’s, recalls, “By 1998, almost embarrassed by their backwardness, professors
would ask me about the [i]nternet, amazed and bewildered.”341  Ghaida, as the
University of Basra’s computer center director, did not have campus internet access until
2001 and even today, struggles to get full-text research articles because of access barriers
and downloading capabilities.  In 2002, the government did open several internet cafes
but barred entry into numerous sites and monitored email.342 In essence, as the rest of the
world’s universities accustomed themselves to greatly enhanced global engagement, Iraqi
students remained in the technological dark ages.  “When we got the internet in 2000,”
remembers Nidhal, “it was astonishing because we saw the world was so small.”
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Most Iraqis shared Nidhal’s savvy, understanding that “Saddam wasn’t under sanctions,
only the Iraqis.” In countless ways, Saddam manipulated the embargoes program to
further exploit Iraqis as well as increase his personal wealth by illegally selling oil.  He
continued to lavish himself and his cronies with luxury goods and palatial homes,
complained Azhar.  All the while, according to Linda, “he grew greedier and more
brutal” and “imprisoned more people.” The ultimate effect of UN sanctions was to give
the tyrant the wherewithal to become more tyrannical.  From a distance, it may be
convenient for equally educated and freer people to ask why the Iraqis did not overthrow
Saddam.  The response by one female Iraqi professor is telling: “I would rather be a live
rabbit than a dead and dismembered lion.”343  In retrospect, it seems rather fanciful that
the western world expected the Iraqi professional classes to lead a coup when the west
was not promising military back-up, refuge, aid and professional job placement.
Therefore, when Saddam was “re-elected” in 2002 with 100% of the vote, when the
election body announced his victory long before any ballot counting could have been
completed, the Iraqi people did not show outrage, only sorrowful acceptance.
According to Nidhal, some Iraqi universities saw a vast improvement in their resources
beginning in 2000.  At the University of Technology, where Nidhal teaches, campus
conditions suddenly improved between 2000 and 2003.  Buildings and grounds were
restored, air conditioning installed and every faculty member received a new computer.
In addition, limited access to western media was permitted by 2002, including new
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satellite service that brought cable channels like VH1 and the Discovery Channel (news
programming remained prohibited).344 While it is unclear why Saddam suddenly
reestablished himself as the patron of higher learning, one possibly reason is that he
suspected an imminent invasion by the United States.  Refurbishing the universities not
only made Iraq look modern and progressive to the outside world, it also elevated
Saddam to champion status among his own people while demonizing the west for their
sanctions.
Nonetheless, sanctions and Saddam’s reactionary measures razed Iraq’s higher education,
dashing it from its stature of regional esteem.  “Degrees became worthless,” writes Nadje
Al-Ali, “in the context of widespread corruption and an uninterrupted exodus of
university professors in the 1990’s.”345  Those professors who were able to emigrate were
fortunate – between travel restrictions imposed by sanctions346 and Saddam’s iron fisted
refusal to let anyone to escape, very few students (or professors) could secure
opportunities abroad.  Par for the course, such limitations did not apply to Saddam’s
friends and powerful Baath members, remark Mayyada and Azhar.  Ghaida insists that
the few study abroad scholarships that were available were  “specified to male not female
faculty as the woman was prevented [from] complet[ing] her PhD or MSc study outside
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of Iraq.”347   Today, university women still aspire to see the wider world.  Linda
confesses bittersweetly, “it was a corny dream.  I’m still dreaming about it, I’m sure one
day I will, inshallah.”348  Ghaida is more dismal, “we were feeling [that we were]
arrested in a big jail! We could release [ourselves in] March 2003349 but I think it is too
late to be free…”
In such a climate, maintaining a façade of higher learning required ingenuity,
determination and faith.  In the estimation of Azhar, “during Saddam’s regime,
especially 2000-2003, our university [was] similar to [a] secondary school.” In essence,
Iraqis became survivalists where “food [was] more important than knowledge.”350
Teaching shortages became a mounting issue in sanctions era Iraq with diminishing
incomes, standards and qualified instructors.  Students did demonstrate resilience in the
midst of intellectual inertia and isolation.  Ghaida found herself an increasingly self-
directed learner, “we depend on…self-learning before teaching our students” and Azhar
managed to have the Red Cross bring her scientific textbooks at the University of Basra.
However, some students (and their instructors) were forced to forsake learning for
income in the face of harsh realities.  Mayyada writes
It was…misery since students had no hope to achieve
anything of worth after getting [their] university degrees.
Professional opportunities for professors were nil, as
the chances and scopes of university professors were
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not much better than those for primary school teachers.”
The tragic consequences sanctions and Saddam ultimately had on every Iraqi university
member is wistfully illustrated in the following joke, often told in Iraq.
A cab driver was speeding down the highway when
he was cut off by a large delivery truck.  He leaned
out the window to yell at the truck driver, “Hey! You
ought to let me go first!  I’m a professor at the
university!” shouted the cab driver.  “That’s nothing,”
responded the truck driver, “I’m the university
president.”
Conclusion
Iraqi youth, especially in comparison to their Iranian peers, had been relatively passive –
not despite their government’s efforts but specifically due to its totalitarian nature.  For
two decades, “the Iraqi people were scared …to speak or refuse any law issued by
Saddam” Mayyada confessed.  Students witnessed their professors, neighbors and family
members be interrogated, imprisoned and even murdered.  Regardless of the presence of
codified law, the aims of the Baath always superceded civil rights.351  The Iraqi
government served just one master – Saddam, who never had any vested interest in
advancing women or higher education for their own sake.  In essence, learning became
synonymous with indoctrination and an Iraqi degree contingent upon Baath allegiance.
And for women betrothed to Saddam’s vision of an egalitarian Iraq, promises made soon
became too lethal to break.
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By 2001, Iraqis were aware that the Bush administration intended to reinvade, and, for
many, they hoped that this time their brutal dictator would be removed.  Keith
Watenpaugh warned that some Iraqis were no longer willing to remain complacent,
“Clearly Iraq’s campuses are set to become radicalized loci.”352  With the 2003 invasion
(led by the United States and its allies353), university students, just like Linda and her
“corny dream,” dared to imagine new lives with the freedom to travel and make up the
academic ground they had lost.  As will be seen in the next chapter, the chaos resulting
from the Allied Invasion provided few genuine opportunities for students and
considerably more danger, enemies and hardships.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Nominal Allies and Actual Insurgents:
Universities in Contemporary Iraq
When the city that was to become Baghdad was founded in the eighth century, it was
called the “city of peace,”354 but since 2003, it has been anything but peaceful. Between
the Allied invasion and resulting military occupation, civil violence between Shia and
Sunni groups, and the infiltration of foreign terrorist cells in the current leadership
vacuum, Iraq is, for all intents and purposes, in complete chaos.  University students
could hardly imagine their lives more challenged than they were during sanctions and,
yet, the 2003 invasion delivered on few promises and made the pursuit of higher
education a hazardous occupation.  From the perspective of women, pursuing their
university studies mutated into a daily challenge of avoiding suicide bombers, gunfire,
carjackings and Islamist vigilantes.
The U.S. and allied nations’ stated case for invasion has mutated over the past few years,
and that debate is beyond the scope of this research.  What is certain is that nearly 24,000
civilian Iraqis died between March 2003 (the onset of aerial bombings) and March 2005
of which 18% were women and children.355   On just the second night of the air
campaign, 320 cruise missiles were dropped into Baghdad alone.356  By April 7, Allied
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forces controlled Baghdad and within two days, rampant looting had taken over the
city.357  Three months later, Uday Hussein was killed and five months following his
death, Saddam was captured.  While stable leadership and governance has not yet
established itself in Iraq, the official occupation of Iraq ended on June 28, 2004 with the
seating of Iraq’s provisional government.358 Iraqis held elections six months later359 and
continue nascent efforts to become autonomously ruled despite multiple competing
factions and insurgent campaigns.
Student Resilience
A composite picture of current Iraqi higher education reveals there are 1290 university
students for every 100,000 inhabitants, or approximately 13% of the total population.360
Nationally, there were 262,000 undergraduates and 18,000 graduate or PhD students in
the 2003-2004 academic year, according to Deputy MOHE Minister Beriwan
Khailany.361  While some researchers and media outlets contend that Iraqi women
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comprise approximately half of the current college student population,362 Dr. Beriwan
asserted that a more realistic figure is 38%.363
The MOHE functioned episodically during 2003 and 2004; nonetheless, all university
applicants still processed through the ministry.  In 2003, 75,000 Iraqis submitted
university applications with 90% identifying the University of Baghdad as their first
choice (of which 10,000 would be accepted).364  Contemporary Baghdad is far from an
idyllic college town.  Anthony Shadid sensed that “even under Saddam’s terrifying grasp,
the city has never felt so dangerous or out of control.”365  Yet, students returned to their
studies in droves in 2003, despite and sometimes in the midst of military action and civil
violence. Eighty-three percent of the entire college population, or 240,000 students,
returned to their classes just weeks after the war began.366  In Linda’s case, commuting
to class came to involve navigating crossfire:
One day, fighting between the [Iraqi National Guard] and
“insurgents” was in full swing.  We were a few blocks from
[campus when] …[a]ll of the sudden, the driver announced
that the guards signaled him to stop.  I had a class I couldn’t
miss …so I decided to walk amidst the shootout.367
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Student resilience is remarkable given the collective mental state of Iraqis.  In the twenty-
six years reviewed in this historical study, Iraq was engaged in wars for ten years,
dominated by Saddam’s tyranny for twenty-five, sanctions reigned for twelve years and
foreign occupation the last three.  In the estimation of the Iraqi Prospect Organisation,
current university students’ “experience of normal civil society is limited due to the
totalitarian nature of the [Baathist] state.”368  One father describes his daughter life,
beginning with her 1979 arrival: “She opened her eyes to the Iran-Iraq war …[and] hasn’t
seen one moment of happiness or security.”369  A Baghdad psychiatrist noted the increase
of young adult patients with panic and anxiety disorders as well as severe depression.370
Mental health experts expect to see continuously increasing rates of post-traumatic stress
and schizoid disorders, and the troubling symptoms that accompany these, given the
unrelenting isolation and violence to which young Iraqis to have been exposed.371
Riverbend, a recent college graduate, wrote in her blog Baghdad Burning,
I think everyone I know is suffering from that mental strain.
You can see it the eyes and hear it in the taut voices that
threaten to break with the burden of emotion.  We’re all
watching things carefully and trying to focus on leading
semi-normal lives.372
Nidhal, a University of Technology instructor, whisked her pregnant daughter away from
the city (herself a student at the University of Baghdad) in 2003.  In Nidhal’s estimation,
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Shayma was suffering from “shell shock and having panic attacks,” taking Valium up to
three times a day.  Human Rights Watch warns that the victimization of women in
regions of conflict inhibits their ability to participate in the rehabilitation of civil society:
The failure…to protect women and girls from
violence, and redress it when it occurs, has both
immediate and long-term negative implications for
the safety of women and girls and for their participation
in post-war life in Iraq.373
Shayma’s narrative illustrates the repercussions Human Rights Watch is speaking of:
You know the unbelievable circumstances that we
live here in Iraq …I can’t stand [it] anymore…I’m
depressed and tired and fed up…I can’t live like this
anymore…always in my prayers I ask God to take me
before anything happen[s] to my family…I’m so
angry at myself because I can’t let my daughter
feel safe…everyday when she goes to kindergarten
I…imagine if I won’t see her again.
“Liberated Iraq”
The United Nations unanimously voted374 in 2003 for the United States and Great Britain
to be vested with “sweeping formal authority” in the occupation of Iraq,375 which came to
be the Coalition of Provisional Authority (CPA).  According to the US Institute of Peace,
“the rebuilding of Iraq is the most far-reaching reconstruction enterprise since the efforts
in Europe and Japan at the conclusion of World War II.”376 The CPA was never able to
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stabilize post-war Iraq, despite U.S. declarations that the country was now liberated and
on the road to democratic governance.  Instead, argues women’s activist Zainab Salbi,
“The violence under Saddam, which had been controlled vertically by the government,
had now spread horizontally out across the neighborhoods.” Since Iraq’s liberation,
conflicting ideologies butt against one another, making consensus-building nearly
impossible.  Anthony Shadid astutely observes that when Americans hear the word
“occupation” they hark back to the productive and harmonious rehabilitation of Europe
and Japan post WWII.  Conversely, for Arabs the term conjures images of Israeli
occupied Lebanon, and, of course, Palestine.377  Keith Watenpaugh is even bleaker,
insisting that US and British higher education advisors “play[ed] a paternalistic
role…akin to colonial administrators:”378
While these programs have the potential to aid Iraqis as they
rebuild their educational structures, in the long run they will
tar all American educational initiatives and American academics
with the same neo-colonial brush.379
In the end, writes Watenpaugh,
Core values of open exchange, freedom of inquiry,
women’s participation in higher education and faculty
self-management may all be dismissed as “American”
values and moreover as anti-Muslim.
Vast portions of Iraq now exist in lawlessness – in 2003, Baghdadis witnessed seventy
carjackings daily.380   Events rarely present in regime-era Iraq, such as Islamist terrorism,
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seeped into the country.  For instance, al-Qaeda terrorists executed more than forty Shia
travelers over a several week period in 2005 on the road between Basra and Baghdad.381
Due to multiple insurgent efforts as well as the United States lack of appropriate post-
conflict planning, municipal services such as water and electricity do not meet basic
demand.  In many cases, power systems and treatment plants that sustained damage in the
First Gulf War were not repaired during sanctions and to this day remain defunct. Nedal
attempts to see her situation with some humor, “no electricity, no fuel, no water, no
internet, just count the ‘no’s’ here, this is our horrible life and in spite of all that we [are]
still working, studying, laugh[ing] and alive.”
Allied forces became notorious for their inability to secure Iraq, establish basic services,
and their lack of cultural sensitivity.  “The American promises to Iraq are like trying to
hold water in your hand.  It spills through your fingers,” complained the owner of
Baghdad’s Renaissance Bookstore.382  Keith Watenpaugh declared the 2003-2004
reconstruction year “a total waste”383 and Anthony Shadid made the following
observation:
There was never really a plan for post-Saddam Iraq.
There was never a realistic view of what might ensue
after the fall.  There was hope that became faith, and
delusions that became fatal.384
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In retrospect, Allied forces failed to identify priorities and envision probable outcomes.
This includes conceptualizing the role universities could have played in reconstruction
efforts and democracy-building.  Furthermore, the United States overestimated the
gratitude they believed Iraqis would have for their “liberators.”  In the end, when it could
not deliver on its promises, the US seemed mystified that Iraqis reacted in anger.  Shadid
concludes that, “the Americans brought a revolution without ambition and upheaval
without design.”385
All of the women interviewed for this study spoke of the exhaustion threaded throughout
their daily lives – worrying which commute route was likely to be safe, how long
electricity would be available, hoping a delayed family member had not being abducted
or worse.  In 2004, Nidhal and her daughter Shayma, as well as Shayma’s preschool-
aged daughter, narrowly escaped a bombing near the Green Zone that destroyed their car.
It was the frustrating monotony created by military checkpoints that really exhaust
Nidhal, “To get to the university takes about two hours …[m]y husband is driving me to
the university because I don’t like to drive in such…messy and dangerous road
condition[s].” Riverbend’s blog details her constant wariness, attempting to be vigilant
for car bombings or checkpoint soldiers who might find her “suspicious.”386  It may seem
ironic to contemporary Iraqis that their despot is finally on trial and yet thousands of
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street crimes now go unpunished.  “Nothing seemed secure,” writes Anthony Shadid,
“not cars, not homes, not daughters, nothing.”387
Female students, like all Iraqi women, have been liberated from Saddam’s sadism only to
find themselves victimized by a war, foreign occupation, rampant street crime and
warring Islamist factions.  By far, the gravest concern for university women is getting to
and from classes safely. Nidhal expressed the uncertainty many commuting Baghdadis
must feel: “we all know that if [we] return back home safe …[one] day, maybe not [so] at
another time. [It] is just like [being on a death list] but we don’t know when or where.”
Exhibiting equal despair, Ghaida shared “Nowadays, no university work, no peace.”
Between March and August of 2003, there were approximately 400 reported cases of
women being abducted in Baghdad alone.388  Most families viewed reporting abductions
to the CPA as futile; instead taking on search-and-rescue missions or revenge into their
own hands.389  University women may appeal to kidnappers for various reasons.
Professional abductors may assume these women’s families have the resources to pay
large ransoms and sex industry traffickers seek Iraqi women for brothels abroad.390
Finally, Islamist factions have attacked, abducted and murdered Iraqi women in
moralizing campaigns over what they perceive to be depraved, overly western lifestyles.
Regardless of the motives, the impact is that women cannot freely leave their homes: “the
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situation is incredibly frustrating to females who work or go to college.”391  For these
emerging professional women, the experience seems infantilizing – adult women are told
they may not leave the house or, if they are permitted, must do so with a male relative,
often himself armed.  Linda expresses that she keeps “in mind my mother’s warnings:
‘do not talk to strangers, they could be pro-Saddam, or pro-some-militia, so keep your
views to yourself’ – it’s fun to be over twenty, but you still feel like five.”392
While Iraq is certainly not a safe place for young men either, it must be acknowledged
that women are uniquely vulnerable during this time.  Nadje Al-Ali theorizes that
Violence against women is often endemic in post-war
situations, partly because of the general state of anarchy
and chaos but also as an element of heightened aggression
and militarization, and prevailing constructions of masculinity
promoted during conflict.393
Young Iraqi women are attacked in what may be classified as “gender-neutral” crimes,
such as ransom-based kidnappings; but women are also targets for sexual and moralizing
attacks, which rarely impact men directly.  Yet again, it is the pervasive and unrelenting
fear, the rumors which cannot be fully disproved, that are nearly as demoralizing as
surviving an attack itself.  For University of Baghdad biology professor, Naba al Barak,
street violence hinders women’s ability to participate in Iraq’s refashioning. She argues
The most important thing is security.  Women’s issues
will have to come second.  If there is no security, we
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won’t even be able to go out to the streets to protest
something that is against out rights.394
It appears as if those factions willing to use terrorism to achieve their objectives have
reached the same conclusion:  fear is an effective systemic barrier to open and democratic
communities.  Islamist sects that are opposed to women moving freely through society
harass and threaten women, douse them with acid, and worse.  Zeena al-Qushtaini was a
college-educated Baghdadi who co-owned a pharmacy with a male physician.  A
divorced mother of two young children, Zeena was known for her work on behalf of
women’s rights and expensive, western-styled clothing.  One March evening in 2005, six
armed gunmen stormed the pharmacy and kidnapped Zeena and her partner.  They were
found ten days later on a highway just south of Baghdad.  The physician had been
beheaded and Zeena had a bullet in her head.  Those who murdered Zeena dressed her in
a full abaya before dumping her body.395
Professional Iraqi Women and Islam Today
Islamist groups, many of which do not hail from Iraq, want Iraqis to choose between their
Islamist ethic and personal beliefs and ambitions. Radical Shia clerics package this
dilemma as the chasm between devout Muslims and fallen ones, insistent that Sharia law
govern Iraq.396 Most middle class, professional Iraqis do not polarize their faith as such
and dismiss the idea that they are not devout simply because they do not want to live
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under Sharia law.  Furthermore, a schism has widened between Shia and Sunni Muslims,
instigated by contemporary political fears rather than a tradition of segregation.  Middle-
age Iraqis “remember fondly a country in which no one knew who was Sunni and who
was Shiite” before “identity politics” fractured Iraqi civil society.397
As illustrated by Zeena al-Qushtaini’s murder, some clerical groups act inhumanely in
the name of their god.  But Riverbend insists this is not Islam: “This is not done in the
name of God—it is done in the name of power.”398  She continues in her blog,
Any oppression to women isn’t a reflection
on Islam.  It is a reflection on certain narrow
minds, ignorance, and politicization of religion.
Islam is a progressive religion and no religion
is clearer on the rights of women.399
Islam has always promoted education for all persons, not just clerics, scribes, the
privileged and male.400 The Prophet’s heirs will be the learned401 and the wise man Hasan
Basari insists that the “ink of the learned” is more precious than “the blood of
martyrs.”402
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Yaner Mohammed, President of the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq, says,
“we’re surprised by the rise of political Islam” and stresses that her country is not a
“conservative Islamic society” like many in the region.403   Another reason Iraq’s
intelligentsia are taken aback by the Islamist presence in their midst is that such
movements had previously been contained to poorer and less educated communities.
What is striking about these Islamist terrorists is their willingness to use tactics that
conflict with their principles of appropriate womanhood.  In their efforts to moralize
through intimidation, clerical groups violate their own codes by speaking directly to
women they do not know, taking them to secluded places, being outwardly disrespectful,
and exposing, touching and defiling these women’s bodies.  It may seem surreal for many
urbane Iraqi women to see the grip fundamentalism has taken.  Of course, there are
women who participate in Sharia and other radical Islamist sects.  Ilana Ozernoy reports
that “for some [young women], Saddam Hussein’s ouster has meant the right to embrace
religious extremism; for others the right to embrace jeans, Internet chatrooms and the
Backstreet Boys.”404  The significance of Islamist movements to this study is that
universities and female students are so often the focus of their campaigns whether these
factions are dominating student elections, disrupting classes, attacking female students or
murdering their professors.
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Social Engagements for University Women
Parents of adolescent and young adult daughters severely restrict shopping and social
excursions from a realistic concern over street violence.  Not surprisingly, these young
women complain that they feel like prisoners and that their entire engagement with the
outside world consists of channel or internet surfing and chatting on cellular phones.405
By 2004, more than 300 channels were available in Iraq through satellite television.406
While few professional families entirely circumvent their daughter’s access to campus,
most women are encouraged to attend classes only and then rush home.  However, more
alarmist attitudes may be on the rise. A study of nearly 2,000 Shia residents in southern
Iraq cited civil violence (as well as rampant unemployment rates) as an adequate reason
to limit women’s education.407
Many young Iraqi women take advantage of “ether socializing” – mingling in digital
communities rather than in the actual presence of people.   As of 2005, there were more
than eleven million cellular subscribers in Iraq, marking a 158% increase in two years.408
This, in turn, spurred the “secret boyfriend” phenomena whereby young Iraqi women are
courted over their cellular phones as well as in internet chat rooms.409  While perhaps not
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as intimate, dating Iraqis have few other options – popular nightclubs and restaurants
have been blown up and strolling couples report being harassed and even shot at by
religious vigilantes.
Today, Iraqi youth access internet venues for their academic and social benefits, but also
to share the realities of their lives through blogging.  Riverbend,410 an anonymous,
female, recent university graduate and Linda,411 interview participant, post regularly on
their blogs and are oft quoted in this study.  Both blogs are fascinating reading, each
sardonic, keenly perceptive and evocative.  At internet forums like aliraqi.org,412 young
men and women, Iraqis and foreigners, send hundreds of posts daily on matters as diverse
as Sunni-Shia relations, finding old classmates, soccer, women’s rights and beer.
CPA Efforts to Rehabilitate Iraqi Universities
The CPA appointed personnel to oversee the temporary administration and restoration of
postsecondary education and, more specifically, the removal of Baath professors and
administrators.  In the end, the CPA failed to accomplish the first objective and acted
excessively in the latter case.  CPA Order Number One, “De-Baathification of Iraqi
Society,” was issued in June 2003 and commanded that all Baath, senior level
administrators across all regions and government sectors were “hereby removed from
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their positions and banned form future employment in the public sector.”413  For
universities, this meant that most top level administrators, presidents, deans, chairs, as
well as senior professors, were immediately terminated and campuses, already in the
midst of multiple crises, were left sans leadership.414  While the CPA naively hoped de-
Baathification measures would remove all vestiges of Saddam’s tyranny, the plan was
shortsighted. First and foremost, the CPA appeared ignorant to the fact that most senior
administrators and professors joined the Baath Party for job protection and promotion and
not because of any authentic allegiance.415  Nor did the CPA have the wherewithal to fill
the vacancies they created. Senior level gender equity was certainly not a concern.  Save
for the appointment of Deputy MOHE Minister Beriwan Khailany, the CPA did not insist
that women play a prominent role in higher education planning and development.
The effects of de-Baathification were comparable to the looting of campus libraries –
entire entities were laid waste.  Sixty-five of seventy instructors at the University of
Baghdad’s political science program were identified as Baath members and the CPA
dismissed six of the most senior professors.416  Nearly 180 more University of Baghdad
professors shared the same fate.417  When university president Sami Mudhafar, a long-
time anti-Baathist, realized the CPA would not relent until they removed all Baath
members in leadership positions, he took his concerns to the MOHE.  Mudhafar
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expressed that his campus would soon face massive teaching shortages and that he could
no longer endorse CPA policies.  Instead of being lent a sympathetic ear, he was
immediately asked to resign.418
The MOHE faced numerous additional challenges aside from protesting presidents.
Looters burned and sacked the MOHE building several times with one of the biggest
losses being the recently installed nation-wide database of student records.419
Reconstruction funds earmarked for Iraqi higher education almost never materialized
although, grants Keith Watenpaugh,
smaller programs sponsored by the USAID that link US
and Iraqi universities have had some positive results,
this includes Al-Sharaka, a program headquartered at
the University of Oklahoma.420
The MOHE, only moderately functional during the height of sanctions, was rendered
nearly useless by the end of 2003. In the estimation of Deputy Minister Idris Salih,421
85% of Iraqi higher education infrastructure was destroyed between 2003 and 2005.422
Salih’s counterpart, Beriwan Khailany, highlighted other problems currently encountered
by the MOHE and its universities:
• Higher education remains highly centralized
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• Curriculum is standardized at the national level
• There are few international engagements or collaborations
• No bilateral agreements with other institutions
• Brain drain: the emigration of Iraqi professors and other researchers423
The CPA could not or would not prioritize the universities and by doing so damaged
relations with an Iraqi sector both familiar with the west and likely to advocate for
rehabilitation and democracy building.   Deputy Minister Khailany criticized US agencies
and grant awardees tasked with rehabilitating Iraqi higher education in this stateside radio
broadcast:
When the US liberated Iraq, all we Iraqis were very
happy to be free from the dictatorship,  After the war
stopped, we were expecting a lot from America and
then they were very slow…European and Asian countries
did a lot more than the Americans.  The only running
program we have so far is with Oklahoma University…apart
from that, in the past two years, we haven’t gotten anything.424
CPA appointed higher education advisors did little to impress Iraqi academics, even
though these advisors were:
de facto head[s] of Iraq’s university system with the
ultimate power to veto appointments and set budgets…
answering first to L. Paul Bremer425 and then the Pentagon.426
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Keith Watenpaugh and his colleagues are especially critical of the CPA’s oversight of the
MOHE and universities calling it “institutionally indifferent to the needs of Iraqis.”427
University officials were overwhelmed as they attempted to navigate the multi-tiered,
cumbersome CPA bureaucracy.428  Furthermore, few CPA staff members appointed to
the MOHE spoke Arabic or were familiar with Iraqi history and culture,429 nor
demonstrated experience with or a vision for higher education in post-conflict regions.
Military Interactions with Students and on Campus
Students at the Universities of Technology and Baghdad eagerly returned to their
campuses in May of 2003, mere weeks after the city endured unrelenting aerial
bombings.  They arrived to campuses heavily fortified, damaged, and ransacked.  Both
universities had security checkpoints manned by Allied troops.  Tanks crisscrossed the
campuses and University of Technology students insist US tanks broke down the main
gates to provide looters access.430  The campus was, again, the focus of intense weapons
inspections.  Temporary barracks and barbed wire peppered the University of Baghdad’s
landscape as the campus was a securable, strategic site for Allied forces.  Both soldiers
and squatters occupied residence hall space431 while students were absent and did not
vacate upon the students’ return, “causing serious friction between university authorities
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and the Coalition [of] Provisional Authority.”432  Approximately 75% of University of
Baghdad residential housing was occupied by foreign soldiers,433 which left, according to
university president Mosa al-Mosawe, 5,000 students without campus rooms.434  Worse
yet, the CPA never reimbursed the university for the use of these rental spaces.435
Students often encountered armed soldiers during their school day.  Troops were
stationed in lecture halls and, on occasion, denied professors entry into their own
classrooms because they were late.436  It is safe to surmise that commuting delays caused
by Allied security checkpoints were the source of many tardy instructors.  In April of
2003, US Marines exchanged machine gunfire with unidentified combatants midday at a
University of Baghdad campus. The Marines then stormed several buildings, in the midst
of classes, looking for the shooters. On the same day, gunfire resulted in the accidental
explosion of anti-aircraft ammunition that was being stored on campus.437 The presence
of western soldiers makes many female students uncomfortable especially with
mandatory “pat downs” at security checkpoints. For Muslim women, this process is
offensive and demoralizing and has caused many women to simply return (and remain at)
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home rather than endure it.438  The reaction of one US Army intelligence officer
exemplifies the divide between extending empathy and security concerns: “We’re not
going to risk the lives of one of our soldiers to be culturally sensitive.”439
University Wastelands
Sanctions-era students surely believed they endured the nadir in their country’s higher
education legacy.  But, in addition to the humiliation and disappointment associated with
the Allied occupation, endless waves of looting left students and faculty stunned by the
decimation surrounding them.  Illustrations of the looting are gut wrenching for scholars
to document: the University of Baghdad’s music department lost 6,000 recordings and
thirty pianos.440  The oldest astronomy department in the Middle East, located at the
University of Basra, was completely ransacked.441  Antiquities and ancient manuscripts
were whisked away to black market dealers and looted library books can be found at
Baghdad’s famed Friday markets.442
Ancient artifacts and books have received the greatest response, in terms of donations,
from foreign higher education institutions.  For Keith Watenpaugh, this is troubling:
While there has been a tremendous international outcry
for the archaeological museums and the ancient past of
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Mesopotamia – things that fir neatly into the trajectory
of the heritage of “our Western Civilization,” a similar
outcry for that past most present in the lives of
contemporary Iraqis, the heritage of Islamic, Ottoman,
Arab – colonial and post-colonial periods was absent
altogether.443
University of Basra Professor Abbas Ebadi agrees, “I have seen all the attention artifacts
thousands of years old have gotten…but this was where we trained young minds for the
future.”444
University libraries sustained considerable looting and damage to their structures and
book drives were begun to restore library collections.  However, in some cases,
international donors failed to identify those university libraries most desperate for
assistance.  Case in point is the University of Baghdad that housed 750,000 volumes.
While only 1% of books were stolen in 2003 looting,445 US and UK philanthropies made
so many donations to the university library that most of these books had to be
warehoused.  On the other hand, items that the university library desperately needed
replaced like computers, air conditioning units and copiers, were not sent. 446 Other
university libraries that endured more pervasive looting were not the benefactors of
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similar generosity. The University of Mosul lost 890,000 volumes and 190,000
disappeared from the University of Basra library,447 after which it was torched.448
Seemingly mundane objects did not escape the efforts of looters or the ire of vandals.
Pictures shared by the MOHE449 show cables ripped from ceilings, steel beams and
venetian blinds torn down, chunks of cement wrenched from the walls, and stairs hacked
apart.  Classrooms and residence halls were robbed of all furniture and fixtures.  Lab,
computer and office equipment disappeared almost immediately in March 2003 but the
looters were not done until they had stripped campuses of their window frames,
doorknobs and lightbulbs.  Students learned their academic records were burnt, scattered
to the winds450 or sold to “document shops” where Iraqis can purchase personal data
about one another.451
Identifying why the looted occurred and who is responsible is difficult due to the number
of suspected groups.  Evidence on most campuses indicates that looting was not merely
opportunistic as arson and wanton destruction accompanied many episodes.452  Anthony
Shadid argues that many looters targeted universities (along with other government
                                                
447 Andrew Albanese and Michael Rogers. “Iraqi Libraries Devastated in War.” Library Journal
128, no. 9 (May 15, 2003).
http://www.libraryjournal.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA296431
448 Mark Santora, “Aftereffects,” 13.
449 Beriwan Kjailany, “Department of Higher Education and Scientific Research: Iraq after the
War,” speech delivered at the University of Oklahoma. Al Sharaka Program for Higher Education
in Iraq, April 27, 2004.
450 Watenpaugh, “Opening the Doors One Year Later.”
451 Frontline World, Saddam’s Road to Hell.
452 See, for example, Mark Santora, “Aftereffects.”
126
entities) to retaliate against Saddam.453  Some looting may be classified as “investigative”
– specifically when Allied troops scoured laboratories and scientific departments.  This,
in no way, is meant to diminish the destruction these spaces sustained.454 University of
Technology students believe Kuwaitis also looted and vandalized their campus,
according to Nidhal.  She insists that in 2003 a large Kuwaiti truck arrived on campus
and unloaded several people who set about to destroy lab and engineering studies space,
all in retaliation for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait tweleve years earlier.  In most instances,
looting was the work of poorer Iraqis stealing items that might fetch them a few dinars.
By mid-May 2003, University of Basra students arrived each morning to see donkey carts
exiting the campus gates, laden with chairs, bricks, coils and books.  Having worked
through the night, the looters passed the students on their way to the thieves’ market.455
Iraqi students and their professors also question the role western forces played by
allowing looters access .456  For example, University of Basra students complain that
British troops stood by as looters pillaged their campus. Brigadier Graham Binns,
overseer of the city’s occupation, stated he explicitly ordered soldiers to not shoot
campus looters.457  Such experiences added to the collective sense of student despair:
“war-time looting and raids by US troops not only disrupted  [students’] studies, but
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affected them psychologically too by violating the apparent sanctity of their campus.”458
Allied forces experienced regret also – one senior CPA official estimated that the
inability to prevent looting “tripled the cost of reconstruction.”459  Who did come to the
aid of Iraqi universities and many other communities were clerical groups.  Armed
Islamist patrols did what police and soldiers could or would not do: stopping looters,
confiscating stolen goods, banning civilian shootouts, distributing food and medical
treatment.  Certain trade-offs were implied in these arrangements and some clerical
groups began to identify aided communities as their newly acquired turf.460 Nadje Al-Ali
elaborates, “In light of the failure of US and UK soldiers to protect hospitals, museums,
libraries, etc., the only people perceived to have provided security in a systematic way are
the religious authorities.”461
Campus life in Iraq today is marked by deprivations and very real dangers. Parents are
organizing car pools or renting buses to take neighborhood students to campus as
abductions grip cities in fear.462 Deputy Minister Khailany has witnessed parents sitting
outside their children’s classroom, insistent on being bodyguards during the school
day.463  A professor at the University of Baghdad Women’s College related the following
student experiences during the spring 2004 semester:
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• Students from the nearby city of Fallujah cannot attend classes due to street
violence.
• Baghdadi students must pay nearly a day’s wages for taxi service to campus.
• Brothers and fathers wait outside classrooms.
• Students submit withdrawal papers because it either too dangerous or too
expensive to continue.464
Chronic petrol, electricity and water shortages mean Iraqi campuses are episodically shut
down, sometimes several times a day.  When electricity is available, some campuses
cannot afford to run the air conditioning,465 despite temperatures that soar past 100°
Fahrenheit.    Medical students hone their skills in combat conditions – treating patients
without water, antibiotics, insulin, lighting, x-ray machines, ventilators, lab supplies or
gauze.   These interns admit, in some disbelief, that Iraq’s medical education is more
devastated now than it was during the height of sanctions.  Intending doctors and nurses
treat diseases, such as Hepatitis C, that had been eradicated from Iraq years ago and
dodge gunfire in the ambulance bay.466  At the University of Basra, British soldiers stop
incoming emergencies at the hospital gate to ensure looters or, worse yet, suicide
bombers, are not in the vehicle.467  At university budget meetings, administrators must
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choose between the electric bill and campus security.468  In both 2003 and 2004, the
University of Baghdad was given a little as $25,000 per month to maintain operations on
its multiple campuses.469  All of this is occurring in the midst of Iraq’s de facto civil war,
and, as shall be seen, these issues are not necessarily the worst that universities face.
Radicalizing the Campus
In 2003, radical elements exploiting Islamic tenets began to visualize the potential and
the problems college students presented.  Militant Islamist organizations, foreign and
domestic, sought to capitalize on those they could influence and paralyze, through terror,
those minds they could not otherwise change.  Any discussion of Islamist movements
must begin with distinguishing them from the Islamic faith. Islamists rely upon (and
sometimes distort) the most fundamental of Islamic beliefs to develop political theories
and governance models.  Entities such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban and al-Sadr Brigade
could all be considered Islamist and, yet, unlike one another in terms of objectives.
Nonetheless, every Islamist organization discussed in this study has chosen extremely
coercive measures, including terrorism, against Iraqi students and university staff.
Organizations such as these demand religious obedience, in the estimation of terror
expert Jessica Stern, to “destroy moral ambiguities.”470  Yet, moral, political and even
personal ambiguities are at the essence of higher learning – we expect students to wrangle
with concepts such as truth, right and wrong, objectivity and so forth.  To Islamists, such
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questioning is absolute disobedience and agents use multiple, coercive measures to
dissuade students from expecting anything more for themselves than what has been spoon
fed to them.  Fundamentalist groups need to infiltrate the professional classes and
intellectual enclaves for their economic resources and to enhance their own status. Even
terrorists may be legitimized by vested students and professors who provide academic
“proofs” which justify inhumane acts.
As Iraqi women have been some of the most free and progressive in the Middle East,
Islamist organizations modified their agenda so as to appear to promote their “liberation,”
all the while claiming to have women’s best interests at heart.  It is uncommon to hear
Iraqi fundamental clerics denounce girls’ and women’s education – instead they are more
likely to demand segregated learning, perhaps because they know success in Iraq will be
impossible without women on board.  Yet, it is also true that many Islamist agencies
genuinely seek educated women, just not empowered ones.  Their movement requires
convert testimony from women admired within the community.  By packaging their
agenda as women and family friendly, Islamists can paint themselves as the elders of
Muslim “family values.”
Jessica Stern writes that there is a positive correlation between terrorism and educational
attainment471 and that economic realities can turn hopeful graduates into practicing




terrorists.472 In many cases, graduates cannot secure professional employment despite
their expertise and years of hard work.  “Radical Islamist groups,” Stern explains, “use
the concepts of benevolence and self-sacrifice to spread their movements in regions
where the government has failed to provide social welfare.”473 It is the unfulfilled
aspirations of the educated, those with the available time and critical thinking skills, who
make the connection between their country’s hardships and western militarism or local
tyranny or whoever the enemy is identified to be.  With time, and appropriate nurturing
by radicalized mentors, desperate actions, including acts of terrorism, may become
reasonable choices for educated persons.
Executing Intellectuals
One especially chilling practice of these Islamist terrorists is marking faculty for death.
More than 240 Iraqi professors have been assassinated since 2003 and more than seventy
have been arrested, kidnapped or had attempts made on their lives.474  Instances of
professor murders include:475
• Dr. Lyla Abdullah al-Saad, dean of the Law College at the University of Mosul,
was shot multiple times in her bed alongside her husband.  Both were then
beheaded.476
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• Professor Abdel-Latif Mayah of al-Mustansariyah University, was forcibly
removed from his car by eight assailants and then shot thirty-five times on a
Baghdadi street.477  He was murdered the day after he spoke to the Al-Jazeera
network.478
• Dr. Wajeeh Mahjoub, employee of the Ministry of Education and who had
published eight textbooks in his field of kinesiology, was shot dead at the College
of Physical Education in Baghdad.
• Dr. Sabri Mustapha al-Bayati, University of Baghdad geography professor, was
assassinated in front of his students on campus.
• Professor Abdul Aziz el-Atrachi was also killed in front of his students.  This
agriculture professor died as the result of American gunfire at the University of
Mosul.
• Professor of veterinary medicine, Bashshar Hassan was killed during a raid on his
home by US troops.
• Dr. Iman Abdul-Munim Younis was shot in her car.  She was the head of the
translation department at the University of Mosul.479
To date, Iraqis remain unsure why their academics are being targeted as the executed do
not share common political or religious beliefs. Nor did the CPA, allegedly, investigate
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any of these murders.480  Numerous theories abound, some plausible, while others raise
suspicion. The Iraqi Union of Lecturers481 insist
Insurgents are systematically assassinating members
of the country’s intellectual elite as a part of their
general campaign to undermine the interim government.482
In this scenario, terrorism against intellectuals is meant to intentionally destabilize the
government by attacking one of its revered institutions.  MOHE Minister al-Baka argues
that “international terrorist group, intent on delivering a body blow to Iraq and preventing
its reunification” are responsible.  For those Islamist groups that can be implicated in
professors’ assassinations, their motives are didactic.  Terrorism’s ultimate goal is not to
take lives but to teach a lesson to those who survive, its impact is always in its aftermath.
The message here, with the killing of intellectuals, is that too much secular learning is
literally dangerous.  By not outwardly claiming responsibility for these terrorist attacks,
Islamist groups may gauge the public’s reaction first, all the while confident they remain
on the right side of their god.
Radical and disgruntled students have capitalized on the campaign to liquidate the
academic community.  Professors have left posts after receiving death threats because
students presumed they were Baath supporters.483  Others have been verbally attacked in
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classrooms for what students suspect are their political leanings, regardless what these
may or may not be.484  Upon advisement from the “Arab-Islamist resistance,” the Mosul
Student Union notified faculty which professors were being put on their death list.485
Riverbend shares in her blog the collective despair these murders create: “[it is] like Iraq
is suffering from intellectual hemorrhaging.”486 In a nation once known for an apolitical
youth sometimes cowed by their instructors, now “professors are afraid of being
denounced by their own students for political and personal reasons – the ultimate student
evaluation.”487
University of Baghdad president Mosa al-Mosawe believes there are financial and
political motivations at play but that murders occur also to “evacuate Iraq of its scientific
ability.” 488 Some faculty may be favorable targets for ransom kidnappings because it is
presumed they are wealthy or have wealthy family abroad.  Other, more conspiracy-
minded persons, including MOHE senior staff, finger Mossad (the Israeli secret service),
or an American backed militia movement.489  As rumors once again swirl through Iraq, it
becomes increasingly difficult to identify the enemy or predict the next act of terrorism.
Therefore, on the university campus, learning has taken a secondary role to survival.
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Faculty routinely pay for bodyguards and handguns and learn to alternate their daily
commute.490  Married professors M.H. Al-Ali and Jenan al-Mukhtar admit that faculty
[s]tay on campus no more than a few hours to do their
teaching and then rush back home.  They come only
two or three days a week, doing most of their work
at home.491
Only projections can be made on how these stressors modify campus culture and national
impressions of higher education.  MOHE Minister al-Baka disclosed that, “deans tell me
their worries. I fear they will resign and that will lead us into a catastrophe.”492 Currently,
the MOHE cannot offer any genuine protection for faculty but Deputy Minister Khailany
urges her colleagues to hold fast to their professional obligations:
We cannot just stand back and say “O.K., I’m
not going, I’m not safe enough.” We’ve got to
work for our Iraq, it’s our country so I will take
the risk.493
For other higher education professionals, the potential payoff is not worth the risk.
Between March 2003 and December 2004, an estimated 2000 academics fled Iraq despite
the fact that their outdated skills made it difficult for them to secure posts abroad.494  As
of the last two years, certain coursework had to be cancelled because of a lack of
instructors.495  Admissions to Iraq’s medical colleges have been cut due to the teaching
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shortage,496 just when Iraq needs more doctors, nurses and public health officials.  “The
situation is so desperate,” explains Dahr Jamail, “that medical universities have ceased
providing their graduating doctors with certificates in order to force them to remain in
Iraq to practice medicine.”497
A report on Iraq’s “brain drain” claims that less than one-third of current Iraqi instructors
hold a doctorate due to emigration and violence.498  Nedal, completing her PhD in
business administration, rarely has instructors with more credentials than she does.
Across her eighteen doctoral level courses, Nedal said only four instructors held PhDs.
Professoriate emigration must be seen in tandem with academics fired in the de-
Baathification purge -- a comparable number499 and then faculty who resigned or were
murdered.   The academic standards for contemporary Iraqi higher education must be
called into question, despite its legacy, because there is overwhelming evidence that
supply cannot meet demand.
Contemporary Student Life
In small ways, Iraqi universities are expressing autonomy.  Professors have begun
blacking out references to Saddam in textbooks and previously banned books, including
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Shia texts and western novels, can now be purchased.500  Once prohibited by the regime,
students are developing representative organizations and many of these play a prominent
role in campus politics.501  Despite these hopeful signs, Iraqi universities and students are
more endangered than they ever were in Saddam’s darkest days.  Car bombings,
abductions and assault dominate students’ days, not exams, ideas or outings.
At the University of Baghdad, Saddam’s statue stands decapitated after U.S. soldiers took
it upon themselves to leave their mark.502  In many ways, the university seems headless
itself.  While leadership is in place, there are simply too many crises at hand– securing
basic utilities, warring clerical groups and suspected mine fields on campus.503  President
Al-Mosawe confided that, after paying for the necessary 1300 campus security guards, he
does not have the funds to buy much needed equipment and books.504 Student fracas’ can
get dangerously out of hand as witnessed recently when a security guard told a Baghdadi
student he was illegally parked.  A fistfight broke out between students and arriving
campus police.  When security reinforcements were called in, they handled the situation
by shooting their Klashnikov rifles.  City police soon arrived, only to be shot at by the
campus police.  Amazingly, no one was injured but students did go on strike, insisting
that campus security be reigned in and apologize.505 Some student protests are more
peaceful including the anti-occupation demonstration held late in 2003 to denounce raids
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at the University of Technology in which three professors were detained.506  Students
certainly have a good deal to complain about.  Aside from concerns of campus safety,
students have protested their treatment at security checkpoints and the university’s refusal
to hear students’ concerns under the pretense that administrators fear for their safety.507
Violence, in numerous manifestations, dominates campus life.  In May 2005, a bomb
planted at al-Mustansiriyah University killed two students and injured six more.508 The
same month a rocket attack at the University of Baghdad’s engineering college resulted
in the death of two students and wounding another seventeen.509  Just five months after
that incident, a man was stopped at a nearby Baghdadi campus510 with ten pounds of
explosives on his person.  Upon police interrogation, the would-be terrorist confided that
Allah had sent him on this mission.511  In many situations, student-witnessed violence
results in their making difficult choices, such as keeping pistols in their dorm rooms512
and dropping out of school altogether.513  A sign of the times is literally posted at the
University of Baghdad.  It reads, “It is prohibited to carry arms in the university.  Kindly
hand it to the reception office.”514
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Female students have been particularly targeted for their clothing.  In Iraq, wearing the
hijab had traditionally been optional and relatively uncommon amongst professional
women.  Today roving morality patrols approach women, often threatening their lives,
for their uncovered heads or western apparel.  Contemporary Iraqi women are expected to
wear loose, long sleeved blouses and long skirts and are discouraged from wearing pants
of any kind.515  A 2004 MOHE Power Point presentation to the University of Oklahoma
contained seventy-two images of students at the Universities of Baghdad and
Technology.  Of these contemporary photographs of student life, women were in fifty
pictures and only nine women appeared without the hijab; some women were dressed in
the full abaya.516    Iraqi women often express that the hijab does not make them more
devout but rather serves as a safeguarding measure. Nonetheless, they insist the veil
should represent women’s choice, not their oppression.517  Riverbend says the hijab
protects her from “ogling and uninvited attention”518 but many women wear it to protect
themselves from Islamist attacks.519
The case of Rana Fuad illustrates why women are making this concession.  In 2004, three
masked men kidnapped Rana as she left Al-Mustansiriyah University.  After berating
Rana for wearing jeans, her abductors swore to chemically burn her face if they ever
caught her wearing pants again.  Upon her release, Rana immediately withdrew from the
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university.520  At two Baghdad campuses, canvassed leaflets read, “If the boy students
don’t separate from the girls students we will explode the college. Any girl student who
does not wear the veil, we will burn her face with chemicals.”521 At Al-Mustansiriyah
University, women are prohibited from using these same stairwells as their male peers522
and Shia-sympathetic professors at the University of Basra insist male and female
students sit apart from one another in their classrooms.523  Muhammad, a Basra student,
explains the hidden dangers of women’s voices, necessitating that they watch to whom
and where they speak. “There is a special softness to women’s voices, and because of that
they speak flirtatiously.” Muhammad frequently admonishes his female peers who are not
wearing a hijab.  “Sometimes they swear at me and tell me to get lost,” concedes
Muhammad, “but I see it as my religious duty.”524  Muhammad is the nephew of the
cleric appointed to oversee Basra’s education system.  This administrator refused to pay
any female faculty their emergency pay unless they appeared in his office wearing a
hijab.525
Some women abbreviate their studies in an attempt to avoid street and campus violence.
Gender disparity in university attendance is especially noticeable in evening studies.  For
example, while 2179 women (34% total student population) attend the University of
                                                                                                                                                
519 Nadje Al-Ali, “Reconstructing Gender,” 751.
520 “Women Fleeing.”
521 Ibid.
522 UNHCHR (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights), “The Present Situation of
Human Rights in Iraq.”  http://www.unhchr.ch/html/hchr/docs/iraq.doc.
523 George Packer, “Testing Grounds.”
524 Women’s International Network News, “Iraqi Women Professionals Ponder a Future under
Shiite Rule,” New York Times, May 25, 2003.
141
Technology during daytime hours, only 1567 women enroll in evening classes as
compared to 5290 men (23% of total population).526  Similarly, while women comprise
48% of the daytime student population at the University of Basra, during evening
attendance women represent only 22%.527  An especially discouraging sign for women is
that approximately 3,000 female students in Baghdad alone applied to the MOHE to
postpone their postsecondary studies in 2004.528 Insights Education, an international
education think tank researching gender disparity in school systems, predicts a dismal
future for Iraq’s female students.  It is “very unlikely” Iraq will achieve “the right of
women and girls to enjoy equal education opportunities with boys and men” by 2015,
based on the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals.529  In other words, Iraq
has fallen from the regional model in schooling women to not meeting basic benchmarks.
Extorting Orthodoxy on the University Campus
Few Iraqis doubt that foreign elements are culpable for rising fundamentalist movements,
notably the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI).  Founded in Iran in
1982, SCIRI’s “goal is to import the concept of ‘Islamic Revolution’ from Iran to
Iraq.”530  “In other words,” writes Riverbend, “they believe that Iraq should be a
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theocracy led by Shia Mullahs.”531  There is no evidence that a majority of Iraqi Shia
welcome theocratic rule.532  Nonetheless, militant Shia organizations have infiltrated
numerous branches of local Iraqi government and instated themselves in campus
governance.  In 2003, Shia leader Moktada al-Sadr urged his student followers to “take
over student unions at universities across the country.”533 By the following year, the
Shiite Union was the largest and most powerful student organization at the University of
Baghdad, funded in part by external Shiite agencies.534  The Shiite Union office walls are
covered with images of “martyrs” killed by Saddam and fatwas535 issued by al-Sadr and
Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Sistani.536
While religious organizations per se are not disruptive to universities, those on Iraqi
campuses are notoriously so, partially because students are at odds about how secular
their higher education should be.  The term “secular” is a neologism in Arabic and often
translated incorrectly as “godless.”537  A recent study of Iraqi university students revealed
that 68% do not want their refashioned country to be entirely secular, perhaps revealing
their misunderstanding of the term.538  The Iraqi Prospect Organisation insists that, “The
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word ‘secular’ has different meaning to some people in Iraq, not to mean separation of
religion and state, but to mean anti-religion.”539
Infiltrating Islamist agencies polarize the issue by insisting students are either obedient
Muslims or teetering dangerously toward becoming infidels.  Furthermore, they package
their agendas as their “freedom of expression” and newly won independence.  Sunni
student leader and anthropology student Abdel Kader Ibrahim of the University of
Baghdad rationalizes his organization’s actions, “Saddam suppressed the voice of
religion on campus, and our job is to revive it.”540  But Dr. Ihsan al-Rawi, President of
the Union of Iraqi Lecturers insists that, “the religion being brought into campus by these
groups is the religion of hate.”541
Some administrators attempt to minimize the long-term influence Islamist agencies will
have among university students.  A University of Baghdad dean estimates that 90% of his
students do not affiliate with organizations demanding religious rule on campus.542
Unfortunately, different Islamist sects have demonstrated they cannot peacefully co-exist
on the same campus, regardless of their numbers.  When Shiites won a majority in May
2005 national elections, an affiliated University of Baghdad organization planned a
campus celebration.  University administrators informed a student representative from the
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Shiite group that religious celebrations were not permitted on campus.  The student
engaged in fisticuffs with a dean’s personal guard soon after and then left campus.  He
was murdered before arriving home.  The student’s grieving friends responded by leading
violent campus protests, destroying classrooms and all Sunni faculty had to be evacuated.
Certainly nothing was resolved by the destructive mourning – the next day a friend of the
slain student was also found murdered.543 Student participation such as this may well
inhibit women’s willingness to engage in campus activities and political events, as well
as diminishing any sense of safety they may have felt at their universities.
More moderate students, faculty and administrators have attempted to temper Islamist
activities on campus.  The Dean of the College of Science at the University of Baghdad
claims that, “the only poster allowed in my college says, ‘When politics is allowed in the
door, science is kicked from the window.’”544  The president of the University of
Baghdad insists that are “severe measures” for any religious or political party found
practicing “their activities” on campus but does not specify what these may be.545  Even
the MOHE Minister has acknowledged the danger Islamist organizations may invite to
the universities and has publicly appealed to clerical groups to curtail their harassment
against students and staff.546  Perhaps the most effective measure against radical campus
organizations is student activism.  A female architecture student confessed she removed
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Shia posters endorsing al-Sadr saying, “We’re not opposing these things because they’re
religious.  But this is a university, not a mosque.”547
Case in Point: The University of Basra
Competing Islamist organizations now dominate the University of Basra system. The
northern campus is under the sway of the al-Sadr Militia, SCIRI’s paramilitary unit,
while the Fadilah Militia rules the southern campus.548   With the removal of Saddam,
approximately 100,000 Shiites that the tyrant had expelled returned to Iraq and, in doing
so, brought their clerical allegiances fostered in their temporary home of Iran.  Many
Basrans believe Iran intends an indirect occupation of their city as most Shia clerical
groups operating in the city maintain ties to Iran.549  The city of 1.2 million is a shadow
of its former cosmopolitan self.  One Islamist group has made an amusement park their
headquarters550 and clerics shut down all city theatres and DVD stores. 551
In 2003, Shia groups infiltrated regional infrastructure by taking posts on the police force,
civic leadership and government agencies.  Clerics networked hospitably with occupying
British forces as part of their strategic vision.552  Currently, local government is perceived
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as corrupt and incompetent with Sharia laws attempting to nudge out secular ones.
Islamist militiamen have ordered that medical students at Basra Hospital may only treat
women who arrive in appropriate Islamic dress.553  Female students are harassed and
even barred entry onto campus for “immodest” clothing and uncovered heads554 and
some local reports claim that three students have been assassinated for not wearing a
hijab.555  Islamist clerics made known their distaste for the arts by closing down the
university’s drama department.556  While the music department escaped the same fate,
students are only permitted to study music in theory as “some Islamists consider music
immoral.”557  They very fact that university leadership is permitting outside, non-
affiliated agencies to dictate what can and cannot be learned demonstrates the stronghold
Shia militia have in the city.
A 2005 University of Basra picnic illustrates this Islamist vice grip.  Each year, the
Engineering College holds a student picnic in a city park and in March 2005 up to 700
students attended.  Students enjoyed a meal, music and soccer – all rather innocuous
activities and very few women attended the picnic unveiled.558  Twenty to forty al-Sadr
militiamen descended onto the picnic, firing into the crowd and beating students with
wire cables, sticks and rifle butts.559  Nearly a dozen students were hauled away in a truck
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while others were robbed of their jewelry and cellular phones.  Women appear to have
been especially targeted,560 and one unveiled woman, an Armenian Christian, was beaten
so severely she suffered permanent vision loss.561  By the university’s incident report,
fifteen students were seriously injured562 and students insist two of these were the result
of gunshot wounds.563
Equally disturbing were the al-Sadr cameramen who brazenly videotaped the attack.
Videos show militiamen ripping clothes off of female students with the warning, “We
will send these pictures to your parents so the can see how you were dancing naked with
men.”564  Then, the militia made a profit from their violence by selling these videos in
local markets.565  The justification for the assault was delivered by a militia spokesman:
“We beat them because we are authorized by Allah to do so and that is our duty…It is we
who should deal with such disobedience and not the police.”566  Despite their overly
puritanical interpretation of “disobedience,” the militia was somewhat correct in their
estimation of local police.  Both Basra police and British troops were at the park,
witnessed the attacks, and not once intervened.567
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Basra students, including those from local high schools and other universities, protested
in the hundreds at both the university president’s office as well as the governor’s
headquarters.  Classes were cancelled when additional students refused to show up,
insisting on an apology and remuneration of some sort.568  In the end, students returned to
classes with little vindication and their university remains under the de facto auspices of a
fundamentalist agenda.  Basra’s waterfront is crowded with heroes from the Iran-Iraq
war, each pointing an accusing finger at Iran.  Today, Basra youth know their enemies
have become local threats -- Islamist infiltrators, an impotent local government, uncaring
occupying forces and blindsided university leadership.
Damage Assessments
The current state of higher education “infuriates all Iraqis” and is “a source of anger and
shame.”569  Assuming a student can complete their degree program in the midst of a
bankrupt economy and military and civil violence, their professional prospects remain
dim.  New medical doctors currently earn $5 per month.570  130,000 engineers reside in
Iraq,571 few of which have ideal jobs and earnings.  One young Baghdadi woman
revealed, “I used to struggle to make my dreams come true.  Now I struggle to have a
dream.”572
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Perhaps, the international postsecondary community cannot muster sufficient empathy to
inundate their Iraqi peers with donations and professional opportunities.  Why should we
care what happens to our counterparts in a country endlessly mired down by violence and
oppression?  Returning to Jessica Stern’s work on the relationship between educational
attainment and terrorism, occupying agencies must acknowledge that their ineptness in
keeping Iraqi universities safe and operational invites in exploitative Islamist agencies.
From the onset, funds promised to rehabilitate Iraqi higher education failed to materialize
– none of which was kept secret from MOHE personnel.   Whatever expectations
university students had that actual learning opportunities awaited them began to fade by
2004 and their disappointment is fertile ground for terrorists.    Tom Owens, et al,
elaborates on the requisite funding to adequately stabilize Iraq’s higher education system:
The United States spends approximately 2.3% of the GDP
on higher education.  To fund Iraqi universities at the same
level would require…at least $800 million.  Instead, to date,
the U.S. government appropriated less than $25 million.  Add
to this the inability of occupation forces and the Iraqi government
to stabilize electricity, water, telephone and internet systems
and it becomes readily apparent that Iraqi universities feel
neglected.573
While the United States and United Kingdom are not wholly responsible for Iraq’s
universities, their inability to connect youth satisfaction with educational and professional
opportunity is downright dangerous.
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There were, during Saddam’s regime, few terrorist organizations in Iraq (aside from the
government).  Today, agencies like al-Qaeda and the al-Sadr Brigade dominate cities, and
make very well known their intent to use terrorism against westerners. These groups
aggressively recruit skilled youth in a country where the median age is 19. More than
50% of the population is under the age of twenty-four which translates to 63% of eligible
voters classified as “younger adults.”574 This population, in a study on attitudes toward
democracy, affiliated the term not with free speech and political affiliation but with
economic and educational opportunities.  “This indicates,” writes the researchers at the
Iraqi Prospect Organisation, “a more instrumental view of democracy where it is defined
by its substantive outcomes.”575  Those nations who identify themselves as “allies” to the
Iraqi people and yet refuse to invest fully in higher education do so only to their
detriment.  In the meantime, Iraqis persist in their mere “skeletons of universities.”576
Some hope to leave Iraq, despite the fact the international travel documents remain
incredibly difficult to secure.  Linda discloses
All that’s left for me is the polluted air which cannot be
captured in snapshots or saved in jars.  And even that I know
I should leave…for my life should start across the borders,
where I’ll have to go with the flow and pretend that I won’t
miss what’s within these dotted lines I’ve always called home.577
Other Iraqis insist they will stay. “We have to do our work properly,” urges University of
Baghdad president al-Mosawe, “for our students, for the sake of our people, for the sake
of our country.”578
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Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that Iraqi academics are capable of Herculean
endurance for only so long.  Sooner or later, a professor knows she or he must leave Iraq
or face professional suicide.  Each day, students must decide if attending classes is worth
the financial and mental costs, especially amidst the Iraqi economy that, for the moment,
cannot support the financial expectations of college graduates.  These challenges are not
unique to university women, although many are – amassing Islamist diatribes on their
womanhood, socially inappropriate interactions with foreign soldiers, family demands
that daughters stay home.  The first waves of Iraqi women who have never lived without
rampant oppression manifesting every aspect of their lives are now graduating from
universities.  We can only imagine what “liberated Iraq” will mean for them in the next
decades, hoping they have more than hope themselves in which to invest.
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While this research is historical in function, appropriate recommendations can be made
toward the reestablishment of Iraq’s higher education system. Contemporary
postsecondary schooling in Iraq is not in a nascent phase; academics and their students
are more than capable of re-establishing superior universities if only provided the
appropriate resources and opportunities.  Naturally, immediate needs must be addressed
first – establishing campus and Ministry security, electricity, water and internet access,579
followed by basic supplies such as computers, furniture, and copiers.580  While digital
journal access, electronic microscopes and educational software have been generously
donated, they are ineffectual on a campus without the infrastructure to make use of them.
Iraq’s universities are at a pivotal moment.  They must edify community engagements as
the country desperately needs committed leadership and proactive citizens.  As
universities are able to normalize operations, they become practitioners of democratic
principles.581  At the same time, universities must detangle themselves from the
Saddamist version of higher education, where the university-educated serve the state and,
yet, the state is absolved of serving them.  Certain mental shifts need to occur as Iraqi
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universities refashion their institutional identities.  Foremost, and in conjunction with the
MOHE, universities must evaluate their highly centralized system.  At this time, it does
not appear prudent to dissolve the ties campuses have to the MOHE.  Tuition costs are
likely to rise and more rural, less illustrious campuses may fail without national support.
Finally, and most frighteningly, universities operating beyond MOHE administration may
soon be utterly overtaken by local Islamist factions.
Peter Taylor and Jude Fransman encourage nations in crisis to consider broader concepts
of higher education.  A “narrow view” of higher education is one where specialized
knowledge is pursued for the sake of financial gain and professional prestige.  Academic
research is undertaken to achieve expert status,582 seeking celebrity amongst academic
peers.  Alternately, the function of higher education in broader terms includes valuing
collaborations between people and institutions, within and beyond academe.  In a nation
such as Iraq, wrecked and disillusioned, those persons able to envision short and long
term, as well as inclusive, solutions re-engage their universities with civil society
building.
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MOHE and University Leadership’s Strategic Planning
The obstacles before the MOHE and university leadership are significant.  It is
inconceivable that Iraq’s higher education system can restore itself without sustained
assistance, in the form of donations and training, from foreign governments and agencies.
The MOHE and universities must first identify their priorities, then identify potential
donors.  To date, Iraqi universities have had little respite to accomplish this, resulting in
too many donors forwarding along what they believed was most appropriate.
After ensuring the Ministry and campuses have reconnected basic utilities, strategic
planning for higher education infrastructure can begin.  It would behoove the MOHE to
evaluate its operational model and identify any structural, cultural and philosophical
barriers.  University leadership as well as MOHE staff could benefit from workshops in
strategic planning as well as budget creation and cost-effectiveness standards;
maintaining student records; academic standards; evaluating faculty; accreditation;583 and
institutional transparency and accountability.  There are certain relationships for which
the MOHE needs to develop a strategic vision, including engagements with national and
foreign media, faculty unions, and, not least of all, students.  One means by which
strategic planning can be pursued is through Ministry retreats584 that welcome university
leaders to express their concerns and potential resolutions.  The MOHE must present
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itself as an advocate for the universities, not simply their master.  Furthermore, it must
articulate to all Iraqi people the role higher education plays in national development.
UNESCO has urged the Iraqi academic community to redesign their hiring, promotion
and admissions policies, writing:
A strategic plan will have to be prepared to ensure that
the universities play a catalytic role in the democratization
process and ensure access to all on the basis of merit.585
This is especially critical after the de-Baathification debacle in which the CPA appeared
hypocritical for removing alleged political appointments on the basis of their political
affiliations.  The UNESCO report suggests that, “professional rather than political criteria
should guide staff appointments and university deliberations.”586  Therefore, transparency
measures should be included in all forms of staff appointment and advancement, as well
as student admissions.  Ideally, Iraqis will come to practice “educational democracy,” as
coined by Raji Abou-Chacra, meaning, “education open to anyone with the ability to
follow any course he wishes, given the needs of society, regardless of race, religion, class
or sex, without any form of political or other discrimination.”587  It is advisable that the
MOHE abandon its total reliance on the baccalaureate exam as it is well-known
standardized tests are not consistent reliable measures of student ability.588 However,
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such action is only advisable when a more judicious and transparent system is ready to be
put in its place.
Ultimately, the MOHE should initiate a “return to excellence” campaign elucidating
higher education’s role in democracy building.  Through outreach to secondary schools,
community organizations, professional associations and expatriates, the MOHE
demonstrates their commitment to a socially mobile and increasingly professionalized
population.  The brain drain phenomena must be immediately addressed, Iraqi
universities cannot sustain any further losses whether due to emigration, resignation or
assassination.  Internet postings or “blogging” is an ideal venue for professors and
students alike to discuss what fuels their academic persistence, current campus
challenges, and the obligatory, supportive bonds between academe and wider
communities.  The MOHE must come to an accord with the Union of Iraqi Lecturers on
what institutional recourse will occur in the event of attacks on faculty or students by
other university members. Each university campus, under MOHE guidance, must make
every effort to prohibit Islamist (or any other political group’s) disruptions on their
campus.  There is an appropriate time for student activism and then there is a time for
campus cohesion so that the promise of higher education is not eradicated for all.
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Exposing Academics and Students to their Scholarly Purpose
Similar to the disillusionment university presidents feel, faculty may be hard pressed to
identify why their work is relevant anymore.  Milton Greenberg elaborates,
Still missing from most faculty preparation and
professional development is the place of higher
education in the nation and the world, the underlying
and pervasive social issues that affect it, and the
great potential of the power of academic citizenship.589
Here, Greenberg is speaking of US faculty.  Imagine how ill prepared Iraqi faculty is to
model citizenship in a country sliding into civil war. The Institute of Development
Studies provides one pathway to revitalizing the teaching profession and inspiring
students.
Experimental and learning-centered participatory teaching
methods are two cornerstones of transformative learning.
Employing these methods in the contexts of [higher
learning institutions] can make a significant contribution
to capacity development of students, staff, practitioners
and institutions as well as the creation of effective
and sustainable initiatives in the community.590
Both instructors and students should be able to envision their studies leading promising
careers and contributing to Iraq’s redevelopment.  Again, students who cannot capitalize
on their university education in sanctioned and financially rewarding means may turn to
rogue elements who are equally disgruntled with the status quo.  The MOHE must
nurture collaborative and pragmatic learning where students move from merely absorbing
knowledge to applying it to their own and their nation’s welfare.
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Some instructional challenges are easier to address.  Professors require updated teaching
skills, relying less on lecture and “depository” learning and instead emphasize critical
thinking and reflective learning.  Students, at all postsecondary levels, should have
opportunities to collaborate, express opinions, test theories, and grow in student-centered,
not teacher-centered environments.  The MOHE could, feasibly, provide incentives to
professors who pursue retraining.  Free online access to the Chronicle of Higher
Education591 and the Times Higher Education Supplement would allow students and
professors to study how other universities operate, familiarize themselves student and
faculty issues on other campuses as well take note of conference and publication
solicitations.
Research, its methods and scope, should also be retaught.  Iraqi academia currently faces
a crisis where data collection, analysis and sharing skills are more than ten years out of
date.  The legacy of both sanctions and the regime is that researchers confine themselves
to what is most readily available and approved by the state.  Now that the world has
literally reopened for Iraqis, scholars need training in navigating digital databases and the
internet for appropriate academic sites. One potential solution is to permit graduate
students and faculty to take, via distance education, research methods and electronic
research coursework.  University librarians, predominantly, have neither library sciences
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degrees nor the technology to satisfactorily operate large, multifarious collections.592
They, too, could benefit from training – namely database and digital research, archiving,
and record keeping.
Absolutely crucial to renewed Iraqi participation in scholarly research is instruction on
how to submit journal articles and developing conference programming.  Students need
the appropriate access to identify those professional organizations that are related to their
studies and then how to apply for membership, submit papers, attend conferences as well
as the student-incurred costs related to these.  While participating in this dissertation’s
interviews, Ghaida struggled to have a paper correctly submitted to the World Scientific
and Engineering Academy and Society (WSEAS).  Ghaida’s work in wireless
networking had received international attention and she was asked to participate in the
annual WSEAS conference in China (April 16–18, 2006).  For months, the WSEAS
seemed incapable of understanding that security and financial barriers made it impossible
for Ghaida to travel to China.  Then the WSEAS asked Ghaida to submit her paper
along with a publishing fee of several hundred dollars.  At the very best, her department
said they could contribute $200 to the publishing costs.  Ghaida was unaware she could
ask the WSEAS to waive or at least diminish her publication costs and membership fees
because of her student status.  She wrote
Although my paper has been accepted …I couldn’t understand
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the details in [the attached] file.  Actually, I don’t know whether
the expenses of the registration ($600) will include travel or not[.]
I really have no experience with [i]nternational conferences.
As a result of this experience, Ghaida recommended that campuses host their own
research conferences to prepare students for future, wider venues.
Finally, postsecondary curricula must be updated.593  The Iraq Higher Education
Organising Committee stresses that new textbooks must meet Iraq’s vocational needs and
that professional organizations abroad should guide curricular efforts.594  This possibly
implies that some textbooks would be foreign publications.  It is critical that Iraqis begin
to write their own textbooks, especially in the fields of history and art -- no one, save
those who directly endured Saddam, sanctions and Iraq’s numerous wars can, in a
transformative context, quantify their country’s toll. Iraqi scholars must reacquaint
themselves with academic criticism, confident that they are practicing and protected by
academic freedom.  Deputy Minister Khailany concurs:
Iraqi universities need a radical transformation of the
humanities and social sciences.  It is these fields that
are most directly targeted by totalitarian regimes; it
is these fields that are the organs of self-consciousness
of a society.595
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Developing Student Services and Activities
Student services during the regime years were primarily confined to residence halls,
cafeterias, computer labs and minor medical clinics.  Student activities, advocacy and
publications were essentially Baathist outreach programs, designed to showcase Saddam.
Clearly, students who witness wars, state and rogue violence as well as extreme
deprivation require some mental health interventions.  Perhaps under the auspices of
psychology departments and medical colleges, universities could provide counselors who
specialize in PTSD, depression and grieving. Group counseling and community outreach
in these areas would also be beneficial and demonstrate that universities are committed to
the collective healing of Iraq.  Students should be encouraged to express, through
recordings, essays, artwork, blogs and conferences, their stories of hardship and survival
and organizations such as The Forgiveness Project596 have been especially well received
in similarly fractured communities.
Students also deserve opportunities to advocate for themselves and to have the sense that
their input matters to university leadership.  Administrative endorsement of student
advisory councils tasked to dialogue with university leadership consecrates the student
body with democratic obligations.  A first order of business for these councils should be
the creation a student code of rights and ethics that would delineate:
                                                                                                                                                
Scientific Research: Iraq after the War,” Speech delivered at the University of Oklahoma. Al
Sharaka Program for Higher Education in Iraq, April 27, 2004.
596 The Forgiveness Project, http://www.theforgivenessproject.com.
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• Comprehensive definitions of academic freedom and freedom of expression and
how the university protects these.
• Inappropriate behaviors by students, faculty or staff that will not be tolerated.
• What constitutes criminal activity by students and against students.
• What constitutes academic dishonesty and student integrity standards.
• University redress and judiciary measures, including the proper chain of
command for grievances.
Deputy Minister Khailany maintains that, “We’re doing non-class activities in our
campuses just to teach our students how to make their own decisions, how to stand up for
their own rights.”597 Nonetheless, Iraqi universities must recover considerable ground to
re-engage students in campus issues and advocacy upon their own behalf.  Since the
1980’s, the Baath have told students whom they may affiliate with and what their issues
are. The implications of which are that, “[t]hese students have never experienced genuine
democracy or a pluralistic civil society.”598 Islamist campus movements have only
hindered nascent student efforts to achieve consensus building. The Iraqi Prospect
Organisation stresses that
There is a poor recognition of what are considered
essential components of democracy as well as a
perception that democratic characteristics, such as
the existence of multiple opinions or political trends
within a society, are synonymous with a country’s
                                                
597 Beriwan Khailany, interviewed by Dick Gordon, The Connection, July 1, 2005.
http://theconnection.org/shows/2005/07/20050701_a_main.asp.




Student government that is vested with the authority to enact legislation is one venue by
which students can be exposed to democratic governance – given certain caveats.  First,
this body must be truly representative.  Simple credos like “majority rules” are
disadvantageous to Iraqi communities where there are a multiple agendas, beliefs and
ethnicities at play. While student participation in electing their representatives is
desirable, caution must be taken that elections are not turned into struggles between
competing factions, nor attached to national politics.  A more beneficial creed would be,
“The right to rule belongs to the majority. But the right to representation belongs to
all.”600 Cumulative voting, once practiced in the United States, mediates instances when
simple majorities do not indicate an overwhelming mandate. 601  As an example, a college
would elect three members to the student government with the proviso that one seat must
go to a minority group that ran in opposition to the majority winner(s). In this way,
underrepresented populations, whether they be Sunni, Kurds, women, Christians,
graduate students or so forth, are also represented.
Secondly, student government must have the authority to enact change, including the
ability to meet with and hold responsible university leadership.  This does not mean that
presidents and deans should become beholden to a tyrannical student body.  Rather,
students must be accountable for the content and quality of their university education and
                                                
599 Ibid, 19.
600 Fair Vote, Program for Representative Government. http://www.fairvote.org/?page=37.
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can achieve this only when they are included in its development.  To keep student
government appropriately vested, faculty advisors should be carefully chosen and the
MOHE must create national standards of university student government that mirror their
own practices of transparency and accountability.  Finally, nascent student governments
may benefit from the advisement of international mentors, whether these are similar
bodies in neighboring countries or broader entities such as the collegiate-level Model
United Nations.602  Through these relationships, student representatives learn rules of
enacting legislation, conflict resolution, effective campaigning and advocacy as well as
identifying student-centered objectives, not political ones.
Alongside the development of representative student government is the opportunity to
organize campus groups. Instead of embroiling themselves in ethnic and political fracas,
these groups would focus on common professional or personal interests –  a pre-dentistry
club, honor’s society, web design enthusiasts or a chapter of the Red Crescent Society.603
Student groups also need committed faculty advisors and should adhere to a standard of
ethics, jointly codified by university administration and student government.  All student
groups should absolutely be required to register their group on campus, and, in return,
receive funding and administrative recognition.   This addresses the issue of radical
political elements infiltrating the campus. With full MOHE backing, universities must
insist that, while they welcome student involvement, organizations must follow campus
                                                                                                                                                
601 Ibid.
602 National Model United Nations Program. http://www.nmun.org/
603 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. http://www.ifrc.org.
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codes and that only registered groups can meet and recruit on university premises.  When
Islamist groups refuse to abide by this, uniform sanctions must be imposed including the
university’s willingness to resort to police intervention every time rogue organizations
disrupt the campus.
University Women Advocating for Change
“The research is unequivocal,” writes Isobel Coleman, Senior Fellow at the Council of
Foreign Relations,
 [I]f the goal is to improve health, nutrition or education…
build robust and self-sustaining community organizations,
encourage grass-roots democracy, and ultimately,
temper extremism, successful efforts must target
women.  Economists increasingly recognize that
nothing is more central to development than the
economic, political and social participation of women.604
While most education experts agree with Coleman’s assessment, there is a disconnect in
understanding how women in higher education impact national development.  It as if the
ability to create literate, voting women is perceived as sufficient when this could not be
further from the case. As an illustration, an Iraqi Women’s League letter of demands to
all British agencies aiding Iraqi women, cited twenty actions as wide ranging as
promoting breastfeeding to the return of looted antiquities.  Not one of these demands
included protecting women’s access to higher education,605 despite the fact that Iraq’s
                                                
604 Isobel Coleman, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Importance of Women’s Participation,”
testimony before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus (Washington, D.C., March 11, 2004).
605 Iraqi Women’s League, “Open Appeal to All Women’s Organizations in the United
Kingdom.”
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record of university educated women was once the best in the Middle East.  Yet, the
numerous women’s organizations that are developing within and beyond Iraqi borders
can only benefit by connecting their work to university women, including them in goal
setting, promoting their issues and networking.
Certainly, Iraq needs its women to be engaged voters but women must also be leaders in
academia, government, industry and advocacy agencies.  More research on how
professional women drive economic, political and social advancement is required if Iraq,
and nations in similar dire straits, are to capitalize on their female citizens and
universities’ potential.    Therefore, programmatic development must accompany
academic output on the relevance of university women to civil society capacity building.
Specific to this study, the MOHE must enunciate the advancement of women as students,
faculty and senior administrators in their strategic planning. A MOHE task force may be
appropriate with the participation of Iraq’s Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA). The
presence of the MOWA at universities, perhaps represented through campus women’s
centers, could initiate gender equity workshops as well as provide female students with
MOWA internships.
                                                                                                                                                
http://womenstrike8m.server101.com/English/iraqiwomenleagueopenletter.htm. The letter also
asserts that, “Only Iraqi women’s organizations in Iraq have the right to speak in the name of our
Iraqi women and voice their demands. No women from abroad are to be dispatched into Iraq to
speak for Iraqi women.” While it can be appreciated that only Iraqi women understand the reality
of their lives, this organizational attitude may inhibit international women’s organizations from
extending aid to them and advocacy in the global community on their behalf.
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Female faculty and students can identify their common challenges and ambitions in an
annual status report of women in higher education, presented to university presidents, the
MOHE and MOWA, media outlets, as well as international agencies vested in women’s
education like UNESCO and id21.org.606  This is also the opportunity for Iraqi academic
women to form a national association. Mentoring at the faculty-student, graduate-
undergraduate and undergraduate-high school levels would help generate a broader and
more fully endowed organization.  Additional programming could include:
• Review board of the MOHE’s admissions policies
• Tenure preparation workshops
• Conference and grant writing training
• A museum and women’s library at the University of Baghdad, MOWA or MOHE
• National panels on significant women’s issues
• Awarding international research scholarships
• Outreach to high schools, community women’s centers and adult literacy schools
While it can be acknowledged that these objectives are oriented from a Western
perspective on the function of higher education, we must nonetheless remember that Iraqi
universities have traditionally been structured on European and American institutions and
that Iraqi academics demonstrate a preference to continue in this fashion.
                                                
606 According to their website, id21.org “communicates international development research to
policymakers and practitioners worldwide: health, education, global issues, urban development,
rural development, natural resources.” http://www.id21.org.
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Campus women’s centers could enhance the visibility of female student issues and serve
as a bridge between the university and community women’s centers. Interview
participants were specifically asked about the feasibility of a women’s center on their
campus and responses varied.  Wasna dismissed the idea:
For me, I don’t think we need it, we have so much
to worry about than meeting and discussing these
unimportant things, from my opinion, if I wanted to
prove myself as a woman who is equal to [men, then]
I should do it in real life not by talking.  I think these
centers are useless, at least in Iraq.
For Wasna, equal opportunity is secondary to eradicating current civil unrest.
Nonetheless, she is ready to demonstrate her equality, not simply discuss it.  Mayyada is
also unenthusiastic about a campus women’s center, admitting she thought it would be
“misused” because “there isn’t enough awareness” of women’s issues. Linda had the
opposite reaction, although abbreviated, writing only, “What a brilliant idea!”  Azhar’s
response was unique from her perspective as a faculty member and advocate, “As a
[women’s rights] activist, I’m doing my best in the student community.”  She continues,
“Now we are working toward establishing a women center [and] we need your help to
prepare a proposal.”607 Finally, Nedal expressed a valid concern – any women’s center
should be driven by the goals of its members, not outside institutions or donor agencies.
She writes,
Yes, it would be a good idea, [g]iven it [was] used
to address Iraqi women’s issues [l]ike improving
                                                
607 Azhar and her colleagues are currently writing a grant to establish a women’s center at the
University of Basra.  I had written similar grants in 2004 and 2005 to benefit the Universities of
Basra and Baghdad and submitted these to the U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for
International Development, co-authored by Drs. Muna Naash and Tammy Boyd.
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woman’s image in work or education [and] help[ing]
mentor young girls entering college…[A]s a teacher,
I feel for my female students …if they asked for my
advice I would give it. I know it is not good enough,
there needs to be an organized effort.
These responses indicate that these women are not wholly familiar with the work
women’s centers do, unsure of how such entities could improve their lives as students.
Regardless, the establishment of a campus women’s center is problematic in
contemporary Iraq.  Universities do not have the funds to support a center and while
foreign donors may be willing to step in, this may only raise the ire of anti-western
elements.  Security will certainly be an issue on campuses such as Basra and al-
Mustansiriyah where brazen attacks against female students occur regularly.  However,
the possibility of women’s centers should not be scrapped altogether.  To capitalize on
their potential, the MOHE and MOWA must jointly advocate for these centers’ existence
and the work done there must be such that women students become the centers’ most
vocal supporters.
“Women’s issues” ultimately impact everyone.  Male students are also victimized when
Islamists target their female peers because the crux of Islamist’s moralizing message is
that men are so innately depraved that women are not safe around them. It is important to
remember that radicalized clerical groups do not represent an Iraqi majority or a
collective male attitude toward women.  University men can “brought on board” as
women express their concerns and demands and should be done so that such efforts do
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not polarize the genders or become trivialized as a “battle of the sexes.”  Women’s center
outreach can include discussions on how men are exploited in hyper-militarized
communities608 (such as contemporary Iraq) as well as connecting women’s education to
overall family earnings and opportunity.609  Establishing co-ed campus events –
especially community service – prove that men and women can work together toward
proactive change and absent of rampant immorality -- something, it appears, most
Islamists find incomprehensible.  Ultimately, each of these recommendations can
cultivate students committed to learning above ideology, a generation of self-determined
scholars instead of the legacy of their country’s demise.
Alumni and Donor Recruitment
Iraq has thousands of alumni, in country and abroad, who are disconnected from their
former universities.  University-trained, expatriate Iraqis, have gone on, in most
instances, to enjoy professional careers and the accompanying financial rewards.  Yet,
institutionalized alumni relations are not practiced by Iraqi universities.610 Iraqi
academics worldwide are distressed to see the conditions in their country’s universities
but lack the financial channels to donate money.
                                                
608 Linda commented that, “men’s lives are complicated, for they were always victims of the
political system. When Saddam was in power…he used to be fond of wars [and] our men must
join the army.  Same thing applies today, US soldiers and [the Iraqi National Guard] are as
sadistic as Saddamists used to be.”
609 Isobel Coleman, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction.”
610 Abdul Satter Jawad, personal communication, April 2004.
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Developing alumni philanthropy can erode the notion that state funding of universities
equates state ownership of higher education, a question the MOHE will certainly face as
Iraq refashions itself.611  Bruce Johnstone has written extensively on how universities are
funded, asserting that, “philanthropy becomes an enormously attractive political solution
precisely because it is not taxes and it is not tuition fees.”612  Furthermore, alumnus
giving signals that higher education is a “socially worthwhile cause.”613  Universities are
ideally situated to benefit from the largesse of Iraqis abroad with disposable incomes,
they lack only the publicity campaigns and banking mechanisms to do so.  The Iraqi
Prospect Organisation goes even further in recommending means by which universities
can generate funds, arguing that, “universities should work toward a diversification of
their sources of funds and develop income from services, investments, intellectual
property rights, partnerships with industry, etc.”614  All of which could be made possible
through the establishment of alumni associations and faculty organizations. In the case of
alumni associations, appropriate training in endowment building would increase their
ability to secure discretionary funding.  Associations can also serve as career centers for
alumni and current students – connecting skilled graduates to in-country, professional
vacancies.
                                                
611 Beriwan Khailany, interviewed by Dick Gordon.  The Deputy Minister expressed her belief
that the MOHE, as well as all Iraqi government, would soon be “very much decentralized.”
612 Bruce Johnstone, “A Political Culture of Giving and the Philanthropic Support of Public
Higher Education in International Perspective,” paper presented at the International Conference
on Higher Education (Luxembourg, August 26-28, 2004), 2.
613 Ibid, 5.
614 Iraqi Prospect Organisation, Iraqi Constitution, 7.
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For better or worse, Iraq’s most generous immediate donors are foreign governments that
promised monies or materials to the MOHE or specific universities. Unfortunately, this
relationship has been compromised by impediments and broken promises.615  Both
Deputy Minister Khailany and University of Baghdad President al-Mosawe expressed
their disappointment with US pledges to assist them, making these statements directly to
the American public.616  They were particularly exasperated by travel restrictions that
prohibited most Iraqis from traveling to the United States.617  While US travel for Iraqis
requires a lengthy application process, it can be achieved when hosting universities act
more proactively.  It is not enough for foreign universities and professional associations
to extend invitations to Iraqi academics for research visits or conferences, we must also
extend the financial resources to do so.  Given the current income of Iraqi professors,
international flights and US accommodations are well beyond what most can afford.  For
students and university administrators especially, visits to foreign universities should
include opportunities to see the wider campus – student unions and housing, bursar and
admissions offices, library archives, Arab-American student associations, faculty senates,
to name a few.
Finally, the community of international donors who have, for the most part, acted
altruistically, must re-evaluate their efforts.  Are we sending the resources Iraqi
                                                
615 The relationship between Iraq and the US was discussed in Chapter Four.  Other nations that
donated to the MOHE and specific universities include Jordan, Qatar, Great Britain, Japan, South
Korea, Germany and Canada.
616 Beriwan Khailany and Mosa al-Mosawe, interviewed by Dick Gordon.
617 Ibid.
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academics specifically requested or are we donating only what is convenient and
appealing to our notions of their needs?  The University of Baghdad received a windfall
in library book donations, as noted in Chapter Four, but lack inhabitable residence halls,
computers and online journal access.  Donations are only useful if they meet an actual
need. However, since Iraqi universities are brimming with such needs, it cannot be that
challenging for donors to identify a handful of means by which they can assist.  We must
listen first, and then react accordingly, resting assured our Iraqi colleagues can express
how we may best help.
Two programs exemplify a more ideal philanthropic relationship.  First is the British
Council’s Iraq website,618 which:
connects people with learning opportunities and creative
ideas from the UK and aim to build lasting relationships
between the UK and Iraq. Education is the focus of our
re-engagement with Iraq, working in partnership with
Iraqi institutions and individuals to reconnect Iraq with
the international educational community and sharing the
UK’s experience to help design Iraqi solutions to Iraq’s
challenges.619
The site, almost overwhelming in its offerings and graphics, nonetheless delivers online
access to numerous academic periodicals and information on study abroad and
international scholarship programs.  While most interview participants were unaware of
the British Council website, Linda said she visited often and had begun her application
for one scholarship program.  The free site also provides online IT training and English
                                                
618 The British Council –Iraq, http://www.britishcouncil.org/iraq.htm.
619 Ibid.
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language testing.  Another instance of suitable philanthropy was the Arab Science and
Technology Foundation’s 2005 conference620 in conjunction with the Sandia Cooperative
Monitoring Center.621 By holding the event in Jordan, numerous Iraqi scientists were able
to attend.  Participants were encouraged to submit research proposals that demonstrated a
clear benefit to Iraqi civil society.  Submissions included identifying human remains
through DNA technology, testing for post-traumatic stress disorders, desert land
reclamation and water sampling.  Several proposals were funded,622 enjoining
international donors with Iraqi academia as well as Iraq’s wider rehabilitation needs.
Money will never be the ultimate panacea for Iraqi universities’ recovery. But when
funds are matched to committed efforts by foreign research agencies, Iraqi higher
education is revitalized, escorted back to the global stage of scholarly engagement.
The Opportunities and Obligations before Us
The ability of the MOHE, faculty and students to restore their universities lies within
them but also amongst the global academic community whose covenant to academic
freedom will ring hollow if we merely witness what is happening in Iraq. Iraqis affiliated
with postsecondary education will hopefully persist in their profession or studies and
demand that their new government protect higher learning and open inquiry.  In the end,
two transformations are possible:  Iraq restores its reputation as a leader in university
                                                
620 Richard Stone, “Iraqi Science in the Line of Fire,” Science, September 30, 2005, 2157.
621 Located in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
622 Richard Stone, “Iraqi Science,” 2157.
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education and students no longer view learning as an action superimposed onto them but
rather a landscape in which they forge their own paths.
Higher education is, unquestionably, a critical facet of national development and
redevelopment, promoting social mobility and serving as “a model of political
stability.”623  Postsecondary schooling instills ownership and engaged citizenship,
allowing its members to participate in a pluralistic and yet, incubated environment.  At
the same time, universities engage with institutions beyond their gates.  The Institute of
Development Studies elaborates, “As crucial components of global research systems,
[universities] have the potential to bridge the global with the local, providing a real
opportunity to scale up local knowledge, needs and priorities[.]”624  Yet none of this can
be achieved without the sharing of knowledge and resources on the part of more fortunate
entities and institutions.  When we practice this we are announcing that nationalism,
political agendas and ideologies are anathema to the principles of academic freedom.
We could turn our backs, again, on Iraqi universities and let them slip into academic
oblivion -- provincial colleges in a “backward” nation with unfamiliar people and
customs.  We could also insist that it is impractical to extend assistance now since Iraq
seems doomed to a bloody and prolonged civil war.  Keith Watenpaugh, ever vigilant of
the academic community’s apparent apathy, disagrees:
It may seem superfluous to think about universities
                                                
623 Vanessa Pape Bouche, “Democracy and Diplomas,” 85.
624 Institute of Development Studies. “Learning to Participate,” 1.
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and colleges, research institutions and foreign exchange
programs while Iraq seems to be going to hell in a
handbasket. It is precisely higher education’s role as
a fundament of civil society, as a device in ameliorating
forms of economic and class difference, and as a tool
for building national community that should put it at
the very center of all our efforts in Iraq…[L]arge-scale,
free (or almost free) merit-based…higher education,
combined with strategic and directed programs of
economic development, is the only way to lessen the
magnetic attraction of radicalized Arab-Islamist nationalism.625
Iraq is just now emerging from its oppression -- decades of dictatorship, violence and
poverty.  Yet, this is precisely the most opportune moment for the global academic
community to offer assistance to their Iraqi peers.  To value only our own rights to open
inquiry and democratic learning environments eventually degrades academic freedom for
everyone.  Iraq is home to Babylonian artifacts, exceptional Muslim sciences during
Europe’s Dark Ages, vast marshlands of remarkable ecological worth, a tapestry of
diverse poetry, art and song.  And it is home to nearly 300,000 Iraqi university students
who seek higher learning in world that seems to hold few expectations for them.
As the last interview set for this study, participants were asked what they wanted
Americans to know about Iraqi women and their universities.  Linda’s remarks were
primarily that the US was obligated to help restore university materials since American
soldiers “opened the doors for the looters.”  Linda’s impression of American “liberators”
is surely the exact opposite message we want to leave with Iraqis but opportunities do
                                                
625 Keith Watenpaugh, “Rebuilding Iraq’s Academic Community and Challenges of Civil Society
in Civil War.” Speech delivered to Center for Arab and Islamic Studies (Villanova
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remain by which we can restore good faith.  While Mayyada classified her universities
as institutionally stunted, she acknowledged the great potential of her female peers.  “All
that Iraqi women need,” Mayyada concluded, “is some peace and encouragement.”
Azhar, marine biology professor at the University of Basra, submitted specific requests –
more computers and books, a women’s center and a research yacht.  But her greatest wish
appears to be the “release [of my] university from the Islamic religious parties.” Azhar
seeks scholarly engagement for her students, not terrorized campuses and closed minds.
Iraqi university women have demonstrated admirable academic persistence, driven by
their ambitions despite the mismanagement and atrophy of their universities. This is
certainly true of the eight women who participated in this research.  Iraq’s potential is
contingent upon its reinvestment in higher education, a commitment they cannot make
without international pledges of aid.  In the meantime, we can only expand and improve
upon scholarly understandings of Iraqi women and higher education.  We can rest assured
that we have yet to see the full potential of either.  To quote Wasna, this study’s
youngest participant, “I want [Americans] to know that we are fighters, survivors and that
all these bad circumstances are just making us…stronger…and wiser. No matter what.”
                                                                                                                                                
University, Philadelphia, September 9, 2004).
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APPENDIX A
The Method of Study
Timeframe of Study
This historical dissertation spans the onset of the Hussein regime until two years after the
Allied Invasion of Iraq (2003).  Major national and international events included in this
study are: Saddam’s presidency (1979 – 2003); the Iran-Iraq War (1980 – 1988); First
Gulf War (1991); U.N. imposed sanctions (1991 – 2003); Second Gulf War (2003) and
the Allied Occupation and post-war Iraq (2003 – 2005).
Salient Methodology
The conceptual structure for this study is the meta-synthesis of primary, secondary and
contextual sources, enabling a more profound understanding of Iraqi higher education
with an emphasis on female university students. Collected narratives (via e-mail) from
Iraqi women enhance the research. They are, however, not the predominant data set. The
narratives serve a special function by elucidating the meaning Iraqi women made of their
university experiences.  Interviews are illustrative and complementary but ultimately
supplemental to the salient methodology, historiography.
Data analysis for this dissertation consists primarily of documentary research.
Employing a historiographic approach, I am able to deconstruct textual evidence,
thematically code each and place them in a chronologically appropriate examination of
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Iraqi higher education.  The coalescence of primary, secondary and contextual sources
serves as the framework in this study’s development.
Overview of Historiographic Method and Documentary Research
The discipline of history is, in essence, academic storytelling.626 David Henige writes:
It is not how assiduous the historian is in amassing evidence, or how
careful in assessing it, that matters, but the way he tells his story.
Through exposition, the historian’s evidence becomes his reader’s
evidence.627 (162)
Historians crave unexplored landscapes of the past, to reframe wider historical studies by
locating stories that have yet been told or not told from a particular perspective.  The rise
and near demise of Iraqi higher education, and the stories of its female students, is
engaging.  Yet, it is also an incomplete history. Middle Eastern scholars and comparative
education researchers have not generated thorough narratives addressing Iraqi higher
education and students’ experiences of this system.
What are historians tasked to examine and then present to their readers? History cannot
always put forth irrefutable facts.  For example, that, in 1991, the United Nations
imposed trade embargoes on Iraq is not in question. However, the impact sanctions had
on the Iraqi people cannot be directly measured nor fully understood by collecting data,
such as child mortality or university enrollment statistics, alone. In essence, historians are
expected to provide summations, cognizant of both their sources’ and their own
                                                
626 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 3rd ed. (London: Pearson, 2000), 93.
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objectivity. Mark Gilderhus states “using remnants of the past, historians reconstruct
history, employing statements of probability, not certainty.”628  The historian’s objective
is to address gaps, to “do their best to fill in the holes with inferences that seem
plausible.”629 Through the development of narratives, historians convey, “what it felt like
to observe or participate in past events.”630  As architects of scholarly narratives,
historians rely on quantitative and qualitative measures, as well as other disciplines’
approaches to their topic.631  We seek to “make connections, assign causes, trace defects,
make comparisons [and] uncover patterns” thereby indicating our study’s rightful place
in historical scholarship and its relevance to events today.632  Historians delve into
archives, municipal records, censuses, and personal letters and practice content analyses,
sequence coding, and measures of central tendency – all acceptable in historiography.
Documentary Sources: Classification and Evaluation
Historians rely on primary and secondary sources to secure evidence in relation to their
studies.  Primary source evidence requires rigorous evaluation. It may “represent narrow
or partisan perspectives … [or] were created intentionally to deceive.”633 While a narrow
interpretation of primary sources would be limited to event eyewitnesses alone, historian
                                                                                                                                                
627 David Henige, Historical Evidence and Argument (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
2005), 162.
628 Mark Gilderhus, History and Historians: A Historiographical Approach, 5th ed. (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 2003), 86.
629 Richard Marius and Melvin Page, A Short Guide to Writing About History (New York:
Pearson, 2005), 4.
630 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 93.
631 John F. McCarthy, “Two Views of Historical Criticism,” Journal of the Roman Theological
Forum 78 (November 1998): http://www.rtforum.org/lt/lt78.html
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John Tosh reminds us that: “sources more remote from the action have their own
significance.  The historian is often as interested in what contemporaries thought was
happening as in what actually happened.”634 Evaluation criterion such as this is
particularly relevant as I focus on Iraqi university women.  In many instances, events
happened to them rather than the women being actors in the event. Therefore, I am not,
for instance, studying female soldiers in the Iran-Iraq War but rather how the war
impacted female students.  A secondary source is, essentially “an analysis of primary
sources.”635 Many of the secondary sources in this study are theoretical in nature, such as
Nadje Al-Ali’s scholarship of contemporary Iraqi women.636
Discerning the bias in each source relates to data trustworthiness as well as identifying
perspective.  Keith Barton urges historians to not discount obviously biased evidence
because the values woven into that source assist our understanding of dominant or
competing ideologies.  Historians should remain mindful that:
[A] great deal of historical analysis is devoted to just this
question: What were the ideas, attitudes and beliefs of
people in the past? To answer the question, biased sources
must be used, because the bias constitutes evidence of
people’s ideas.637
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Nonetheless, when historians rely on biased evidence without seeking alternate accounts,
their own objectivity and researching skills can be called into question.  This issue is
especially pertinent to this study of Iraqi higher education. The Baath regime had little
vested interest in accurate reporting, especially in regards to human rights abuses and
citizen dissatisfaction. Saddam’s rule was based in ideology and, therefore, his self-
preservation banked upon the ideas of Iraq’s successes and adversaries versus what Iraqis
actually experienced.  Nor is Saddam alone in his misinformation campaign.  Other
governments and their agencies exploited and manipulated educational data “to document
successes.”638   One function of the interviews of university women is to provide a
counterbalance to the propaganda and possibly inaccurate information provided by the
regime-controlled Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research.
Primary and secondary sources may have an obvious, direct relation to the issue at hand
or may be classified as contextual. Contextual sources inform research by providing
pertinent and circumstantial evidence.  These sources are significant to this study as there
is limited targeted research on Iraqi higher education.   Contextual primary sources are
regularly put to use in a manner not intended by the author.639 An example of this is
government memorandums secreted out of Kurdistan in the 1990’s.  While their original
function was classified communiqués on supposed anti-Baath activities, they include
mention of university students and therefore enhance our understanding of Saddam’s
oppressive measures as they relate to higher education.
                                                
638 Benigno Aguierre and Roberto Vichot, “The Reliability of Cuba’s Educational Statistics,”
Comparative Education Review 42, no. 2 (May 1998), 118-138.
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Clearly, the historian’s practice is interpretive -- rarely can we return to the time and
place, seeking clarifications.  We must become comfortable writing amidst conflicting
ideas and incomplete stories. This intellectual milieu makes history intriguing as we are
challenged to put forth the most accurate and thoughtful accounts we can.  John Tosh
speaks of the “historian’s instinct” which is relied upon when encountering gaps in the
historical record – “matters of motive and mentality frequently fall into this category.”640
Historiographers must concede that history is unkempt.641  Evidence trails peter out, data
cannot be fully verified and people die with their stories unrecorded.  Again, historians
should make every effort to be both objective and thorough in their narratives. However,
as we evaluate historical studies, we must do so from the vantage point that “truths” in
the historical context are interpretations of the available evidence, filtered through the
researcher’s method and analytic eye.  Positivist concepts of Truth are rarely appropriate
to historical studies for the very fact that the truths we seek are those saturated in human
experience and expression.642
Data Sources
The data sources employed in this study of both primary and secondary nature can be
classified as such:
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• Government and regulatory agency documents.  For example, publications from
the MOHE, General Federation of Iraqi Women, UN or USAID Iraq
Reconstruction Project.
• University publications. For example, Baghdad University Journal of Medicine,
academic department websites or student newspapers.
• Media reports. For example, The Times Higher Education Supplement,
AlJazeera.net or PBS broadcasts of “Frontline.”
• “Watchdog” organizations. For example, Iraq Body Count, Human Rights Watch
or the British Council: Iraq.
• Books and referred academic articles.
• Interviews and personal communiqués.
Pertinent Definitions
Intersectionality is an epistemological approach positing that “the classical models of
oppression within a society, such as those based on race, gender, religion, sexuality,
class, and other markers of difference do not act independent of one another. Instead,
these forms of oppression interrelate.”643 This approach is regularly used in feminist
studies of humanities and social sciences. For instance, in studies of Middle Eastern
women, gender cannot be studied in isolation. We must also acknowledge their pertinent
national and ethnic identities to generate more accurate descriptions of lived experiences.
The term intersectionality has, for this study, been appropriated to also refer to those
                                                
643 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersectionality.
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external, interacting political, cultural and social influences impinging Iraqi universities
and female students.  As an illustration, emerging Iranian-based agencies in southern Iraq
affect the clinical practice available to University of Basra medical students.644
Inherent to historiography is the premise of restorying or creating the “metastory.”645
Textual evidence and other forms of data are potential narrative units, requiring thematic
and sequential coding as well as evaluation of their trustworthiness.  After analyzing data
for their significance, each narrative unit is woven into the appropriate context for the
study.646  Restorying is a data processing tool commonly wielded by historians. However,
restorying also occurs as narrative participants “externalize” their stories by sharing them
with the researcher.647  It is, therefore, dually practiced. Iraqi university women
reconstruct their memories and insights in response to assigned e-mail questions.  In turn,
I restory their narratives while writing a history of Iraqi higher education.
Interviews of Iraqi Women
The sources that are unique to this study are the university women’s narratives that
essentially become new primary sources.  Historical narratives, such as this, are both
incomplete and lackluster without “the ‘texture’ of dire affliction … felt in the gritty
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646 Ibid, 480 and 483.
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details of biography.”648 Therefore, the addition of interviews enjoins lived experiences to
historical events as well as social and political phenomena. By providing emotional and
reflective context, interviews help researchers “extend [their] intellectual…reach across
age, occupation, class, race, sex and geographical boundaries.”649 For this research,
interviews corroborate the documentary research.
Recruitment involved e-mail solicitations through Iraqi university students or alumni.
Approximately thirty women were suggested by existing contacts in Iraq or Iraqis abroad
and all were invited to participate in the research interviews.  There were few constraints
to research participation in an effort to cull multiple perspectives. The criteria for
research participants was the following:
• Participants must be female.
• Participants must have attended the University of Baghdad, University of Basra or
Technology University between 1979 and 2005 as either an undergraduate or
graduate student.  These three campuses were selected for their geographic
diversity, institutional size or specialized focus, as was the case of the University
of Technology, and researcher’s feasibility in maintaining consistent e-mail
dialogues. Studies of Kurdish universities are not included due to the semi-
autonomous Kurdish region which would have added considerable heterogeneity
to the research.
                                                
648 Paul Farmer. Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights and the New War on the Poor
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 31.
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• Participants must respond in English to assigned e-mail questionnaires. (English
is often the language of instruction in Iraqi university classrooms.)
Factors that did not influence research participation included field of study, degree
completion or current country of residence.  As a segment of the informed consent (see
Appendix D), participants were instructed that only their first names would be used in
this study and that aliases could be requested.  Eight women fully participated in these
interviews and a sampling of interview questions can be found in Appendix C.   E-mail
narratives are deconstructed for thematic coding. Therefore, interviews and interview sets
are not used in their entirety nor is this research a biographical case study.  Instead,
interview data inform and illustrate facets of an overall history of Iraq’s universities.
Travel to Iraq is currently not feasible, for both my own and the participating women’s
safety.  Iraqi women remain under a shroud of surveillance and judgment, especially if
seen interacting with westerners with, all too often, lethal consequences. The choice to
conduct e-mail based interviews was, therefore, partly generated from this rationale.
However, e-mail based interviews provided distinct benefits. This asynchronous
interview design allowed women to respond at their own pace (I asked that participants
respond within two weeks) and in a private context.  It seemed relevant that interviewees
provide only the information they wanted to share, because any censorship on their part
was also telling.  E-mailing in a country with unreliable electricity and internet access
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was not always convenient but certainly a better choice than traveling myself or hiring an
interpreter or interviewing assistant.  In the latter case, these occupations have
notoriously been targeted for murder in Iraq, a risk I was not willing to take.
Furthermore, the entire interview set consisted of nearly forty reflective questions that
would have required multiple, in person interviews.  I did not commit to this e-mail
research protocol without some reservations, namely how I would engender ether space
that invoked authentic and targeted responses.  However, I am confident that e-mails
allowed participating women to express, in their own time and their own words, their
perspectives on Iraqi higher education.  In the end, e-mails best suited my research
objectives, providing new data while not harming or endangering participants.
A period of reflection (which may be prohibitive in real-time interviewing)650 was
intentionally built into this research method because I sought emotional analyses and
memory recollection, both of which are not instantaneous processes. Therefore,
computer-mediated communication (CMC), in the form of e-mail, was the most
appropriate means of data collection allowing “researchers to capitalize on the ability of
the medium to cross time and space barriers which might limit FTF [face to face]
research.”651 E-mail based data collection also eliminates “transcription bias” whereby
                                                                                                                                                
(Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995), 3.
650 Chris Mann and Fiona Stewart, Internet Communication and Qualitative Research: A
Handbook for Researching Online (New York: Sage Publications, 2000), 17.
651 Ibid, 17.
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the entire narrative is transmitted as the respondent intended it and immediately ready for
coding. 652
Interview participants were placed on a “blind” e-mail list and sent questionnaires on a
two-week cycle.  A concerted effort was made to practice “progressive focusing”653
whereby interviews commence with general questions on family background and
educational status and then gradually focus on more sensitive or complex issues. The first
questionnaire requested basic biographical data such as year of birth, parents’
employment, hometown, Iraqi universities attended and programs of study as well as
familial status while enrolled.  Subsequent interview sets were thematically clustered,
focusing on professor-student relationships, social opportunities, professional
development and career tracking phenomena, for instance.  The last few interview sets
were “era clustered” asking women to retell their experiences in regards to living under
one or more of the following events: Saddam’s regime, Iran-Iraq War, First Gulf War,
sanctions, Second Gulf War and Occupied Iraq.  Employing Rubin and Rubin’s
“responsive interviewing” technique,654 I occasionally asked for clarifications and
elaborations from respondents, recognizing that the interviewee and interviewer
participate in a “dynamic and iterative process.”655
                                                
652 Ibid, 22.
653 Fiona Leach, “Researching Gender Violence in Schools: Methodological and Ethical
Considerations,” Paper presented at the World Congress on Comparative Education Societies
(Havana: WCCES, October 25 – 29, 2004), 4.
654 Herbert Rubin and Irene Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing, 15.
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Interviews may contradict one another in terms of historical events and political and
social phenomena.  One woman may express that the Baath presence on campus was
acutely apparent while another may have rarely noticed it.  Gilderhus justifies this as
“divergent renditions result in larger, complementary forms of understanding in which
one enriches and animates the other from separate vantage points.”656 I recruited as many
participants as possible so that I could write from a multi-faceted perspective, the
historiographic equivalent of triangulation.  University women participants may
contradict themselves in a singular interview or their interview data set.  However, these
interviews should not be discounted on that basis alone. Participants are sharing their
recollections, insights and the meaning they took away from witnessing a particular
event.  These are highly subjective processes that cannot be verified solely by empirical
measures. A more appropriate model for this historical study is Interpretive
Constructionist Theory where the means by which people interpret events is equally or
even more relevant than the actual event itself.657 Again, historians engage in interpretive
work, analyzing the significance witnesses took from episodes or phenomena in their
own lifetimes. Rubin and Rubin write, “In this sense, multiple, even conflicting version
of the same event or object can be true at the same time.”658
Ollerenshaw and Creswell succinctly describes the critical elements of narrative inquiry
which are pertinent to the interviews in this study:
                                                                                                                                                
655 Ibid, 15.
656 Mark Gilderhus, History and Historians, 86.
657 Herbert Rubin and Irene Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing, 27.
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• The researcher recognizes the significance of learning from those who
participated or witnessed the event.
• The narratives become data.
• The researcher should identify key themes, arrange data chronologically and both
deconstruct and restory the data.
• There is a level of collaboration between the researcher and the researched in
fashioning meaning and sequence ordering.659
The Truth about Realities and the Realities of Truth
The academic community is sometimes wary of anti-naturalist interpretations of truth,
especially as they relate to narratives.  The Personal Narrative Group writes “[o]ur
academic disciplines have more often discouraged us from taking person’s life stories
seriously.  Disciplines have…done this by elevating some kinds of truth – the kinds that
conform to established criteria validity – over others.”660  Yet, validity is not a suitable
approach to historical research.  Instead, we are more likely to rely on the “historian’s
truism” as proposed by Mark Gilderhus.  Simply put, “different people in different times
and places literally saw and experienced the world differently.”661 The experiences
restoried in this study cannot be replicated, which is one reason this research is both
                                                                                                                                                
658 Ibid, 27.
659 Jo Anne Ollerenshaw and John Creswell, “Narrative Research: A Comparison of Two
Restorying Data Analysis Approaches,” Qualitative Inquiry 8, no.3 (June 2002): 331-332.
660 Personal Narratives Group, “Truths,” in Interpreting Women’s Lives: Feminist Theory and
Personal Narratives, ed. Personal Narratives Group (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1989), 262.
661 Mark Gilderhus, History and Historians, 5.
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significant and engaging.  We must acknowledge that Iraqi university women acted and
reacted in manners that made most sense to them at that time.662  In doing so, we are
asserting a “positive valuation of the subjective.”663 This is best explained through a
lengthy passage from the Personal Narratives Group:
When talking about their lives, people lie sometimes, forget a lot,
exaggerate, become confused, and get things wrong.  Yet they are
revealing truths.  These truths don’t reveal the past “as it actually
was,” aspiring to a standard of objectivity.  They give us instead the truths
of our experiences…Unlike the reassuring Truth of the scientific ideal,
the truths of the personal narratives are neither open to proof nor
self-evident.  We come to understand them only through interpretation,
paying careful attention to the contexts that shape their creation and the
world view that informs them.664
The theoretical underpinnings for the concept of truth for this study are as follows:
• We cannot evaluate women’s voices in the context of a male-oriented value
system, whether that is Middle Eastern or western in perspective, without tainting
our interpretation of their experiences.
• We cannot genuinely hear women’s voices from a feminist perspective that is
wholly western. This fails to embody the feminist objectives and struggles
pertinent to Iraqi women.
• We cannot evaluate competently the Iraqi system of higher education from our
position saturated in western academia.  Iraq’s universities are both similar to and
radically different from their American counterparts.665
                                                
662 Virginia Olesen, “Feminisms and Models of Qualitative Research,” in Handbook of
Qualitative Research, ed. Norman K. Denzien and Yvonna S. Lincoln (Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications, 1994), 161.
663 Personal Narratives Group, “Truths,” 263.
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Women, indeed all people, come to know and express their truths from their individual
experiences of shared realities.  While the event that occurred may not be in dispute, the
significance taken away is highly subjective.  As the researcher, I must remain conscious
of the gaze I bring to my study of Iraq -- a western educated feminist and higher
education scholar.
Study Limitations
The research scope of this study is limited by my inability to safely travel within Iraq as
well not speaking Arabic. While research participants maintain functional literacy in
written English (as most have had English-based coursework, in various formats, since
middle school), cultural-linguistic barriers remain a potential obstacle.  Forces of culture
imbue the significance we give to particular words. I must recognize that research
participants and other authors of textual evidence are writing from their “sensory
worlds,” not mine.666 For instance, my notion of university student services – residential
housing, student activities, academic advisement and so forth – may not translate into
Iraqi students’ concepts of the same.  Furthermore, my relationship with research
participants is “consultative,”667 our e-mail dialogues are premised upon the fact that I am
seeking information.  Therefore, university women who engage in this study may choose,
                                                                                                                                                
664 Ibid, 261.
665 Expanded upon from Virginia Olesen, “Feminisms and Models of Qualitative Research,” 161.
666 Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966), 2.
667 Nina Brown, “Edward T. Hall: Proxemic Theory, 1966,” Center for Spatially Integrated
Social Science, http://www.csiss.org/classics/content/13.
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in this non-intimate relationship, to withhold some information and emotive discourses
because that is what feels like appropriate distance for them.
However, the greatest research challenge is securing Iraqi governmental, MOHE and
individual campus documents.  Since 2003, Iraq’s universities and the Ministry have been
repeatedly looted and torched, resulting in the loss of pertinent documents.  Every effort
has been made to access available textual evidence. As mentioned earlier, the credibility
of some documents must be questioned due to corrupt Baath reporting. “Contingency
governs the writing of history,” emphasizes David Henige.668  This dissertation’s data is
contingent upon the documents I can secure and then choose to use or disregard; the
analysis in this study is contingent upon my own limitations and biases as the
researcher.669  Some collected textual sources, upon review, were omitted from this study
because I was not able to verify seemingly dubious data or claims.
The use of narratives and biographical data from participant women also encounters some
limitations.  Hala Fattah, Stephanie Platz and Gibson McGuire elaborate:
Autobiography is not really an Iraqi genre because over the past
forty years, dictatorship and foreign wars have colluded to raise
self-censorship to a level of survivor’s art, to where the
reconceptualization of the past has been portrayed as subversive.670
                                                
668 David Henige, Historical Evidence and Argument, 9.
669 Ibid, 9.
670 Hala Fattah, Stephanie Platz and Gibson McGuire, “An Oral History of Iraqi in Iraq and the
Diaspora,” American Academic Research Institute of Iraq (2005), www.taarii.org/research.php, 1.
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Yet specifically because so many records and documents have been destroyed, Iraqis
must rely on spoken evidence and their memories to stand in for official documentation
of their status, participation and struggles.671  While this may raise positivist concerns of
validity, “the historian’s business is to construct interpretations of the past from its
surviving remains.672
Researcher’s Background and Intent
My studies in higher education regularly focused on marginalized student populations,
women’s experiences of higher education as well as comparative higher education
studies.  In 2003, I assumed the position of Gender Specialist for the Al Sharaka Program
for Higher Education in Iraq, based at the University of Oklahoma.  This USAID funded
grant, in collaboration with the Oklahoma Higher Education Partnership, provided
$4,000,000 in assistance to Iraq’s MOHE as well as five Iraqi universities.  As this grant
program came to a close and I began to conceptualize a dissertation topic, I realized the
unique opportunity before me.  In discussions with numerous Iraqi university women, I
repeatedly heard the complaint that westerners neither understood how robust Iraqi
higher education had once been nor the realities of Iraqi women’s lives.
Dissertation advisors suggested I consider only one political-military event and its impact
on Iraqi higher education.  However, as I delved further into the research, I realized how
appropriate the intersectionality model was.  It is impossible to gauge the repercussions
                                                
671 Ibid, 1.
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of the Second Gulf War on the University of Baghdad, for instance, absent of the role
Saddam and sanctions also played.  I believe this study to be unique in focus, exploring
the multiple and interacting political, cultural and social factors as they manifested
themselves on Iraqi campuses.
The additional focus on Iraqi university women results from my studentship in women’s
studies and research projects on women’s access to higher education.  I maintain a robust
doctoral candidate research record in women’s narratives of higher education, especially
populations struggling to complete their studies.  Admittedly, personal experiences
etched themselves into the development of my dissertation.  As a doctoral student and
working mother, I have endured numerous challenges to completing my Ph.D.  As a child
raised by State Department and USAID officers in the Developing World, I maintain a
keen interest in comparative studies, especially as they relate to women’s authentic
opportunities to learn and participate fully in civil society.
I remain critical of the CPA and affiliated agencies’ efforts to stabilize and rehabilitate
Iraq, including its universities.  We, the American government and our predominantly
distracted intellectuals, have not so much exported democracy as forced the Iraqis to
submit to an agenda that is neither rational nor altruistic.  In the end, this has allowed
terrorist agencies operating within Iraq to tie nationalist causes to their resistance.
However, I remain a proponent of American universities “exporting” precepts of
                                                                                                                                                
672 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 55. Italics mine.
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academic freedom along with appropriate material and financial donations.  Learning can
always take us further than we could have imagined but only when we assert our
collective right to open inquiry.  To confine learning opportunities to geography and
ideology is a transgression for which few of us should expect redemption.
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APPENDIX B
Significant Events in Modern Iraqi History
1918 – 1932 British Mandate Period
1932 – 1958 Monarchy Rule
1937  Saddam Hussein born in Tikrit.
1949 Syrian teachers working in Iraq begin to disseminate Baathist ideology.
1956 University of Baghdad is founded. Saddam joins the the ABSP.
1958 ‘Abd al-Karim Qassem overthrows Iraqi monarchy and declared the
 new ruler.
1959 Pan-Arab Iraqi military officers lead an unsuccessful revolt against
Qassem who reacts by attempting to purge Iraq of Baathists. Saddam is a
member of an assassination team that fails to kill Qassem and must flee to
Syria.
1961 – 1963 University students lead nationwide protests denouncing the Qassem
regime.
1963 Qassem is overthrown and a Baathist regime is put in place which is
replaced nine months later by a more moderate Baathist government
which supports pan-Arab socialism.
1964 University of Basra is established under the auspices of the University of
Baghdad system.
1967 After the Six Day War, Iraqi Baath protest their government’s support of
pan-Arab nationalism over that of Iraq’s.
1968 On June 17, the ABSP and military officers depose the moderate Baath
government.  The Revolutionary Command Council is now the ruling
body of Iraq and led by ABSP Secretary General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr.
He also commanders the army and is named president.  Saddam Hussein
becomes the deputy chairman of the RCC and director of internal security.
1970 Ministry of Higher Education is established.
1972 All Iraqi petroleum assets are nationalized.
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1974 University of Technology established as a vocational-technology center.
Unprecedented attacks against the Kurds take place in retaliation for their
attempts to become semi-autonomous.
1977 After a failed Shia cleric demonstration against the RCC, nearly 200,000
Shia are stripped of their national papers and possessions and deported to
Iran.
1979 Iran’s Islamic Revolution is followed by al-Bakr’s removal from office
and being placed under arrest.  Saddam Hussein becomes the new Iraqi
President and immediately executes one-third of the RCC.
1980 Saddam declares war against Iran, which will last eight years.  This war,
which killed an estimated 300,000 Iraqis, will be Iraq’s most deadly
conflict.
1988 Saddam commences the Anfal Campaign, gassing over 1200 Kurdish
villages.
1990 Saddam boasts to the international media that he has massive weapon
capabilities and denounces Gulf States for their inexpensive petroleum
prices.  Later that year, Saddam invades Kuwait and effectively controls
the government and all Kuwaiti assets.  UN Security Council Resolution
660 condemns the invasion.  UN Security Council Resolution 661 instates
sanctions that prohibit purchasing “all commodities and products
originating in Iraq and Kuwait” by any Member State.
1991 When Saddam refuses to withdraw from Kuwait by the date imposed by
the UN Security Council, Iraq is bombed and invaded.   
1992 Heavy US, British and French bombing takes place in southern Iraq as
Saddam refuses to comply with UN Resolution 668.  This is followed by
bombings in and around Baghdad for non-compliance with weapon
inspections teams and a failed assassination attempt on President George
H. Bush. The Saddam regime promises $10,000 for any foreigner killed
inside Iraq.  A series of laws are passed that declare amputation the
appropriate punishment for theft and dereliction of military duties.  When
doctors announce their refusal to perform these punitive amputations a
subsequent law is drawn up promising doctors will face amputation if they
do not comply.
1996 The Oil-for-Food Program allows Saddam to sell oil in exchange
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for basic commodities.
2003 Allied Invasion of Iraq begins in March, followed by CPA
oversight. Saddam Hussein is captured in December.
2004 CPA  turns national governance back over to the Iraqis and
elections are held.  Insurgents destabilize civil society in major cities.
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APPENDIX C
Sampling of Interview Questions
Questions were clustered thematically and distributed, via email, on a two-week cycle in
spring 2006.   They were posed for open-ended responses and in some cases, follow-up
or clarification dialogues took place. The following is a sampling of distributed interview
sets.
Biographical Data
• City of origin
• Institution attended, degree sought, undergraduate and graduate data
• Parents’ occupations
• Familial status during studenthood
• Working status during studenthood
Academic and Professional Choices
• What were your career ambitions as you were growing up?
• How did your parents influence your choice of university?  Did they influence
your career choice?
• I know that students are admitted into the university based entirely on their
baccalaureate exam scores.  Regardless of where you went to university and what
you studied, what university was your first choice and what did you want to
study?
• Did you ever want to be a professor and why did this career appeal to you?
Academic Interactions
• How did professors treat students and how did students treat their professors?
Were you encouraged to ask questions or debate issues in class? Did you visit
with professors in their offices or meet with them outside of the classroom?
• Were male and female students treated differently?  Please share examples.
• Did you have an advisor or mentor on campus?  If so, how did they help you?
• Is academic advising (for instance, choosing a major) or tutoring offered on your
campus?
Student Engagement
• A 2003 UN Report (UNESCO) said Iraqi universities offer the following services:
psychological counseling, nurseries, sports facilities and health programs. Does
your campus offer these?  What services are provided at each? Would you (or
have you) used these campus services and why?
• Did your campus offer career counseling or job placement?
• On a weekly basis, how often did you use the university cafeteria, library and
computer labs?  What, if anything, prevented you from using these facilities?
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• Did your campus have student publications, such as a newspaper?  What topics
were written about?
• Were you involved in any student organizations?  Please discuss the purpose of
these organizations.  Were there barriers to developing student organizations?
• What were the larger social events held for university students?
• Did you socialize with other students?  Please discuss how you spent your time
when not studying or working.
• What are your best memories of your university days?  Also, please discuss the
times that were most difficult and why.
Student Life under the Baath Regime
• In your estimation, how did Saddam improve and/or harm Iraqi higher education?
• Were some students given easier admission standards or higher grades because
they were connected to Baath leadership? Can you provide an example?
• As you applied for or were admitted into the university, were you required to sign
any statement saying you supported the Baath party? If so, please provide details
on what this document looked like.
• Do you think the Baath government supported some academic departments more
than others?
• I have read documents that said some university classes were taught in Arabic
while others were taught in English.  Please give examples of classes that you had
in Arabic followed by those given in English.
• I know that undergraduate students were required to take a class in Arab social
studies. Please tell me what this class was like, providing examples. What were
your impressions of this class?
• Please provide examples of programming and activities the Baath Student
• Union held on your campus and what kind of students joined?  Did you join?
Why or why not?
• Please discuss the General Federation of Iraqi Women.  Did the GFIW have any
projects or influence on your campus?
• In your classrooms, could you openly discuss what you thought about Saddam
Hussein and the Iraqi government?
• Please discuss surveillance measures on your campus.  Were students and faculty
asked to report on the activities of their peers?
• Do you remember a time when students were harassed or arrested by the police or
Revolutionary Command Council?
• What items did Saddam prohibit to be on campus and why?
• One author I have read claims there was a program to inject young women with
fertility drugs, especially during the Iran-Iraq War.  Is this a rumor or possibly
true? Why or why not?
• I know that Saddam improved the status of women in many ways.  I also know he
did many things to damage their freedoms and opportunities.  Please provide your
opinion on Saddam’s treatment of women and how it impacted your life.
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• What year do you remember starting to use the internet and e-mail?  What were
your impressions of the internet?
Sanctions Era
• Please provide examples of how sanctions directly impacted your university
studies.
• During sanctions, which items were the most difficult for you to get?
• How did sanctions make you feel about your university education and your
professional opportunities?
• How did Saddam respond to sanctions?
• During sanctions, did you want to study abroad or attend conferences? Were you
prevented you from these opportunities?
• Please give your opinion on the impact sanctions had on Iraqi women.
Universities since the Allied Invasion (2003)
• What are your thoughts when seeing American or British troops on your campus?
• What is university life like now for female students?
• Please describe any damage done to your campus since the Allied Invasion.
• Please describe an average day in your life as a university instructor or student
since March 2003.
• What role do Islamic and/or Islamist groups play on your campus today?
Seeking Insight and Solutions
• What do you want Americans to know about Iraqi women and Iraqi universities?
• What are some of the more frustrating aspects of your university and its policies
and practices?
• Please make very direct suggestions on what improvements should be made to
your universities and who should make them.
• If you could make recommendations to your professors on how they could
improve their teaching methods, what would these suggestions be?
• What do you think about the Iraqi system for admitting students into the
university?  Do you think other factors, beside your baccalaureate exam score,
should be considered by the Ministry of Higher Education?  What would these
other factors be?
• Many western universities have campus women’s centers.  These centers are for
female students to have meetings, develop organizations and discuss issues such
as rape, women’s health and establishing equality with men. Many of these
centers also offer a mentoring program where female faculty and graduate
students mentor undergraduate women as well as undergraduate women serving
as “big sisters” to high school girls.  Women’s centers often have a computer
center and small library (focusing on diverse women’s issues) also. Would a
women’s center be a good idea on your campus? Why or why not?  Which of the
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above services would you use and what additional services would you want the




CONSENT LETTER (CONFIDENTIAL PARTICIPANTS)
Dear Iraqi University Woman:
I am a PhD student in the Adult and Higher Education Program at The University of Oklahoma,
under the advisement of Dr. Rosa Cintron.  I invite you to participate in a research study being
conducted under the auspices of the University of Oklahoma-Norman Campus and entitled Iraqi
Women’s Experiences of Higher Education, 1979 – 2005.  This is a historical dissertation that
examines the effects sanctions, war and autocracy had on female Iraqi university students.  You
have been selected as a potential participant because you attended the University of Basra,
University of Baghdad or Technology University between 1979 and 2005.
Your participation will involve answering, via e-mail, a series of open-ended questions about
your experiences as a university student. Questions will be emailed to you on a two week cycle
over a period of three to four months.  Each email should take no more than twenty minutes for
your response.  It is understood participants will reply the best of their ability, given the current
situation in Iraq (this study also includes expatriate Iraqi women).  Your involvement in the study
is voluntary, and you may choose not to participate or to stop at any time.  The results of the
research study may be published, but your name will not be used.  Instead an alias (code) will
replace your name. Your identity will not be associated with your responses in any published
format.  However, I cannot assure confidentiality of email responses.  After the completion of the
dissertation writing process, emails will be removed from my University of Oklahoma email
account and also wiped from my computer’s hard drive.  I will keep printed copies of all emails
indefinitely.  However, these will be maintained in a locked file system in my home in which no
other person has access.
The potential risk in this study includes emotional recollections of your collegiate experiences
through the email writing process.  The benefit of this study is to improve scholarly
understanding of the impact wars, sanctions and insecurity have on university services and
learning.  The findings from this project will provide information on how sanctions, war and
autocratic rule impact higher education with no cost to you other than the time it takes for the
survey.
If you have any questions about this research project, please feel free to contact me at
etweathers@ou.edu or (405) 325-4202.  Questions about your rights as a research participant or
concerns about the project should be directed to the Institutional Review Board at The University
of Oklahoma-Norman Campus at (405) 325-8110 or irb@ou.edu.
Thank you for your consideration!
Erin Taylor Weathers





ABSP Arab Baath Socialist Party
CPA Coalition of Provisional Authority
GFIW General Federation of Iraqi Women
ISU Iraqi Student Union
MOHE Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
MOWA Ministry of Women’s Affairs
RCC Revolutionary Command Council
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations
UNHCHR United Nations High Commission for Human Rights
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
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Appendix F
Expertise of Scholarly Sources
This dissertation contains approximately one hundred and fifty sources.  In an effort to
not disrupt the historical narrative’s flow, academic expertise is rarely mentioned in the
main text.  Instead, I have grouped together academic authors below, according to their
field of study.  Many of these scholars have interdisciplinary expertise, as it relates to
Iraq, but I have listed most only once. Journalists are not included in this appendix but are
cited in References.
MOHE Personnel and Iraqi University Staff









J. Thomas Owens, Tammy Boyd and Erin Taylor Weathers
Keith Watenpaugh, Eduoard Metenier, Jens Hanssen and Hala Fattah





Vanessa Pape Bouche (Master’s Thesis)
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